SERGEANT FRED TENORE - WORLD WAR II ACCOMPLISHMENTS – MAY 26, 1941 TO JULY 27, 1945

Fred Tenore was born on July 7, 1921, to immigrant parents Michele Luigi Tenore and Concetta Tenore (born Magnotta) both of Andretta, Avellino, Campania, Italy. Michele and Concetta were married on September 26, 1907 and emigrated from Napoli on April 27, 1910, to New York on May 11, 1910 on the ship Duca Degli Abruzzi. Newark, New Jersey became their new home.






LIST OR MANIFEST OF ALIEN PASSENGERS FOR THE UNITED

The crossing took several days to complete and there were a large number of Italians onboard, most of them seeking a new life in America. The *Duca degli Abruzzi* (not to be confused with the Italian destroyer involved in WWII) belonged to the **Navigazione Generale Italiana Line**, and covered the transatlantic line between Italy and the Big Apple. During its numerous crossings between 1908 and 1922, the *Duca degli Abruzzi* transported almost 67,000 passengers to a new life in America.

Fred was one of seven children including brothers Fancesco, Domenico and Mario and sisters Giovannina, Antonietta and Marcellina. He had the pleasure of growing up in a big city during the roaring twenties and, unfortunately, he also felt the pain of the stock market crash and the start of the Great Depression in 1927 when he was six. Those were tough times for everyone but it also prepared them for tougher times yet to come.

By the mid-1930's the great depression had ended, people were employed and dreaming again (Fred Tenore eventually became a laborer and presser in a garment factory) …. but although the US was once again on its feet, World War I, the war to end all wars, was quickly becoming a distant memory as Germany once again began to assert its power in Europe.

By the spring of 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt began rapid expansion of military forces for the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Roosevelt signed the Selective Training and Service Act (STSA) of 1940 on September 16 creating the country's first peacetime draft and formally established the Selective Service System as an independent Federal agency. The World War I conscription system served as a model for that of World War II. The 1940 STSA instituted national conscription in peacetime, requiring registration of all men between twenty-one and forty-five, with selection for one year's service by a national lottery. In the massive draft of World War II, 50 million men from eighteen to forty-five were registered, 36 million classified, and 10 million inducted.


REGISTRATION CARD

SERIAL NUMBER — 1. NAME (Print): FRED (First) (Middle) TENORE (Last) — ORDER NUMBER

2. PLACE OF RESIDENCE (Print): 422 So. 10th St. Newark Essex N.J.
(Number and street) (Town, township, village, or city) (County) (State)
[THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE GIVEN ON THE LINE ABOVE WILL DETERMINE LOCAL BOARD JURISDICTION; LINE 2 OF REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE WILL BE IDENTICAL]

3. MAILING ADDRESS: Same

4. TELEPHONE — 5. AGE IN YEARS: 24 — DATE OF BIRTH: July 7 '21 — 6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Newark (Town or county) N.J. (State or country) — 7. OCCUPATION: Unemployed

8. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON WHO WILL ALWAYS KNOW YOUR ADDRESS: Mrs. Concetta Tenore (mother) Same Add.

9. EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

10. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS
(Number and street or R. F. D. number) (Town) (County) (State)

I AFFIRM THAT I HAVE VERIFIED ABOVE ANSWERS AND THAT THEY ARE TRUE.

D. S. S. Form 1 (Revised 6-9-41) — Fred Tenore (Registrant's signature)


REGISTRAR'S REPORT

DESCRIPTION OF REGISTRANT

RACE		HEIGHT (Approx.)		WEIGHT (Approx.)		COMPLEXION	
White	✓	5'8"		185		Sallow	
		EYES		HAIR		Light	
Negro		Blue		Blonde		Ruddy	✓
		Gray		Red		Dark	
Oriental		Hazel		Brown	✓	Freckled	
		Brown	✓	Black		Light brown	
Indian		Black		Gray		Dark brown	
				Bald		Black	
Filipino							

Other obvious physical characteristics that will aid in identification: Tattoo mark on right shoulder

I certify that my answers are true; that the person registered has read or has had read to him his own answers; that I have witnessed his signature or mark and that all of his answers of which I have knowledge are true, except as follows:

Elizabeth Galletta (Signature of registrar)

Registrar for Local Board 38 Essex N.J. (Number) (City or county) (State)

Date of registration July 30 1945

Local Board No. 38 Essex County 22 018 JUL 30 1945 45 Branford Place, Room 204 Newark 2, N.J.

(The stamp of the Local Board having jurisdiction of the registrant shall be placed in the above space)

Fred Tenore never registered for the draft. Figuring the draft would get him sooner or later and he might as well get his time over with, Tenore enlisted on May 26, 1941 at the age of nineteen. (His official Draft Registration Card shown here was issued after his discharge at the end of the war in 1945 at the age of 24). While at the time of enlistment it might have felt like winning the lottery to be assigned to paradise in the Hawaiian territory in peacetime, no one foresaw what was coming later that year. Hawaii's history as a strategic military location had been building for quite some time.

Pearl Harbor: A short history before Dec. 7, 1941

Polynesians have inhabited the Hawaiian Islands for centuries. Hawaii was discovered relatively late by Europeans. The first visit by westerners to the islands was in 1778 when the British Captain James Cook arrived.

The English ship Butterworth, under Captain William Brown, entered Honolulu Harbor in 1793. Captain Cook passed it on his famous voyage in 1778, but did not enter because there was coral at the entrance of the harbor.

It was the native Hawaiians who originally called the Pearl Harbor area, "Wai Momi," meaning "Water of Pearl". It was also called "Puʻuloa". Pearl Harbor was the home of the shark goddess Ka'ahupahau and her brother (or son) Kahiʻuka. The gods were said to live in a cave at the entrance to Pearl Harbor and guard the waters against man-eating sharks.

Kaʻahupahau is said to have been born of human parentage but to have changed into a shark. These gods were friendly to man and it is said that the people of Ewa whom they protected would keep their backs scraped clean of barnacles. The ancients depended on Kaʻahupahau to protect the harbor's abundant fish ponds from intruders.

The harbor was teeming with pearl-producing oysters until the late 1800s. In the early days following the arrival of Captain James Cook, Pearl Harbor was not considered a suitable port due to a coral bar obstructing the Harbor entrance.

It was whaling, sugar and pineapples that first brought Pearl Harbor to America's attention.

At the whaling industry's peak in 1846, nearly 800 whaling vessels made port calls in the Hawaiian Islands, mostly U.S.-flagged ships, according to Navy history and heritage command. The Navy was ordered to send regular patrols around the islands to protect the commercial whaling ships from pirates or rival nations.

The impact on Hawaii, an exotic land where natives farmed and fished for centuries, was dramatic. Ship repair facilities cropped up, and Honolulu and Lahaina became bustling towns catering to hungry, thirsty and sometimes rowdy sailors. Bakeries, laundries, carpenter shops, blacksmiths and boarding houses sprang up overnight, according to a Navy history command account of those years. Business was booming.

Just when it seemed the growth would never stop, it did. The discovery of oil in 1859 in Pennsylvania devastated the whaling industry, since the need for whale oil for lamps and other uses drove much of the demand. The Civil War then devastated what was left of the fleet. The Confederate ship Shenandoah pursued Yankee whaling ships into the farthest reaches of the Pacific, successfully sinking many of them, in an effort to knock the air out of the Union economy.

By the late part of the 19th century, Hawaii's whaling boom was over.

But Washington didn't lose interest in using Hawaii as a toehold in the Pacific. The Civil War may have helped kill the whaling industry, but it provided Hawaii with another economic opportunity and America with another chance at getting a Pacific port. The North's boycott of Southern sugar led to an expansion in imports from Hawaii, helping to make sugar plantation owners rich. Pineapples would emerge as Hawaii's second-largest export crop.

At about the same time, Washington was growing more interested in establishing a more robust naval presence in the Pacific. Hawaii was a natural choice.

John M. Schofield

Barton S. Alexander

Maj. Gen. John Schofield and Brevit Brigadier Gen. B.S. Alexander arrived in Hawaii in 1873 aboard the USS California on a secret mission "to examine the defensive capabilities and potential commercial facilities of the Hawaiian Islands," the Navy history said. "With one exception there is no harbor on the islands that can be made to satisfy all the conditions necessary for a harbor of refuge," Schofield wrote. "This exception is the harbor of the 'Ewa' or 'Pearl River.' "

Two years later, as part of the Reciprocity Treaty between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom of 1875 as Supplemented by Convention on December 6, 1884, and ratified in 1887, the United States agreed to allow Hawaiian sugar to enter the United States duty-free in return for a pledge that Hawaii would not lease the Pearl River to any other country, thus, obtaining exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor inlet. Naturally, the sugar barons put pressure on King Kalakaua to sign the treaty. In return, the United States got what it viewed as access to a well-defended port in the Pacific.

In testimony before the House of Representatives, Schofield said Pearl Harbor would be an ideal harbor for a modern navy, said Steve Twomey, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who wrote Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack.

“However, you have to understand the term ‘modern navy’ meant in the era before airplanes," Twomey said in an interview.

The harbor was sheltered with a narrow approach, which made it easily defendable from attacking ships. That terrain feature would, of course, become a vulnerability, as the fleet was bottled up and getting out meant navigating a narrow channel.

Though Hawaii—and Pearl Harbor—remained independent from the United States, American warships frequented the region, bringing with them advisories from the United States government on how to govern and conduct relations with foreign traders. The United States may not have had official control over Hawaii or Pearl Harbor, but its influence was greatly persuasive.

Despite decades of peaceful business dealings, conflict entered the picture. In 1893, Euro-American business leaders formed the Committee of Safety and staged a coup d'etat against Queen Liliuokalani in hopes of forcing annexation by the United States. Outnumbered by US Marines, the monarchy was defenseless and the coup succeeded, putting in place a provisional government headed by members of the Committee.

After the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States annexed Hawaii and, in the years following, "began to look more seriously at the need for an American military presence in the Pacific," the Navy history said. Following annexation, work began to dredge the channel and improve the harbor for the use of large navy ships. Congress authorized the creation of a naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1908. By 1914 other bases housing U.S. Marines, as well as Army personnel, were constructed in the area around Pearl Harbor. Schofield Barracks, constructed in 1909 to house artillery, cavalry and infantry units became the largest Army post of its day.

In the early years of the 20th century, Pearl Harbor remained more of an outpost than the major naval base it would become in the years leading up to World War II, Twomey said. The islands had no oil or coal, and U.S. ships did not make it a permanent base. "Everything the Navy needed had to be imported from the West Coast," Twomey said.

It was a high point for the Navy and American global power. President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the Great White Fleet, consisting of 16 battleships, to circumnavigate the globe in 1907. Among the young officers participating in the cruise was Adm. Husband Kimmel, who would be commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet when Pearl Harbor was attacked more than three decades later.

The base expanded gradually during the early part of the 20th century. By 1911, the channel to Pearl Harbor had been dredged enough to allow large vessels to navigate it, according to the Navy history. The USS California was the first deep-draft ship to navigate the channel.

Expansion work at Pearl Harbor was not, however, without controversy. When construction began in 1909 on the first dry dock, many native Hawaiians were outraged.

According to legend, the shark god lived in the coral caves under the site. Several collapses of the dry dock construction were attributed by the engineers to "seismic disturbances" but the native Hawaiians were sure that it was the shark god who was angry. The engineers devised a new plan and a kahuna was summoned to appease the god. Finally, after years of construction problems, the dry dock was opened in August of 1919.

The Harbor Expands 1919 to 1941

In 1917 Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor was purchased for joint Army and Navy use in the development of military aviation. Over the following two decades, as Japan's presence in the world as a major industrial and military power began to grow, the United States began to keep more of its ships at Pearl Harbor.

In addition, the Army's presence was also increased. As the navy assumed full control of Ford Island, the Army was in need of a new base for its Air Corp station in the Pacific, thus construction of Hickam Field began in 1935 at the cost of over $15 million.

Pacific Fleet Established

When the war in Europe began to rage in the late 1930's and tensions between Japan and the United States continued to increase, the decision was made to hold the Navy's 1940 fleet exercises in the area of Hawaii. Following those exercises, the fleet remained at Pearl. On February 1, 1941, the United States Fleet was reorganized into separate Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

The newly formed Pacific Fleet was permanently based at Pearl Harbor. Further improvements were made to the channel and by mid-1941, the entire fleet was able to be birthed within the protective waters of Pearl Harbor, a fact not unobserved by the Japanese military command. A coaling station, Marine barracks, an ammunition magazine, hospital and submarine base were soon added, the Navy history said.

The decision to base the new Pacific Fleet at Pearl forever changed the face of Hawaii. Both the military and civilian workforce increased dramatically. New defense projects meant new jobs and thousands of workers moved to the Honolulu area from the mainland. Military families became a major group in the already diversified culture of Hawaii.

Assignment - Oahu, Hawaiian Island Territory

After enlisting May 26, 1941, Fred Tenore was one of two and a half million men to be processed through Army Replacement Training Centers in the United States. Following a few weeks of basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he was assigned to the Army Mobilization Training Camp at Schofield Barracks on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, as a member of the 89th Field Artillery Regiment. Constituted on 1 October 1933 in the Regular Army, it was redesignated as the 89th Field Artillery Battalion and assigned to 25th Infantry Division. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion was activated at Schofield Barracks in the Hawaiian Territory on 1 October 1941, making this Fred Tenore's first assignment after completing basic training. They were responsible for deployment, maintenance and use of a number of 105 mm howitzer cannons in support of ground forces.



The Pacific Fleet had been established one month earlier and the reinforcement and protection of the United States presence in the Pacific was of paramount importance. In addition to the harbor in the Pearl River, major military installations on Oahu included the Hickam Field Army Air Corps bomber base, Wheeler Field fighter squadrons, Ford's Island Naval Air Station, Bellows Field near Kanoehe, the Ewa Marine Corps Station as well as Schofield Barracks, Fred's new home.

M2A1 – 105MM Howitzer



It is one of the most recognizable artillery pieces ever made. The M2 howitzer was slowly developed during the long pause between World Wars. Upon its introduction in 1940 (as the M2A1) it was a powerful and accurate gun often deployed at the battalion level. Its sterling performance in North Africa, the Pacific, China, Italy, and Western Europe cemented its reputation with the US Army and Marine Corps. By 1945 over 10 000 were manufactured by Rock Island Arsenal and many were kept in storage or exported to NATO members and allies as surplus. After the World War II the M2A1 was redesignated as the M101. Production continued until 1953.

This field howitzer fought an unbroken succession of wars in four continents from 1941 until the present. This left it ample time to impact the development of both towed and self-propelled howitzers. Its familiarity with US artillerymen was so entrenched by the time it was upgraded and renamed the M101A1 in 1964 the improvements were met with criticism from veteran crews who preferred the same howitzer that dated to the last World War.

Like other 20th century towed artillery pieces the M101 was the sum of four vital components: these were the barrel assembly, the breech, its carriage, and trailer. Since it was designed in the 1930s peculiar features like the splinter shield and a short barrel remained unchanged for many, many years. But what made the M101 innovative during its heyday was it being designed to be pulled by trucks and not horses. Its hydro pneumatic recoil system placed above the barrel was distinctive as well. Despite its quaint appearance the M101 was a reliable weapon with astounding adaptability. It functioned in different climates and remained in step with technological breakthroughs decades after it entered service.

The M101's career is far from over. It remains in the arsenals of at least a half dozen Latin American countries and is found throughout Asia. Whether marking a national holiday with a salvo or pounding terrorist camps in the Southern Philippines the M101 hasn't become redundant. With its literal impact on modern history it is apparent the roar of the M101's thunder will echo for years to come.

Early History of Schofield Barracks

The 14,400 acre site, located between the two major mountain ranges on Oahu, which was to become Schofield Barracks was ceded to the U.S. Government on July 26, 1899, less than a year after Hawaii was annexed to the United States. In December of 1908, construction began of a temporary cantonment on the Waianae-Uka military reservation, initially constructing tents for the officers and men, followed by temporary wooden barracks. The cantonment was informally known as Castner Village among military personnel. In April, 1909, the War Department chose instead to name the post after the late General John M. Schofield, former Commanding General of the U.S. Army.

In 1910 the United States Army District of Hawaii was formed at Schofield Barracks. Originally under the jurisdiction of the Department of California, it became a department in the newly organized Western Division and in 1913 the Hawaiian Department was formed as an independent command under the War Department. Schofield Barracks' population numbered about six thousand men by 1914, with the 1st Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Regiment, and 4th Cavalry all garrisoned at Schofield. In April 1917 the United States of America entered the World War I in Europe and soon all of Schofield Barracks was called to war.

Following the war to end all wars, the Hawaiian Territory remained a key strategic military location in the Pacific. The 'Hawaiian Division', activated in 1921, was organized under a square structure of the World War I divisions. In 1941 its major units consisted of the 21st Infantry Brigade, comprised of the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments; the 22nd Infantry Brigade comprised of the 27th and 35th Infantry Regiments; and the 11th Field Artillery Brigade, comprised of the 8th, 11th, and 13th Field Artillery Regiments. (Elements of all seven of these regiments would eventually serve with the 25th Division).

In 1940 as war threatened, the Army concluded that the square division was too cumbersome for modern warfare and adopted a new triangular division design of three infantry regiments, four field artillery battalions plus support troops. At Schofield Barracks on 1 October 1941 the Army activated two triangular divisions, designated the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, using the units of the Hawaiian Division.

The 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments and the 11th and 13th Field Artillery were assigned to the 24th Division. The 27th and 35th Infantry Regiments and the 8th Field Artillery were assigned to the 25th Division. The Hawaiian Division's support units composed primarily of the 3rd Engineer Regiment, the 11th Quartermaster Regiment and the 11th Medical Regiment were reorganized and redesignated as separate battalions and assigned to the two new divisions.

To provide the third infantry regiment the 25th was assigned the 298th Infantry Regiment of the Hawaiian National Guard called to federal service in 1940. The first Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division was Major General Maxwell Murray who as a Brigadier General commanded the 11th Field Artillery Brigade of the Hawaiian Division.



Moving In

When Fred Tenore arrived in the early fall of 1941, the Hawaiian Division military installations were buzzing with a mix of peacetime activities and constant operational readiness maneuvers. One of his fellow soldiers, author James Jones, was stationed for two years at Schofield with the 27th Infantry. His observations of Army life and the December 7, 1941 attack were later the basis for the book "From Here to Eternity." The 1953 movie version starring Montgomery Clift, Deborah Kerr, and Burt Lancaster was filmed at "C" Quad on Schofield Barracks.








The Boxing Bowl - Conroy Bowl, Schofield Barracks

It may not look like much - a low-slung, barn-like, octagonal shed set on a coconut-and plumeria-dotted lawn in the heart of Schofield Barracks, but Conroy Bowl is burned indelibly into the memories of thousands of GIs.

The originally roofless amphitheater with seating for 10,0000 on concrete benches was dug out in 1923 as an entertainment venue for off-duty soldiers (movies, concerts, roller skating, boxing and basketball) and a briefing locale for about-to-be-deployed battalions, brigades and whole divisions. The “boxing bowl,” as it was called then, drew regular weekend crowds to its popular intra-Army boxing matches.

Because of the confluence of social and political factors, the history of Western boxing in Hawaii has three separate eras.

- The first is the **Bootleg Era**. From 1893-1929, boxing was legal in Hawaii only if sponsored by the military. In town, the police rarely tried to enforce anti-boxing legislation, but the threat was always there. This severely restricted civilian boxing.
- The second is the **Territorial Era**. From 1929 to 1959, boxing was legal throughout the Territory of Hawaii. A territorial commission supervised bouts in town, but the US military continued to exert considerable control over life in and around Honolulu. The YMCA, the Catholic Youth Organization, and the Honolulu newspapers all supported boxing, and through their patronage, the Territorial Era became the Golden Age of Hawaiian boxing.
- The third is the **Statehood Era**. From 1959 to the present, boxing has been legal in the State of Hawaii. The state boxing commission continued to supervise bouts in town, but the military, church groups, and newspapers gradually withdrew their patronage. Meanwhile, jet planes made it unnecessary for boxers heading for Australia or Asia to spend a few days in Honolulu en route, and network television broadcasts hurt local fight clubs by introducing televised boxing from the Mainland. The professional market withered, and so, since statehood, most Hawaiian boxers either have been amateurs or made their reputations outside the state.

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Mid-Pacific American Base That Boasts of All-American Boxing Team—Post Has the Largest Covered Army Arena in Which Boxers Representing Every Race and Color Compete—Col. Sandman's Outfit Has High Class Boxing Talent

By LT. K. S. VANDERGRIFT

OUT in the mid-Pacific on the Island of Oahu, Hawaii, boxing in the Army is doing an SRO business at all times. And in the Hawaiian group, the biggest boxing program is being dished up at famous Schofield Barracks, one-time home of the Hawaiian Division, and current home for thousands of young, hard-hitting, well-conditioned American soldiers.

Commanded by popular Colonel O. E. Sandman, a famous University of California all-around athlete, Schofield Barracks has made a remarkable recovery in an athletic program that was shelved on the fatal December 7 attack by the Japs. No post in the Army has the facilities to promote the big shows that are regular weekly features in the Army-famed Red Lands of Oahu Island.

Schofield has a 10,000 seat covered arena popularly referred to as the sockatorium. The big fight arena sets down in a natural bowl and is below street level at the highest seat. Covered over and walled in, the arena seats 10,000 for boxing and over 8,500 when converted into a theater. Over 8,500 seats are permanent concrete seats, while the remainder are portable ringside folding chairs.

The big arena is blacked out so that fights can be held at night under the Hawaiian martial law that allows no lights to show at night. Smoking is permitted, since the Army authorities have worked out an ingenious system of blackout ventilation.

Schofield Barracks not only has the largest permanent fight arena in the Army, it has a set-up that allows perfect match-making along all-American lines. Soldiers at Schofield represent every known race and color and all share and share alike in the ring, in the stands and at all athletic events. The winner is cheered; the loser gets his share of cheers for having made it a great fight.

There is no racial prejudice and out of nine champs crowned in January, two were colored boys and two were American of Japanese descent while another was a Filipino. A big Samoan

SCHOFIELD'S ALL-AMERICAN BOXING TEAM—*The Schofield Barracks Recreation Office has concluded a six weeks' boxing program that attracted more than eighty thousand fans into the big Oahu Island sockatorium. The scrappers who fought their way into the finals have been labeled the Schofield "A" team and will compete in a series of home-and-home team matches with stables from the C.Y.O., Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Naval Air Station. A second program will get underway, providing six more weekly cards, and then the champs of the second program will meet the first program champs, now on the "A" team, for the All-Schofield crowns. The "A" team members are shown here.*

Back row, left to right—Post Commander Colonel O. E. Sandman; Tuuloina See, light-heavyweight, American Samoa; Clarence Bender, middleweight, Kauai, T. H.; Jack Apperson, Blue Field, W.Va., welterweight; Sal Siena, welterweight, New York City; Richard Kato, VVV, middleweight, Honolulu, T. H.; Bert Harris, light-heavyweight, Junction City, Ga.; Lieut. Col. J. A. Sabiston, Post Recreation Officer. Front row, left to right—Joe Matsunaga, VVV, flyweight, Honolulu, T. H.; Aoki Hoshigo, VVV, featherweight, Hilo, T. H.; Tiger Tanaka, VVV, featherweight, Honolulu, T. H.; Eddie Reyes, bantamweight, Hilo, T. H.; Ted King, lightweight, Philadelphia, Pa.; Howard Dorsey, Jr., welterweight, Philadelphia, Pa.; Manuel Bunda, bantamweight, Waialua, T. H.; Wallace Naguo, VVV, flyweight, Honolulu, T. H.

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

During the Territorial Era, boxing tournament were scheduled weekly. While scrapbooks like the one to the right can be found in private collections, there are few public records and photos from the summer of 1941. Following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the arena was blacked out so that fights could be held under cover of darkness under the Hawaiian martial law that did not allow lights at night. The ingenious methods taken by Army personnel to allow boxing to go on included a system of blackout ventilation that even allowed attended to smoke.

Popular family folklore includes Fred Tenore among the active boxers during his stay at Schofield Barracks. Could that be him in the ring or pictured with another boxer and their seconds before a scheduled bout?

The 25th Infantry Division

The 25th Infantry Division was activated on 1 October 1941 at Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii. Only two months later the Division would see its first combat on 7 December 1941 and take the first casualty of the war. While the Division itself was brand new, the majority of its assigned components were well-trained professional Regular Army units, which had served at Schofield Barracks for decades with the Hawaiian Division.



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Triangular Division Structure – 1941



Source: John Sayen, *US Army Infantry Divisions 1942-43*

The Division Patch - "TROPIC LIGHTNING"

DESCRIPTION: On a red taro leaf, 2 7/8 inches (7.30cm) in height, and 2 inches (5.08cm) in width at the widest point, with stem up, surrounded by a 1/8 inch (.32cm) yellow border, a yellow lightning flash per pale 1-13/16 inches (4.60cm) in height.

SYMBOLISM and BACKGROUND:

- The Division's shoulder patch, a lightning bolt superimposed on a taro leaf, was formally adopted during late 1943.
- The 25th Division had used "Lightning" as the telephone code-name for the Division Headquarters since its arrival on Guadalcanal in December of 1942.
- The "Lightning" epithet was adopted because the Japanese found it difficult to pronounce the letter "L".
- The Marines called the unit the "Lightning Division".
- "Lightning" was subsequently changed to "Tropic Lightning", as the Division had spent the year in the tropics.
- The taro leaf of the shoulder patch is reminiscent of the birth of the 25th from elements of the famous Hawaiian Division. It is also suggestive of the Pacific Region where the Division was established, and where it had fought.
- The taro plant has arrow-shaped leaves, often brilliantly colored, and is native to the Pacific isles.
- The rootstock of the taro plant is edible, its pulp being similar to that of a potato. It is used in the preparation of poi, a staple of Hawaiian cuisine.
- The bolt of lightning symbolizes speed and aggressive spirit.
- The colors of red and gold were those of the late Hawaiian Monarchy.

The Day that Lives in Infamy

December 7, 1941 was a lazy Sunday morning – a typical day of rest following the Saturday night celebrations with shore leave in Honolulu and weekly boxing matches at Schofield Barracks – a good day to sleep in.

There were 130 vessels of the US Navy's Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Ninety-six of the Pearl Harbor ships were warships. Almost all were at anchor with thousands of sailors asleep in their bunks. Eight of these were battleships, seven of which were lined up along Battleship Row.





A:Oil storage tanks

B:CINCPAC headquarters building

C:Submarine base

D:Navy Yard

9:Ford Island NAS

10:Hickam field - The bombers at Hickam Field were perfectly lined up on the tarmac as if ready for inspection – and nothing else.

1:USS California

2:USS Maryland

3:USS Oklahoma



4:USS Tennessee



5:USS West Virginia

6:USS Arizona

7:USS Nevada

8:USS Pennsylvania

Tora, Tora, Tora …

At 7:40 AM, as a Japanese dive bomber peels away, the torpedo he dropped hits the USS West Virginia and the first of many explosions is heard across the island. (This picture was found torn to pieces at Yokusuka Base by photographer's mate 2/C Martin J. Shemanski of Plymouth).

The sounds of diving planes, gunfire and explosions caused great confusion.

Many wondered who in their right mind would call for unannounced exercises on a Sunday? But reality set in quickly.

It was the beginning of the first seemingly endless day of a global war. The Japanese sneak attack would come in waves.



Instead of the calculated attack plan trained for by the Japanese airmen, the sight of the Harbor, in all its morning glory, was too much and the aircraft dove on in - ahead of schedule and all at one.

The first wave attacked at 7:40AM, concentrating fire on "Battleship Row", taking American sailors and civilians by complete surprise, while putting the six airfields out of commission.

Bombs, torpedoes, machine gun and cannon fire erupted from every angle and billowing black smoke choked the air. Spilt oil did its job along the Harbor waters.

Many died before they knew what had transpired.

While the Army installation at Schofield Barracks was not a prinipal target, it was caught in the crossfire as Wheeler Field and her aircraft, a primary target, were destroyed. Recorded by the 25th Infantry Division Association on their website at https://www.25thida.org/division/pearl-harbor/, details of that day at Schofield Barracks are presented here.

The 25th Infantry Division on December 7, 1941

The Japanese Attack*: Approaching from the east at approximately at 0800 hours on December 7th the Japanese attacked Wheeler Field employing 25 Aichi Type 99 Val dive bombers from the aircraft carrier Zuikaku each carrying a 250 kilogram general purpose bomb. They were accompanied by 14 Mitsubishi Zero fighters from the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu to provide air cover for the Vals.*

Zuikaku at Kobe on 25 September 1941 after launching

Hiryū at anchor in Yokosuka, shortly after completion in 1939

A6M2 "Zero" Model 21 of *Shōkaku* prior to attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

D3A "Val" dive bombers preparing to take off from an aircraft carrier for the attack on Pearl Harbor; *Sōryū* is in the background.



Aichi D3A1 from carrier *Akagi*.

The Japanese dive bombers made an initial attack run dive bombing on Wheeler from low altitudes on the parked aircraft, the hangers and the barracks inflicting heavy damage and casualties of thirty-six killed and seventy-four wounded. The Vals then circled back and made a strafing run on the airfield joined by the Zeros. Forty of the P40s were totally destroyed in the attack. Thick black smoke from the destroyed P40s obscured the parked P36s from the air, consequently only six were destroyed. But approximately fifty aircraft were seriously damaged or were already out of commission due to lack of parts leaving only twenty-seven P40s and sixteen P36s flyable.

As the Japanese aircraft finished their strafing runs on Wheeler they flew over Schofield Barracks at low altitudes strafing the Engineer, Infantry and Artillery quadrangles, as well as certain officer's quarters and the post hospital inflicting some structural damage as well as personnel casualties both killed and wounded. Either two errant Japanese bombs or US Navy anti-aircraft shells struck Schofield. One hit a corner of the Engineer quadrangle and one hit the parade ground in front of the Commanding General's quarters causing no casualties.

For Fred Tenore, it was a morning he will never forget. Fifty-five years later, he hesitantly spoke about it in an interview with a local paper in Florida –

Fred Tenore was eating the usual, eggs, for breakfast in the kitchen of the Schofield Barracks on Dec. 7, 1941, before it was a day that would live in infamy, when he heard "Planes! Planes! Planes!"

Then at 7:53 a.m., in the rainy paradise where soldiers dreamed of being stationed, came a surprise shower of bullets.

Tenore ran to the window, and outside saw a man from his battery, shot and bleeding on the ground. He ran outside and tried to pick him up. Another soldier came out to help, and together they dragged him to the medics as planes buzzed above.

"When I was carrying him over, I could just see the bullets go by," said Tenore. "Our pursuit planes were getting bombed left and right."

Later they found out the soldier's name was Frenchie, but by that time he was dead.

This photo was taken at Schofield Barracks the moment of the attack described by Fred. As you can see, everyone is running away to the right except for two soldiers in the foreground running towards a fallen comrade to the left. One of them might just be Fred Tenore running to the aid of Frenchie.

"Frenchie" was Pvt Walter R. French of the Medical Department on duty with the Dental Corps. He was from Houston, Texas, having enlisted in February of 1940. Frenchie and three others killed that day at Schofield Barracks were memorialized at the USS Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor and in a December 22, 1941 LIFE Magazine article, "Killed In Action – These Men Fell First at Hawaii". The First to Fall in Hawaii". (In the article he was listed in error as a Sergeant from Ohio).


LIFE

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



At both Schofield and at other locations the 25th Infantry Division suffered a total of two killed and seventeen wounded according to available documents from the National Archives. Most Schofield casualties occurred in the Artillery quadrangles which received the brunt of the strafing. Private Walter R. French, 89th Field Artillery Battalion became the 25th Infantry Division's first Soldier to be killed in action in WWII. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion also suffered five wounded and the 8th Field Artillery Battalion had four wounded. The 35th Infantry Regiment had three wounded. The 27th Infantry Regiment and the 325th Quartermaster Battalion each had one wounded.

Away from Schofield, Private Tarao Migita of the 298th Infantry Regiment was killed in Honolulu by an errant navy anti-aircraft shell. The 298th Infantry Regiment and the 65th Engineer Battalion each had one wounded at two other locations.

The 24th Infantry Division suffered one killed and nine wounded, seven of which occurred in the Artillery quadrangles. Corporal Theodore J. Lewis, 63rd Field Artillery Battalion became the 24th Infantry Division's first Soldier to be killed in action in WWII. Japanese planes also strafed the adjacent town of Wahiawa killing two civilians and wounding nine.

***The American Response**: With Wheeler Field under heavy attack precluding any American aircraft from taking off, seven pilots drove to a dirt auxiliary air strip at Haleiwa on the north shore of Oahu. Here were located three P40s and four P36s. The aircraft were fueled and armed and were quickly airborne. These Army pilots engaged and shot down eight, possibly nine Japanese aircraft.*

After the first wave attack ended seven pilots in P36s and one P40 managed to take off from Wheeler. They pursued the departing enemy, shooting down two aircraft while losing one of their own. At 0930 hours nine Zeros that had attacked Bellows Field as part of the second wave attack made a strafing run on Wheeler and Schofield as they were heading back to their carriers. Tragically one of the Haleiwa P36 pilots who had shot down two enemy aircraft was inadvertently shot down and killed by ground fire as he flew low over Schofield. By 1000 hours Japanese aircraft were departing the skies over Oahu.

Division units in the field had live ammunition and used it in firing at the attacking planes. Major General Maxwell Murray, Commanding General of the 25th Division, had the foresight to secure permission of the Hawaiian Department to allow the units of the division at Schofield to store small arms ammunition in the company-level arms rooms to facilitate movement to the field in case of a full alert. In some units this enabled highly motivated personnel to draw weapons and ammunition to return the fire of the strafing aircraft from the ground and from the quadrangle roof tops. As Japanese aircraft flew over, they were met with a combination of ground fire from light machine guns, rifles and even pistols. It was believed that at least one possibly two Japanese aircraft that crashed in Wahiawa were brought down by this ground fire.



Available official documents show that at least three soldiers were decorated by the 25th Division for bravery during the attack. As depicted in the movie From Here to Eternity by the actor Burt Lancaster, Technical Sergeant William O. Gower, 27th Infantry took a machine gun and ammunition to the roof of the 27th Infantry quadrangle and engaged strafing aircraft, at first cradling it in his left arm, then mounting it on a tripod. He remained on the roof throughout the attack. Another 27th Infantry soldier, Corporal Edmond F. Lynagh, also mounted a machine gun and although wounded remained to direct his squad in firing at the Japanese aircraft until the attack was over. Staff Sergeant Irwin W. Krambeck, 8th Field Artillery Battalion standing in the open in the Division Artillery quadrangle took the enemy aircraft under fire with a Springfield rifle. All three received the Purple Heart which at that time was awarded for meritorious acts as well as for wounds.

Part 2: EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS

Members of the 25th Infantry Division who were eyewitness to history made on that disastrous day relate below their memories of the time during the attack, as well as the times prior and following. Individual ranks shown are as of December 7, 1941. Most advanced to higher ranks either as non-commissioned or commissioned officers during World War II.

As described herein these Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division were well trained to take defensive actions within the scope of the plans for defending Oahu against enemy ground forces landing on the beaches. Most of its members had served in the Hawaiian Division and had participated in frequent practice alerts. As it was a Sunday most were off-duty and some were off-post on pass or leave. All were totally surprised on this peaceful Sunday morning when the sounds and sights of war shattered the silence.

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION UNITS IN THE FIELD BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACK

- *Corporal Steve Rula, company clerk in Company C, 27th Infantry didn't get too excited about an alert on November 27, 1941 that sent them to the field. But this alert was different. For the first time they were issued live ammo. Company C set up camp in tents near Ft. Shafter. The unit was assigned to guard the municipal water works, Hawaiian Electric power plant, railway station, and Honolulu docks against sabotage. On the morning of December 7, 1941 Corporal Rula, like many other Soldiers, was in the chow line when he noticed what he thought was the Navy taking anti-aircraft practice. Sergeant Earl T. Kirk a former artilleryman yelled, "Practice hell, practice shells make white smoke — that's black!" Breakfast was over — the war was on.*

- *Living in tents in the hills, building concrete machine gun emplacements, and spreading barbed wire for months prior to the attack is what heavy mortar section leader Sergeant Clem S. Seroski of Company H, 35th Infantry remembers doing. All part of a defensive strategy for Oahu focused on repelling an amphibious assault. At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack Seroski was preparing to go on an armed motor patrol with machine guns mounted on vehicles and live ammo. When the bombs began dropping he was ordered to return fire. Random fire at Japanese planes produced no known hits. The patrol was cancelled to "await further orders". They were sent to defend Wheeler Field later that day.*

- *Private First Class Walter C. Porter, a rifleman in Company C, 27th Infantry was in Honolulu on anti-sabotage duty armed with a shotgun. He had just returned to a rest area. At 0700 on December 7th he was preparing to go out again on an armed patrol. One hour later he was ordered to return fire on the Japanese planes. Company B, 27th Infantry was also set up on the Honolulu waterfront to conduct anti-sabotage duty. Private First Class Donald Burrows, the company bugler, was just coming off guard duty at the Mutual Telephone Company. Returning to the Command Post he heard a bugler to his west sound the "Call to Arms". Every bugler hearing it is ordered to repeat the call. He grabbed his bugle and was about to repeat when a new young officer in charge told him to put the bugle down until the phone rings with orders from higher up. "Consequently", says Burrows, "no outfit east of us heard the Call to Arms."*

- *Company A, 27th Infantry was also on anti-sabotage duty in Honolulu. The Company Commander 1st Lieutenant Harold F. Brunschwein and 99 of the 128 men in his company were camped in a park near Fort DeRussy in Waikiki. They had sufficient arms and ammunition to deter possible sabotage, but not to resist an enemy amphibious assault. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry commander ordered Lieutenant Brunschwein to double the guard and send a vehicle to pick up additional ammunition. The First Sergeant was dispatched to Schofield to bring back the rest of the company and a truckload of ammunition.*

  All of the units that were on duty in defensive positions around Pearl Harbor and Honolulu during the attack were suddenly and perilously in harms way themselves from strafing and shrapnel from enemy bombs and errant navy anti-aircraft artillery shells. They could only watch as the U.S. Navy ships were damaged and sunk by Japanese bombers and torpedo planes. They witnessed Hickam Field, home of Army Air Corps heavy bombers, taking a similar pounding. Hangars and planes on the ground were being destroyed and people were dying. Feelings of helplessness, horror, and anger were expressed by many witnessing the carnage and destruction.

- *1st Lieutenant George F. Carter the 90th Field Artillery Battalion Motor and Ammunition Officer writes in his WWII memoirs (paraphrasing) of leading his ammunition train of about twelve 2-1/2-ton trucks all day and night from the ammunition magazines to his battalion's defensive positions. One driver, Private Judy, exemplified the spirit of the men by driving, without relief and uncomplaining, with a recently broken arm. On one run that night to Aliamanu Crater near Ft. Shafter in total blackout*

conditions, we were struck by the full impact of what had happened to the fleet. The battleship Arizona, burning from end to end with half collapsed main mast, along with other ships ablaze, lit up the evening sky and the harbor like it was daylight. Many other seriously damaged ships sat on the bottom of the shallow harbor with hulls and superstructures protruding above the waterline. Another mighty battleship, the Oklahoma, was capsized. Certainly hundreds had died, writes Lieutenant Carter.

- *Private First Class Philip K. H. Kam, a clerk-typist with the 65th Engineer Battalion Headquarters and Service Company was at home on pass. He was awakened at 0800 by the bombs exploding. PFC Kam drove through billowing smoke and flying shrapnel on Waipahu Rd. to report for duty. He was back at Schofield Barracks in 25 minutes.*

- *On the eastern side of Oahu, Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion was in the field on a construction site near Kaneohe Naval Air Station. Most of the company was in Honolulu on pass. About 30 were in camp according to Corporal Camellus Cappelluzzo and Private Alwyn H. King both of whom had just finished breakfast when the Japanese planes swooped down on Kaneohe, home of the Navy's PBY long range patrol aircraft. Hangers were destroyed, planes exploded on the runways, and smoke billowed. King says one Japanese plane dove down and strafed the path between the rows of their tents, "but he was a bad shot." Company B was ordered back to Schofield to guard the motor pool. By morning on the next day, Dec. 8, they were in foxholes near Pearl Harbor.*

UNDER FIRE AT SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Most of the 25th Division Soldiers at Schofield Barracks had just finished breakfast or were in the chow line when Japanese planes attacked Wheeler Field and then swept over Schofield strafing the quadrangles and other facilities. Some of the men were still in their bunks, others were getting dressed, or shaving. Some were on there way to church services—the usual Sunday morning activities. No where was the element of surprise made any more vivid than it was at Schofield.

- 89th Field Artillery Battalion Private Fred Tenore's story was introduced on page 16. In the blink of an eye he went from the breakfast table to the aid of Private Walter R French, the first man killed in action in the war. It never slowed down after that. During an interview in 2006, the memories of that day, and the days following in the gritty thick of war, came slowly to Tenore, then 85, who has barely ever told his family about his four years of service in the 25th Infantry Division. He had to shake the cobwebs off them to remember, a very difficult and emotional task after fifty-five years of trying to forget.

  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he just remembers everyone working, preparing for the invasion they were convinced would come. For weeks after he was stationed at the beach on the losing end of a barb-wire fence that stretched down the sand.

  "The way I understood it was that there was only one gate," said Tenore. "If the Japanese bombed us, that was the only gate out."

- *27th Infantry members Private First Class Charles M. Earlywine and Private First Class Frederick H. Edinger of Company F, Private First Class Thomas F. Conlon of Company G and Private Chester J. Lukawty of Company L, were among those at breakfast with Tenore. Edinger says he woke Acting First Sergeant Armstrong. They were issued weapons and ammo and Armstrong told them to get on the roof and return fire. In just a matter of minutes, Lukawty was on the roof with his BAR firing at the planes.*



SCHOFIELD BARRACKS UNDER ATTACK – DECEMBER 7, 1941

- *Private First Class Harry N. Stinley of Company D and Sergeant Roger L. Newcome of Company M, 35th Infantry were machine gunners. Stinley is one of several who said they had to "break the heavy padlock off" to get weapons and ammo out. Stinley said he thinks he "might have scored a hit on one of the planes."*

- *First Sergeant Emile Matula, Sr. of Co. M also recalled that "we had to break in with axes". Access to weapons and ammo was a problem in several units preventing a quick response to the attack. He states that the "NCOs took charge with solid performance under fire". 1st Lieutenant Delbert E. Munson of Service Company, 35th Infantry was asleep when the attack began. Arriving at the Motor Pool he found no casualties, but the machine gun strafing had set four half-ton trucks on fire. He ordered all remaining trucks taken out and dispersed.*

In the distance there were sounds and flashes of explosions. Machine gun bullets from the Japanese planes were striking the Quadrangle buildings. Return fire from machine guns and rifles on the rooftops and the ground joined the acrimonious noise of battle. There was no safe place.

- *Private First Class Charles O. Clements of Headquarters Battery, 25th Division Artillery saw a very low flying plane firing on two of our soldiers who were running between Quadrangle buildings.*

- *Corporal Manlon A. Sawdey of Headquarters Battery, 8th Field Artillery reported being fired at while on his way to the Motor Pool.*

- *Private First Class Roland W. Nee also of Headquarters Battery, 8th Field Artillery was ordered from the mess hall to the Motor Pool to get the trucks and guns assembled to move out. Troops were ordered to set up defensive positions around the Motor Pool and return fire on the Japanese.*

"WHEELER IS BURNING!"

Over at Wheeler Field the sky was filled with dark smoke and the sounds of the exploding bombs and of machine gun fire could be easily heard throughout Schofield Barracks.

- *From the 3rd floor of the barracks Private Rene L. Provost of Company F, 35th Infantry could see bombs exploding and streaking tracers flying at Wheeler.*

- *Company E, 35th Infantry had moved out to a hillside where Private Marvin Moore saw the oil storage tanks at Wheeler bombed and exploding into columns of fire and smoke.*

- *Then 17 years old, Private Charles Powell of Battery B, 8th Field Artillery recalls his most vivid memory was seeing the Japanese planes dropping bombs and blowing up Wheeler.*

- *Private Herbert G. Hunt, Jr. of Company K, 27th Infantry snapped a photo with his Brownie Box camera of the smoke rising from Wheeler.*

- *With no weapon or ammo issued to him, Corporal Albert W. L'Heureux, a truck driver with the rear detachment of Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion at Schofield was ordered to the motor pool to get a truck and drive to Wheeler to help transport the wounded to the Schofield hospital. Devastation greeted him there. L'Heureux recounted how rows of tents that were set up outside the hangers to*

house new troops were strafed as Wheeler was bombed. Bodies of the dead were taken on truck beds to the Schofield cemetery. After the attack some Company B personnel including Corporal Maurice A. Storck were sent to help defend the key road along the Pali cliffs through the mountains from the eastern side of Oahu to Honolulu with orders to blow it up if the Japanese invaded.

STORIES INSIDE THE 25th INFANTRY DIVISION'S FIRST COMBAT IN WWII

Within the Hell of the greater experience of combat there are many actions and events taking place. They are sometimes serious, sometimes humorous, but always an important part of the greater picture.

- *Sergeant Kenneth C. Nine, a platoon sergeant in Company F, 27th Infantry was sitting on the ground in front of the barracks when the Japanese planes came over Schofield. Sergeant Nine had been relieved of duty and was scheduled to return to the Mainland for reassignment on Monday, December 8, 1941. Sergeant Nine had been partying all night until 0500 with five others who were also "going home" on Monday. Nine says, "my Commanding Officer told me to get in the saddle because I wasn't going anywhere". Sergeant Nine was suddenly alert and 'all soldier' again–breaking the supply room doors, getting machine guns, weapons, and ammo, and heading for the roof top.*

- *Intense desire to fight back and anger was evidenced by men futilely firing weapons at the Japanese planes—weapons that were not likely to bring the planes down. Corporal Bronsil L. Metz, a gunner in the 90th Field Artillery Battalion saw Captain Dailey firing his .45 caliber pistol at the planes as he was running across the parade ground.*

- *Sergeant Boyce Huson of the Division Headquarters and Military Police Company remembers seeing Private First Class Ledgerwood standing in the Quadrangle firing a Springfield rifle at attacking airplanes.*

- *1st Lieutenant George F. Carter of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion relates the story of his Battery Commander "Pop" Warner running out of his house and standing on the lawn in his pajamas, firing his .45 caliber pistol at the Japanese planes.*

- *On guard duty near the Ewa gate, Private Charles K. Day of the Division Headquarters and Military Police Company was ordered to return a work detail of prisoners to the Stockade. Traveling under the flight path of the attacking planes Day safely returned the prisoners. He recalled being on alert for 2 weeks—an alert that for him terminated the evening of Dec. 6th.*

- *Private Donald Hall of the same company tells of an officer from the Division Intelligence (G-2) section saying the planes were American until a burst of machine gun fire from one of the planes narrowly missed them.*

- *1st Lieutenant John Fahey, Executive Officer, Battery C, 64th Field Artillery Battalion lived off-post in a rented house in Wahiawa with five other officers. The evening of December 6th was spent at the Officers Club's weekly dance, followed by partying at home into the early morning hours. Sleeping soundly in the a.m. of Dec. 7th, the sound of explosions, walls trembling, and windows shivering didn't get Fahey up. The yell "you guys, the Japs are bombing Pearl Harbor" had them all outside in seconds. The sight in the distance was of planes looking like a swarm of angry wasps circling and diving, bombs exploding, and ant-aircraft artillery bursts peppering the sky. Back inside radios were blaring, telephone ringing and all getting the message — "Alert Level Three (All Out) is in effect — Report for duty at once". En route Fahey saw a Japanese pilot leaning out of the cockpit of a plane flying low overhead. In Wahiawa*

he saw a downed Japanese plane. He witnessed civilians crying and screaming after their bus had been strafed. At Schofield he found the barracks empty, drew a pistol and three clips of ammo then joined the rest of the battalion all loaded up and ready to roll.

- *An ammo handler and truck driver in the 90th Field Artillery's Service Battery, Private Leon Cohen, remembers a Browning Automatic Rifleman wounding himself when he accidentally dropped his weapon which discharged. In his memoirs Lieutenant George F. Carter confirms the wounding of the BAR man during the attack on Schofield.*

- *Corporal David I. Breedlove of the 35th Infantry, Corporal Bronsil L. Metz of the 90th Field Artillery, Private First Class Roland W. Nee of the 8th Field Artillery and Corporal John Petrone of the 27th Infantry were among those who told of seeing Japanese planes go down.*

For some December 7th 1941 started as "business as usual".

- *While the Japanese planes were strafing Schofield and working in an atmosphere of disbelief, Private James M. Proxmire of the Medical Detachment, 35th Infantry was operating the Regimental Dispensary.*

- *Private John R. Nugent of 325th Quartermaster Battalion was waiting for the bus to Honolulu.*

- *Sergeant Roger R. Boyer, 65th Engineer Battalion and his battalion commander Major Reeves were about to start a scheduled tour of Pearl Harbor!*

- *According to an entry in Lieutenant George F Carter's memoirs, Lieutenant Mort Loomis, an officer in the 90th Field Artillery Battalion who was on leave, slept through the entire attack in his room at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Waikiki.*

Back at the Schofield Barracks Quad, exhausted, confused and angry soldiers dropped to the ground holding rifles that had just been released from under lock and key at the armory. Ammunition was belatedly finding its way to the rifles and now the soldiers were locked and loaded, but the enemy was gone. It was too little and too late

AFTER THE ATTACK — AND THE DAYS THAT FOLLOWED

Within the first few hours that followed the surprise attack, descriptive words like shock, confusion, disbelief, disarray, were quickly being replaced with words like order, sense of purpose, discipline, commitment, readiness. Under the circumstances that prevailed on that morning, the 25th Infantry Division demonstrated an impressive ability to recoup and execute the defense plan.

***Defense of Oahu**: Under the Oahu defense plan the 24th Infantry Division had responsibility for the northern half of Oahu and the 25th Infantry Division had responsibility for the southern half of Oahu including Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. The 27th Infantry Regiment was responsible for the southeast portion of Oahu including Honolulu. The 35th Infantry Regiment had the defense of Pearl Harbor, the southwest and western portion of Oahu and the 298th Infantry Regiment the eastern shore of Oahu. The Hawaiian Department went to Alert Level 3 as the attack occurred and as early as 0930 units of both divisions began quickly moving to their assigned defense sectors.*

In a short time, weapons, ammunition and gas masks, had all been issued. With full field packs troops were ready to move out. Trucks and drivers were soon in position to transport the men to the field. Most units were in the field in predetermined defensive positions within three hours of the attack. Non-Commissioned-Officers performed in an exemplary manner during this deployment.

With the possibility of a Japanese land invasion, the first order of business was to quickly construct permanent beach fortification including pillboxes and revetments as well as stringing thousands of yards of barbed wire on the beaches. Because a goodly portion of the defensive positions were on private land the Army had been unable to construct more permanent defensive fortifications at these locations. No such restrictions existed after the attack and an intense effort was undertaken to improve fortifications covering likely amphibious landing sites.

Barbed wire was installed at Waikiki Beach and other coastlines across Hawaii after the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor. The harsh military rule in Hawaii ended nearly three years after the Pearl Harbor attacks, but, according to Brown, the islands were forever changed.

Barbed wire along the front of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Waikiki, taken over by the U.S. Navy and used throughout the war only for military personnel.

Besides manning the beach defenses the units of the 25th Division also guarded key non-military installations on the southern half of Oahu as well as aided in the enforcement of the Martial Law that had been put into effect after war was declared.

There were rumors of Japanese troops landing on the west shore of Oahu, paratroopers in the mountains, two-man submarines off the beaches, downed pilots hiding in the fields, another air attack on the way, etc. Increased anti-sabotage patrols were ordered. Private Charles K. Day of Division Headquarters and Military Police Company remembers martial law being declared. Military Police took over responsibilities for law and order aided by their civilian police counterparts. The 25th Division military police operated from a former Girl Scout Camp near Pearl City until the division was relieved of its defense mission.

Besides manning the beach defenses the units of the 25th Division also guarded key non-military installations on the southern half of Oahu as well as aided in the enforcement of the Martial Law that had been put into effect after war was declared.

Fred Tenore and his fellow soldiers spent many hours, day and night, patrolling the barb-wired beaches. His patrolling assignment began right after the attack. Their routine was simple with men at either end of a stretch of beach walking in opposite directions and meeting in the middle. If they didn't meet, the others knew there was a problem.

On Monday morning, December 8, 1941, Fred was on patrol at Waimanalo Beach on the southeastern coast of Oahu. Waimanalo is the longest stretch of sand in all of Oahu.



Corporal David M. Akui and Lieutenant Paul C. Plybonwas were also walking along Waimanalo Beach when Akui found a Japanese man lying unconscious on the sand. The man awoke to find Akui standing over him with a drawn 45 caliber pistol and Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki became the first Japanese prisoner of war in World War II, a most notable event for both the soldier and his prisoner. For Fred Tenore, it was a near miss at fame.



How this lone Japanese soldier ended up unconscious on Waimanalo Beach is a remarkable story unto itself.





Japanese Midget Submarines

A midget submarine of the Japanese Imperial Navy carrying Ensign Sakamaki and Chief Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Inagaki was launched from a mother submarine 10 miles off Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, at 3:33 a.m. on Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941. About four and a half hours later, Japanese bombers attacked the United States Pacific Fleet, plunging America into World War II. But Ensign Sakamaki was frustrated by mechanical misadventures.

His 78.5-foot-long submarine, HA-19, and four other midget subs, each armed with a pair of 1,000-pound torpedoes, were to attack American destroyers or battleships.

But Ensign Sakamaki's gyrocompass, which had given him trouble even before the mission began, continued to malfunction, causing his submarine to run in circles while at periscope depth. He struck submerged coral reefs three times, then surfaced just after 8 a.m. -- moments after the Japanese bombers' first wave -- and ran aground.

The submarine was spotted by an American destroyer, the Helm, which fired at it. The shots missed, but they blasted the submarine off the reef and knocked Ensign Sakamaki unconscious.

After he revived, Ensign Sakamaki tried to get his submarine going. It managed to avoid American depth charges, but the firing mechanisms for its torpedoes were damaged. The submarine became partially flooded, it filled with smoke and fumes from its batteries, causing the two crewmen to pass out.

Ensign Sakamaki revived once again late Sunday night, opened the hatch, noted that he was near land and tried to run his submarine onto a stretch of beach. But the engines died, and the submarine grounded on yet another coral reef.

After ordering Warrant Officer Inagaki to abandon the submarine, Ensign Sakamaki lit the fuses of the self-destruct charges and leaped into the rough surf. The charges did not explode, and the other crewman drowned. When the explosives failed to go off, Sakamaki swam to the bottom of the submarine to investigate the cause of the failure

and due to lack of oxygen passed out again. (The book *Attack on Pearl Harbor* claims that his submarine hit four coral reefs and sank).

Exhausted and having survived three brushes with death, Ensign Sakamaki somehow reached a stretch of beach and lay there through the night having fallen unconscious yet again. When he awakened the next morning, American Soldier, CPL. David M. Akui, was standing over him with a 45 caliber pistol. Sakamaki was the only crewman to survive from the midget submarines. All five were lost and none were known to have caused damage to American ships.

The HA-19 was later recovered from the Sea and can be seen on display today at the National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas.

Defense of Oahu *(continued)*

- *Private Rene L. Provost said that Company F, 35th Infantry was in its defensive position at Nanakuli Beach within one hour.*

- *Sergeant Henry J. Cudzilo said Company M, 27th Infantry moved to defensive positions at Ft. Kamehameha next to Pearl Harbor within one hour.*

- *Private Philip K. H. Kam said that the 65th Engineer Battalion had orders to move out immediately — Company A to Kailua, Company B to Ft. DeRussy, and Company C to Ewa Beach area.*

- *Sergeant Jerome K. Jerome of Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion confirmed that their orders were to move immediately to their defensive positions. These reports of speedy deployment to predetermined defensive positions are typical.*

- *After dark on the evening of Dec. 7th, Sergeant Michael Kordilla, Jr. of Company C, 35th Infantry recalls going on several patrols in the mountains to look for Japanese paratroops and downed pilots. None were found. Private George F. O'Connell was a company runner with Company G, 35th Infantry. The company was located on the west shore of Oahu where Japanese troops were rumored to have landed. O'Connell described the next 24 nervous hours as — 8 hours running barbed wire, 8 hours building guard position, and 8 hours on guard duty.*

- *In his memoirs, Private Donald F. Hall, Jr. of the Division Headquarters and Military Police Company writes that on December 8th the division headquarters moved from Schofield to a gymnasium in the town of Aiea where he served in the Operations (G-3) section.*

- *Private Charles Clements of Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery writes that initially Division Artillery Headquarters set up in tunnels in the Kalihi Valley near Fort Shafter and then joined the Division headquarters in Aiea several days later.*

- *Illustrative of what all the units in the 25th did after their post-attack deployments to their defensive positions; Lieutenant Carter, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, tells of his battalion working seven days a week for three months building underground bunkers for duty stations and living quarters as well as digging camouflaged gun emplacements on the west coast of Oahu. Strict black-out rules were enforced every night. Each morning before dawn and until the sun rose the entire battalion manned their howitzers in case of a dawn attack.*

Information Lockdown: Under the impetus of attack and the ensuing excitement, the Army moved quickly on 7 December 1941 to control almost every facet of public and private life. One of its first steps was to round up all still and motion pictures made of the attack itself, except those taken by the Navy.

By 10:30 a.m., in co-operation with the Navy, the Army G-2 organization had begun to apply a tight censorship to prevent the transmission from Hawaii of any unauthorized information about the attack or about the condition of Oahu's defense forces after it was over. A few minutes later, as Governor Joseph B. Poindexter was announcing over the radio that he had ordered Hawaii's emergency M-day act in effect, the Army cut him off because it thought Japanese attackers were using radio beams to guide their navigation.

Under martial law the Army could and did impose a strict censorship on all information media in Hawaii and to all civilian letters and messages sent from Hawaii after 7 December. The latter measure prevented the enemy from finding out about the weaknesses as well as the strengths of island defenses.

On 8 December the War Department authorized censorship of all communications to and from personnel under military control outside the United States, and the Hawaiian Department was in a position to take full advantage of this authority. In addition to postal censorship, radio stations came under Army control on 8 December, and English language newspapers were censored beginning on 9 December. Three days later the Army suspended the publication of foreign language newspapers and of "weekly labor and communistic papers and other uncertain publications."

Although the Army gave up its direct control of civilian censorship to the federal Office of Censorship in February 1942, thereafter throughout the war the Army and Navy continued to exert a much closer indirect control of information than existed on the mainland.

***Evacuation of Dependents**: Of additional concern was providing protection for the some twenty thousand women and children who were military dependents of service personnel stationed on Oahu. Fearing additional air attacks on Schofield and Wheeler and shortly after the Schofield units had deployed to their defensive positions, buses and trucks evacuated Schofield families to schools, hotels and homes in Honolulu and some to homes in the hills of Wahiawa.*

The difficulty of caring for the dependents in these locations led to their early return to Schofield which was followed by the prompt decision to evacuate all dependents back to the Mainland who were not residents of the Territory of Hawaii. However, organizing such a major evacuation was time-consuming. Not only were the dependents to be evacuated but their household goods, pets and automobiles needed to be sent back as well. While the evacuation process was being set up and as their husbands and fathers manned the island's defenses, the families lived under austere conditions in their quarters faced with the rationing of foodstuffs and gasoline, mail censorship, restricted telephone use, a dusk to dawn curfew, nightly blackouts, slit trenches in their yards

and air raid drills. Only a few dependents left Schofield prior to January 1942. But most were gone by late April 1942. Despite a threat of Japanese submarines all convoys of dependents arrived safely at West Coast ports.

The Civilian Population: It's no secret that the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, which killed more than 2,000 Americans, changed the course of history for the United States and the rest of the world. But it also dramatically altered the identity of the island paradise of Hawaii, changing everyday life for the people who lived there and bringing tourism, one of the islands' most important industries, to a halt.

Hours after the attack, Hawaii, a U.S. territory at the time, was placed under martial law, and all of the islands' residents were under the dictatorship of the U.S. military.

Since Japanese-Americans made up 37 percent of Hawaii's population, it was impossible for the military to incarcerate all of them. Instead, all residents of Hawaii — white, Native Hawaiian, Japanese, Filipino, Chinese — were forced to live under strict military rule.

Everybody was under martial law and treated equally unfairly because the military couldn't target just the Japanese, who were so important to the economy. After all, Japanese-American residents had long-established themselves in Hawaii as business owners, teachers and community leaders. Without them, Hawaii's economy would have collapsed.

A newspaper photo shows two Japanese-American workers at an emergency medical unit in Honolulu, with the caption saying they are "typical of the loyal Japanese-Americans in the Islands; they have been on continuous duty since the attack on December 7.

Under martial law, life in Hawaii became dramatically restricted. Immediately after the attack, civilians were mandated by the military to dig holes for makeshift bomb shelters and were ordered to place barbed wire around everything, including beaches, water pumping stations, electrical installations and government buildings.

While they were free to live their normal lives during the day, Hawaii residents were forced to black out their windows, and a curfew banned civilians from being outside at night.

All electricity was required to be shut off after sundown, and the military enforced the curfew every night. Any unauthorized civilian out after hours faced the risk of being shot. If civilians were permitted to drive after-hours for official purposes, they were required to paint their cars' headlights black.

Food Supplies: The inventory of food ordered by the Army on 7 December reflected a long-standing concern with the problem of feeding Oahu's civilian population in an emergency. With the island's agriculture devoted almost exclusively to pineapples and sugar, most foodstuffs had to be imported from the mainland. The Army's prewar plans and tentative moves toward encouraging the production of other foods on an experimental and educational scale, and toward stocking seed, had been ineffective. Another plan for stocking nonperishable foods for emergency use received the blessing of the War Department but no appropriations from Congress.

When war came Oahu had about a normal supply of food on hand for its 250,000 civilians, and no means of increasing local production significantly. The inventory disclosed a 37-day supply of most staples, but serious shortages of potatoes, rice, and onions. To maintain this supply and feed Army forces would require prompt shipment and a continuing flow of about 32,000 tons of food a month from the mainland. In addition, General Short asked the War Department to arrange for a six-month emergency reserve of 48,000 tons of food, and he placed orders with the division engineer in San Francisco for 40,000 tons of seed, insecticides, fertilizer, and farm implements in order to boost local food production.

Filling these orders on the mainland was no problem, but in the first few weeks after the attack the presence of Japanese submarines and a critical shortage of shipping made the food outlook an alarming one. Congress hastily approved a revolving fund of $35,000,000 to finance shipments, and the first emergency cargo of food began to load in San Francisco on 20 December. By mid-February 1942 the food situation was sufficiently in hand to permit the War Department to turn over responsibility for supplying civilian needs to the Department of Agriculture, and by June there was an ample supply of food on hand. The effort to stimulate the production of food crops locally met with indifferent success, partly because the federal government decided that maximum production of sugar and pineapples was more important to the war effort.

Food on the island was rationed to families. There was a ban on liquor, and bars were shuttered. Waikiki's iconic beachfront hotels, once thriving with tourists and affluent locals, were closed to the public and taken over by the military.

The military even banned Hawaii civilians from taking photographs of any of the islands' coastlines (to prevent the Japanese from finding points of entries) and anything with war- or military-related imagery. As a result, officials reviewed and confiscated any photographs that contained barbed wire, beaches or military bases. Many of these images are on display at the Bishop Museum in Honolulu for the 75th anniversary of the devastating attacks.

What follows are some of the forbidden photos and other World War II memorabilia that reveal what life in Hawaii was like for those who lived during and beyond December 7, 1941.



CURFEW PASS

The bearer TAKANORI OGASAWARA is required to be on the streets and highways of Lanai City, Lanai, so that he may proceed to work or to return home from work.

The bearer is not to use this pass other than going directly to and from work.

Identification Card must be shown with this pass.

D. Fraser
Plantation Superintendent
Lanai Division

Date 8-15-44

A curfew was imposed by the military government on all civilians in Hawaii, which lasted for nearly the entire war. Without some sort of curfew pass like this one, citizens could be arrested after curfew.



1943	JANUARY					1943
BLACKOUT SCHEDULE					7:15 am 1 7:00 pm	2
7:15 am 3 7:00 pm	4	5	6	7	8	9
7:15 am 10 7:00 pm	11	12	13	14	7:15 am 15 7:15 pm	16
7:15 am 17 7:15 pm	18	19	20	21	22	23
7:15 am 24/31 7:15 pm	25	26	27	28	29	30

Next Change: February 10th

A printed schedule for Hawaii's very strict nightly blackout, which began Dec. 7, 1941, and was gradually eased until it was eliminated in 1944.

A blacked-out restaurant in downtown Honolulu, 1942.

Pins like these showed a commitment to winning the war, but they also provided manufacturers some quick income.



The patriotic slogan, "Remember Pearls Harbor", was widely printed in the early war years. This sticker uses a snake to symbolize the treacherous sneak attack on December 7, 1941

During World War II, Waikiki's luxury Royal Hawaiian Hotel was seized by the Navy and was open only to military personnel, seen here in the hotel's Coconut Grove.

Gas masks were issued to all Hawaii civilians over the age of 7, and practices like this one were held to prepare for poison gas attacks or air raids.



Territory of Hawaii A. R.4114491
IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE
Issued Jan 3 1942 Sr. No. 8-440
This certifies that:
Name: Kikuno Nakamoto
Residence: 216 #13 N. Kukui St.
whose signature and fingerprints appear hereon, has been duly registered and identified under the Hawaii Defense Act.
Citizenship Status: Japan Date of Birth: 12-27-1883

Hair	Eyes	Height	Weight	Age	Occupation
Gray	Brn	4'8"	115	68	Housewife

Visible Marks: Scar on forehead
Kikuno Nakamoto
Registrant's Signature.
By M. J. Cole
Registrar.

Every citizen of the Hawaiian Islands was required to be fingerprinted and issued an official ID card like this one. Under martial law, this card had to be carried at all times. In Kikuno Nakamoto's case, the card appears to show either the wrong age or the wrong birth year.

Reconnaissance: The most obvious joint enterprise of the Army and Navy in the period immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack was the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. The improvised and unsuccessful attempts of 7 December to locate the Japanese *Striking Force* were succeeded as rapidly as possible by an organized daily search under the command of the Navy's Patrol Wing Two using as many Army and Navy planes as could be made available, to a distance of 700 nautical miles in all directions. To make this patrol possible the Navy transferred three squadrons of reconnaissance craft from the Atlantic as quickly as it could. The Navy's reconnaissance plan that

became effective during December called for a daily search by 46 planes, but in practice only 37 were normally used-12 B-17's and 25 Navy PBY's. The Army managed to hold back 18 of its heavy bombers as a striking force ready for action on 30-minute notice. The reconnaissance, though far superior to anything attempted before Pearl Harbor, was admittedly a good deal less than perfect- low visibility in the patrolled lanes could cut its effectiveness to near zero, and about one-fifth of the circle surrounding the islands had to be left virtually unpatrolled each day. To make the patrol fully effective would not only require a good many more planes but also radar to eliminate the hazards of visual observation.

The Japanese were still around during December 1941, but not on carriers. They kept a group of about nine submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii until mid-January, to do what damage they could. As commerce destroyers, Japanese submarines in Hawaiian waters proved as ineffective as they did on the west coast. Another reason for their remaining was to find out just how much damage had been done to the American Navy in Pearl Harbor. Fliers returning to the carriers on 7 December had reported as best they could on what they had seen and photographed through flame and smoke, but the Japanese wanted a better picture.

To get one, a plane launched from submarine 1-7 flew over Pearl Harbor at dawn on 18 December. The next day a Japanese Navy communiqué announced that 8 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 2 destroyers had been sunk or heavily damaged, and lesser damage had been done to another battleship and 4 more cruisers. The communiqué also claimed 450 planes destroyed on the ground and 14 shot down-a claim more closely related to enemy prewar overestimates of Hawaiian air strength than to the damage actually done, bad as it was. Apparently neither the 18 December flight nor a similar one during the night of 6-7 January was detected.

Before December was over Japanese submarines had brought war home to the outer islands, though in almost innocuous fashion. Just before dusk on 15 December a submarine lobbed about ten shells into the harbor area of Kahului on Maui, and three that hit a pineapple cannery caused about $700 worth of damage. During the night of 30-31 December, submarines engaged in similar and nearly simultaneous shellings of Hilo on Hawaii, Nawiliwili on Kauai, and again on Kahului. At the last-named point Army coast artillery guns returned the fire. Damage at all three points was slight, and no one was hurt. The principal result of these shellings was to stir up the war consciousness of all the Hawaiian Islands.

Reinforcement: The initial military reinforcement of Hawaii following the Pearl Harbor attack was guided by a lengthy list submitted by General Short on 8 December 1941, of the troops and equipment most urgently needed for the defense of Oahu and by several supplementary lists sent by him during the next few days. By 12 December the War Department had arranged to ship from San Francisco some 7,000 men, more than 100 crated pursuit ships, 3,000,000 rounds of the scarce caliber .50 ammunition, more than 8,000 aircraft bombs of assorted sizes, and a variety of other munitions.

On the evening of 13 December the Army had 2 fast transports loaded and ready to go, but the Navy refused to let them leave without escort. They finally sailed with 3 slower ships on the 16th, and reached Honolulu five days later- but only a fortnight after the Pearl Harbor attack.

A second and larger convoy of ships departed from San Francisco on 27 December and arrived in Hawaiian waters on 7 and 8 January 1942. Together these convoys brought about 15,000 more troops to Oahu, and the unit reinforcements included two regiments of infantry, one regiment each of field artillery and coast artillery, and light tank, signal, and railway artillery battalions. With their arrival the strength of the Hawaiian Department was increased to about 58,500 officers and enlisted men, and it now had most of the heavy bombardment and pursuit strength allotted a month earlier. Despite a continued serious shortage of antiaircraft weapons, the second week of January found Oahu generally well secured against invasion.

Two arguments won the approval of the War Department during December of a much larger reinforcement of Hawaii. The Navy contended that the sure defense of the Hawaiian area depended primarily on Army air power and that the security and effectiveness of that air power required its dispersion among the major islands of the Hawaiian group.

Secondly, while the immediate reinforcement of December 1941 might ensure against a direct attempt by the enemy to invade Oahu, the Japanese had the naval strength to cover an invasion of one or more of the almost undefended outer islands. From bases on these islands the enemy could attack and possibly starve out Oahu. These arguments led to an inquiry to General Short about his plans for garrisoning the other islands of the Hawaiian group. As of mid-December, all he planned to do was to distribute another National Guard infantry regiment among them and add to their defenses a few more second-class weapons (the best being kept for Oahu).

When General Emmons assumed command, he asked for nearly 50,000 additional troops, including two infantry square divisions, to garrison the outer islands. He also Wanted fillers to bring Oahu's units up to war strength as soon as possible-the combined strength of the 24th and 25th Divisions then being no more than 15,000 men. And he wanted to build up the Hawaiian Air Force to a strength of 200 heavy bombardment planes and 325 pursuit ships.

On 23 December General Marshall orally approved the immediate dispatch of one square division, two more antiaircraft regiments, and 10,000 additional service troops to Hawaii, and by the end of the month the War Department had established an eventual strength of 100,000 ground and 16,000 air troops for the Hawaiian Department, exclusive of its distant appendages. Other more critical needs in the Pacific delayed the movement of the bulk of the approved troop reinforcements, and Army strength in Hawaii actually declined during early 1942. But with the arrival of the 27th Infantry Division in March and April and its deployment with supporting forces among the outer islands, the invasion threat to them really ended, and it ended before the enemy again approached the Hawaiian area in force.

One More Attack: The Japanese made a very ineffectual swipe at Oahu during the early morning of 4 March 1942. Two Japanese flying boats starting from Jaluit Island in the Marshalls had refueled in a rendezvous with three submarines at French Frigate Shoals and then flown on to Oahu, about 500 miles to the southeast. Army radar spotted them 90 miles off Kauai; and the Interceptor Command sent up four pursuit planes to find them, but without success because of their high altitude and a heavy overcast. One Japanese plane merely skirted the west coast of Oahu.

The other followed the north coast to Kaneohe, then turned south and at 2:15 a.m. dropped four 500-pound bombs which landed in woods on the slopes of Mount Tantalus, about 2 miles from downtown Honolulu. They caused no casualties, and no damage other than a few broken window panes. Because of the high altitude of the planes and the overcast, antiaircraft guns did not fire, and no general air raid alarm was sounded. Both planes returned to their starting point safely; but as a "night reconnaissance" of Pearl Harbor the flight was a failure, and a second "K Operation," as the Japanese called the feat, scheduled for 7 March,

was canceled. Hawaiian authorities deduced that the Japanese planes must have staged through French Frigate Shoals, and the Navy thereupon took steps to deny them to enemy submarines.

Hunkering Down: A tight blackout had helped Army defenders pass the test of an isolated enemy air operation, but how well they were now prepared to defend Oahu against a large-scale carrier-based attack remained an unanswered question. The elements of the interceptor system were functioning day and night, and as efficiently as they could with the equipment at hand. American planes in Hawaii still lacked equipment for their ready identification as friendly, and the bulk of the pursuit planes, though modern P-40's, still could probably not have climbed rapidly enough after radar warning to fend off a high-level bombing attack. The antiaircraft situation was much better than at the time of Pearl Harbor, but antiaircraft guns could only make a heavy air raid more costly to the enemy, not stop it. The dispersal, bunkering, and camouflaging of Army aircraft made them relatively immune to heavy loss, but the naval base and Honolulu could not be hidden. As earlier, the Army was best prepared to fight off an invasion of Oahu. Combat troops were dug in in battle positions all over the island, and a Washington inspection at the end of April found the morale of the troops "excellent," and that "all understood that this is a real war."

Midway

A month later real war again approached the Hawaiian Islands in the shape of a formidable Japanese fleet bent on capturing Midway and drawing out the Pacific Fleet for a decisive engagement. The Japanese were executing the second step of the "second phase" operations projected in their *Combined Fleet's* operational order of 5 November 1941-the order that had set in motion the Pearl Harbor attack and the conquest of the Philippines, southeast Asia, and Indonesia. Winning their first round of victories in only half the calculated time, the Japanese in mid-January had begun planning what to do next. The first proposal, advanced by the chief of staff of the *Combined Fleet*, was for an invasion of the main Hawaiian Islands, but by early February caution had modified it into a plan for occupying strategic points in the outer Aleutians, Midway Island, and points on the Hawaii-Australia line of communication. In particular, the Midway operation was expected to force a fleet engagement, and, if victorious, the Japanese would then have undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.

However, the Americans knew well in advance almost precisely what the Japanese were up to, thanks to their prewar breaking of the communications code used by the Japanese Navy. This knowledge and the fortunes of battle tipped the scales in the Battle of Midway, the most decisive engagement of the Pacific war. Midway redressed the disparity of naval strength that Japan had temporarily enjoyed and made impracticable any more major offensives beyond the original perimeter of enemy conquest.

With Midway, the threat that Japan might try to invade Oahu or one of the other main Hawaiian Islands was dissipated, and, although Japan retained a capability of making a carrier strike, the likelihood of one became increasingly remote. The strength of the Hawaiian Department in officers and men continued to grow after June 1942, but more and more, Hawaii became an advance training base and staging area for Army ground and air units that would do battle in the farther reaches of the Pacific.

The 25th Infantry Division History (continued)

By June 1942 with the defeat of the Japanese fleet at Midway, units began to get Sundays off for recreation and limited passes were granted for trips to Honolulu. Also units of the division began rotating off their defensive positions for several days at a time to practice offensive operations. Private First Class Clements and others write that the 25th Infantry Division was relieved of its defense mission on 1 November 1942 and returned to Schofield Barracks to begin intense preparations for combat in the south Pacific.

Jungle Warfare Training

Army jungle warfare training began in Hawaii during World War II, with the establishment of the Jungle Warfare Training Center in 1942. The former Pacific Jungle Combat Training Center (CTC) was comprised of several parcels of land totaling approximately 2,545 acres in the adjacent valleys of Punaluu and Kahana, located in the Koolauloa District on the northeast coast of the island of Oahu, Hawaii. During World War II, these parcels were used as a unit-level jungle combat training center.





SOUTH PACIFIC JUNGLE reminded old-time Marines of Nicaragua or Haiti, but proved itself a formidable enemy to both Japanese and Marines.

Jungle warfare is a term used to cover the special techniques needed for military units to survive and fight in jungle terrain.

It has been the topic of extensive study by military strategists, and was an important part of the planning for both sides in many conflicts, including World War II and the Vietnam War.

The jungle has a variety of effects on military operations. Dense vegetation can limit lines of sight and arcs of fire but can also provide ample opportunity for camouflage and plenty of material with which to build fortifications. Jungle terrain, often without good roads, can be inaccessible to vehicles and so makes logistical supply and transport difficult, which in turn places a premium on air mobility. The problems of transport make engineering resources important as they are needed to improve roads, build bridges and airfields, and improve water supplies.

Jungle environments can also be inherently unhealthy, with various tropical diseases that must be prevented or treated by medical services. Likewise, the terrain can make it difficult to deploy armored forces, or any other kind of forces on any large scale. Successful jungle fighting emphasizes effective small unit tactics and leadership.

Training began in earnest in the early 1940s as World War II in the Pacific necessitated the need for soldiers to be well-versed in the tactics of jungle warfare.

The thick, triple canopy and dense foliage made radios all but useless and reduced visibility to just a few yards. Rain and humidity ensured soldiers were constantly wet and the jungle floor was always slick with mud, which the soldiers had to march and crawl through.

There were tree roots and vines on which to trip or become entangled. Other plants offered worse. A manual written for troops stationed in Panama during World War II listed over 100 poisonous or injurious varieties of flora. Leaning or brushing against the wrong plant could lead to some rather uncomfortable conditions.

If the plants were not bad enough, there was local wildlife to contend with. Poisonous snakes and bugs surely top the list of unwanted encounters. Enormous spiders would spin giant webs across narrow jungle paths. Snakes waited in the underbrush and in trees.

However, the worst encounter for many soldiers was the common mosquito. They are ubiquitous in jungle environments and are a terrible nuisance. Although most bites simply leave soldiers itchy, their most dangerous quality is their ability to carry malaria. In the jungle, a little carelessness can lead to a lot of pain. Failing to properly secure mosquito netting at night could mean waking up covered in mosquito bites. Even with the netting, soldiers were not entirely safe. Exposed skin, carelessly pressed against the net while sleeping, would be open to bites.



FIGURE 330.—Training in how to live in and on the jungle, at the Jungle Training School, Hawaii.

Structures Used at the Training Camp Can Still Be Seen Today

The 161st executed numerous CPE's (Command Post Exercises), alerts, test defense exercises, and the 161 Officers and some NCO's had gone through the Division Weapons School, nicknamed "Collin's School of Tactical Knowledge". Weapons instruction had been emphasized all over the regiment. When the regiment was relieved of its mission of beach defense and once more assembled as one unit, regimental Headquarters and the second battalion were stationed at Fort Hase, the first battalion at the Kailua Race Track, and the third battalion at the Coconut Grove. More replacements came into the regiment at the Race Track from the Christens end Canton Island Task Forces, and from the 27th Infantry Division.

Training began - marches, lectures, jungle work, range firing, combat and obstacle courses. In November our amphibious maneuvers began. we the 161st trouped down to Pearl Harbor to board transports. They sailed out, debarked into Higgins boats with machine guns mounted in their noses. Then they churned into a bay near Wuaimanilo and dashed through the surf, spluttering and wet, on Pokoi Beach. The last week in November they had the annual manual of arms drill-down for the Thomas G. Aston Trophy and a Regimental Parade at Fort Hase.

There were men from farms, from oil fields, from steel mills, from lumber yards, from high schools and colleges, from the professions and from businesses. The enlisted men came from forty-seven states (the exception was New Hampshire), from the District of Columbia, Canada, Porto Rico, and Mexico. The 161st had become a real "All-American" outfit.




Kailua Oahu, L to R, Ferris, Brummett, Christianson, Rossi, Worden, Unknown, Windle, Fred Tenore, Lew Miller



Moving Out

With its departure from Oahu beginning on 25 November 1942 the 25th Infantry Division ended its participation in the Central Pacific Campaign. Three weeks later the division entered a new campaign to liberate Guadalcanal in the Solomons Islands where its success earned the 25th its special designation of Tropic Lightning.

Islands of the South Pacific

During the first six months of 1942 the U.S. Navy fought the Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway and raided the Marshall and Gilbert Islands (Kwajalein and Tarawa respectively). Army Air Forces medium bombers took off from a carrier at sea and bombed Tokyo in April 1942 in a surprise attack. As part of the Midway operations in June, planes of the Japanese Navy bombed U.S. installations in Alaska and enemy troops landed in the Aleutian Islands on Attu and Kiska.

The Allied defensive phase of the war in the Pacific ended on 6 August 1942 with the Japanese defeat and US Military occupation of Midway. With control of the northern Pacific line from Hawaii to Midway, the Allies were ready to strike the enemy-held islands in the South Pacific.

161st Infantry: With the 41st Division being reconfigured to the new triangular division, the 161st was considered excess. The War Department ordered the 161st Infantry to the Philippine Islands to reinforce American forces there in anticipation of a possible Japanese invasion. However, the Japanese attacked Hawaii and the Philippines before the 161st was to depart San Francisco. In reaction the War Department directed the 161st to Hawaii to reinforce the defenses there. The regiment sailed from San Francisco on 16 December 1941, arriving in Hawaii on 21 December 1941. On 17 February 1942 the 161st Infantry was reassigned from the 41st Division to the Hawaiian Department.

Upon the assignment of the 161st Infantry to the 25th Infantry Division and in preparation for a late November deployment to Guadalcanal, the 89th Field Artillery Battalion was paired with the 161st Infantry to form the 161st Regimental Combat Team. Fred Tenore was now with the 161st RCT and would be providing critically needed artillery support for their ground combat actions.

On December 6, 1942, Part of the 161st boarded the USS Republic. There was little confusion this time as there had been when these troops left San Francisco one year prior. By the afternoon they and their cargo were stowed away and, in the twilight of the evening, Honolulu and the Island of Oahu faded from view.



USS Republic

The USS Frederick Funston, manned by the Captain and some of the crew from the USS Bliss, which had been sunk off North Africa, followed on December 16th with the third battalion, Anti-tank and Cannon Companies, including Fred Tenore.

For many weeks members of the Division knew they were moving. They knew we were heading south under sealed orders. Where?

USS Frederick Funston

The soldiers would fall out on deck every morning boat drill or for some other activity that just seemed like harassment. After seeping the deck one more time, the uninformed non-commissioned officers would take their compasses and began to wildly shoot azimuths from one end of the Pacific horizon to the other. Then they would scurry below, dig up old beat up Rand McNally world map out of a barrack bag and proceed to plot our course trying to figure out where they were going! At various times it was back to San Francisco, Panama, Midway and Tahiti.

USS Frederick Funston



USS Frederick Funston Deck Plans

Namesake:	General Frederick Funston
Builder:	Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding
Launched:	27 September 1941
Sponsored by:	Miss Barbara E. Funston
Acquired:	(by the Navy) 8 April 1943
Commissioned:	24 April 1943
Decommissioned:	N/A
Reclassified:	To *T-AP-178* (date unknown)
Stricken:	N/A
Honours and awards:	Six battle stars for World War II service, one for the Korean War

Displacement:	7,000 tons (lt)
Length:	492 ft
Beam:	69 ft 6 in
Draft:	26 ft 6 in
Propulsion:	Geared Turbine Drive, 2 × Babcock & Wilcox header-type boilers, single propeller, designed shaft horsepower 8,000
Speed:	16 knots
Capacity:	Troops: 2,200
Complement:	576
Armament:	1 x 5"/38 caliber dual-purpose gun mount, 2 x 3"/50 cal. dual purpose gun mounts, eight 1.1"/75 caliber guns, replaced by 16 x 20mm gun mounts

Sailing time. The ship slowly pulls away. Goodbyes said, last hurried phone call made; last letter posted. Soon land will fade from the horizon and for days the sea will be a mysterious and treacherous companion.

LIFEBOAT DRILL: "Now hear this, at the sound of the alarm, report to your station!"



Troops put gear on bunks and get setled into the routine of confined life in a seeming endless sea.

Not exactly the Waldorf!



Washroom, where traffic is heavy in the morning as troops begin day with clean start.



Not much elbow room in the troop mess, but plenty of wholesome food. When the sea is heavy, many appetites are light.



The ship's Chaplain, a Navy officer, conducts services in troop recreation area. Whether on land or sea, men in uniform do not forget God.



For many the trip is wonderful. For others, victims of mal de mer, with no relief from dramaine, it is no pleasure cruise.

A popular shipboard pastime - shuffling the pasteboards



"Dear Mom...sorry I haven't written sooner but...."



".....and this is the kid brother, and this is my sister. Your Sister? Wow! Where did you say you were from?...."



The Route to Guadalcanal





On Christmas day the Funston anchored off Viti Levu Island, Fiji, and arrived at Noumea, New Caledonia on December 28th. The Republic arrived on December 30th and the Funston on January 4th anchoring in the Indispensable Strait between Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

In four hours, both ships unloaded cargo and thousands of troops via cargo nets, Higgins boats, and lighters. Both landings were completed by mid-morning.

USS Frederick Funston at Guadalcanal – January 4, 1943




PA 89





Riding in assault craft, Army infantrymen and medics land on a New Georgia beach, where they will be met by native guides.

Looking out from the bow of a landing craft loaded with personnel, Guadalcanal looked like a steaming jungle. They could almost smell it!

Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)
aka: Higgins Boats

The LCVP, served as a tug, liberty boat, water ambulance, ferry, carrying of troops/vehicle to the beach, and as a lifeboat: There were few amphibious operations in the last years of World War II in which LCVPs did not take a major part. The LCVP was designed to beach, lower a ramp, discharge men and cargo, retract, and return to its transport. The crew consisted of a coxswain, engineer, and two deck hands (bowman and sternman).

SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE HIGGINS INDUSTRIES
36-FOOT LCVP

Construction Material:	Wood (oak, pine and mahogany)
Displacement:	15,000 Pounds (light)
Length:	36-Feet, 3-Inches
Beam:	10-Feet, 10-Inches
Draft:	3-Feet Aft and 2-Feet, 2-Inches Forward
Speed:	12 Knots
Armament:	Two .30-Ca liber Machine Guns
Crew:	Three - Coxswain, Engineer and Crewman
Capacity:	36 Troops with gear and equipment, or 6,000 pound vehicle, or 8,100 pounds of Cargo
Power Plant:	Gray 225-HP Diesel Engine

The design on the LCVP is credited to Mr. Andrew Higgins of Higgins Industries, Inc., New Orleans. Mr. Higgins designed both high speed patrol craft and landing craft of various types. It was Mr. Higgins landing craft though that made so many African, Pacific and D-Day landing possible in all theaters of WWII.

The LCVP itself was based on a design Mr. Higgins had perfected in the 1930's. His Eureka model work boat was intended for use in the shallow swamps and bayous of Louisiana. The boat could operate in 18 inches of water while running over vegetation and debris without any damage. Special design features of the hull kept aerated water under the bow reducing friction and swept objects away from the boat preventing fouling of the propeller. With the addition of the bow ramp, the LCVP was complete.
Armored, with 2 machine guns in ring mountings aft, and the LCVP was conned from a position on the port quarter, forward of the engine compartment. On transports the LCVP could be carried on deck or in single to three-tier davits; the LCVP could be launched when loaded, but only from appropriate davits. Their use in beaching was simplified by the late stages of the war: driven hard ashore, they would be nudged off the beach by trucks. Between 1942 and 1945, some 23,358 LCVPs were built.







Guadalcanal – Solomon Islands

The Guadalcanal campaign (Operation Watchtower) to establish a southern front against the expansion of the Japanese Empire to Australia and New Zealand had been ongoing for months. On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly United States Marines, landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomon Islands, with the objective of using Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases in supporting a campaign to eventually capture or neutralize the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain.

The Japanese defenders, who had occupied those islands since May 1942, were outnumbered and overwhelmed by the Allies, who captured Tulagi and Florida, as well as the airfield – later named Henderson Field – that was under construction on Guadalcanal. Surprised by the Allied offensive, the Japanese made several attempts between August and November of 1942 to retake Henderson Field. Three major land battles, seven large naval battles (five nighttime surface actions and two carrier battles), and almost daily aerial battles culminated in the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November, with the defeat of the last Japanese attempt to bombard Henderson Field from the sea and to land enough troops to retake it. In December, the Japanese abandoned their efforts to retake Guadalcanal but there was much cleaning up to do as the marines moved on to other islands.

GUADALCANAL WAS THE TURNING POINT, and on Guadalcanal the crucial position was Henderson Field, shown here as defending Marine, Navy and Army airmen (and Japanese bombers) knew it from the air.

Relieving the 1st Marine Division: By the end of November, the higher commanders in the Pacific clearly recognized that the 1st Marine Division needed to be relieved and evacuated to a healthier climate. The division had begun the first offensive undertaken by American ground troops in World War II. Despite the lack of the powerful air and surface support that American infantrymen in later campaigns were to take almost for granted, and in spite of air raids, naval bombardments, inadequate diet, inadequate armament, and resolute Japanese infantry attacks, it had captured and successfully defended an airfield of great importance. Its achievements were rewarded by the Presidential Unit Citation.

Marine battle casualties had not been excessive. Over 600 men of the division were killed in action or died of wounds and other causes between 7 August and 10 December 1942. During the same period, the dead of other American units on Guadalcanal totaled 691. Over 2,100 sick and wounded men of the 1st Division had already been evacuated.

In the Solomons battle casualties did not accurately reflect a unit's losses. Hospital admissions resulting from sickness must also be taken into account. Up to 10 December 1942, of the 10,635 casualties in the division, only 1,472 resulted from gunshot wounds; 5,749 malaria cases had put men out of action. In November malaria alone sent 3,283 into the hospital. Gastro-enteritis, which had struck nearly 500 men during August and September, materially decreased during the following months and in December only 12 cases appeared. War neuroses afflicted 110 during October when enemy bombardments had been heaviest, but in November only 13 were affected. These figures are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many malaria victims were hospitalized more than once; many of the same men

The 1st Marine Division, while still fighting hard, had lost many men and the makeshift sick bays (above) were handling a capacity of cases

were also later killed or wounded. Thus, the number of men in the division who were not hospitalized may have been larger than the statistics indicate. Yet many other malaria victims did not report for treatment, and many milder cases were not hospitalized.

The 1st Marine Division men who had remained on duty were ready for relief. They had endured months of intermittent combat, air raids, and naval attacks. Inadequate diet had caused nearly every man to lose weight. Secondary anemia was common. Weakness resulting from malnutrition, heat, and disease was causing an excessive number of march casualties in all units. Merely living in the Lunga perimeter was an ordeal in itself. Water was insufficient for bathing and laundry, and fungi frequently infected those who bathed in the rivers. The old October perimeter had included less than thirty square miles, so there were no real rest areas, nor any recreational facilities. Flies, attracted by unburied enemy corpses lying beyond the perimeter, harassed the troops constantly. They clustered so thickly that men messing in the open had to brush flies off their food with one hand while eating with the other.

On 30 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send the 25th Division to the South Pacific, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins. The 1st Marine Division was to be relieved, with the first echelon leaving in early December. It was to go to the Southwest Pacific Area to be rehabilitated and to provide General MacArthur with a division having amphibious training.

General **Joseph Lawton Collins** was a senior United States Army officer. During World War II, he served in both the Pacific and European Theaters of Operations, one of a few senior American commanders to do so. He was Chief of Staff of the United States Army during the Korean War.

Fred Tenore Arrives at Gaudalcanal: The 161st RCT 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Red at Guadalcanal on 4 January 1943 following the 35th RCT and 27th RCT arriving in December and January, respectively, without any losses. The 25th Division was assigned to the XIV Corps composed of the 25th, the American Division and the 2nd Marine Division.



The First January Offensive

Phase One: The 35th RCT was chosen to lead the first offensive actions against the Mt. Austin area and the 27th RCT against a series of hills called Galloping Horse. The 161st was placed in division reserve minus the 1st Battalion, which was attached to the 27th as a reserve. (Division personnel strength reports for that period show the 161st Infantry Regiment to be seriously under-strength, being short close to 1300 personnel).

While in reserve manning defensive positions around Henderson Airfield, the 161st was also handed the assignment of eliminating a concentration of Japanese troops in what became known as the Matanikau River Pocket. The Pocket, estimated to hold 500 enemy troops, was a dense jungle redoubt positioned between a steep hillside and a high cliff over the Matanikau River. The heavy undergrowth masked the well-camouflaged Japanese positions, both on the ground and high in the trees, and made dislodging them a slow, grim task.

The combination, though, of frequent patrols, heavy pinpoint artillery bombardment by Fred Tenore's 89th Field Artillery Battalion, and starvation served to eliminate this strongpoint in the end. On 10 January 1943 the offensive was launched and successfully completed by 21 January with the seizure of Mount Austin by the 35th Infantry and Galloping Horse and the Gifu strongpoint by the 27th Infantry.





The native people on Guadalcanal were not sympathetic to the Japanese occupiers. As shown here, they provided scouting and guide assistance through the maze of streams and dense jungles. They were also given rifles and were not afraid to use them to protect themselves and their American allies. Some of them were just children but they made their contribution nonetheless.

U.S. Army soldiers push supplies up the Matanikau River to support the 25th Infantry Division's offensive on Guadalcanal in January 1943.

Crossing the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal on a raft ferry

Japanese tanks knocked out by 37 mm guns near the mouth of the Matanikau River, Guadalcanal

Phase Two: The offensive in January was to be General Collins' first combat experience. Graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1917 at the age of twenty, he had been sent to Germany to serve with the Army of Occupation in 1919. From 1921 to 1931 he attended and instructed in various Army schools and was graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1933. After a tour of duty in the Philippines, he was graduated from the Army Industrial and War Colleges. He taught at the War College for two years, served for several months with the War Department General Staff, and in 1941 became Chief of Staff of the VII corps, an organization which he was to command in the European Theater of Operations during 1944 and 1945. Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Collins became Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department and in May 1942 he was made a major general and given the command of the 25th Division.

The second phase of the Corps offensive was to drive west to the Poha River.

This is the Battle Plan Map Used for the January offensive.



Overlaying this map on a satellite image of the area, the path and the hills that were assaulted and taken by Fred Tenore and the 161st can be reconstructed.

THE FIRST JANUARY OFFENSIVE ZONE was west of the Matanikau and Army fighting was concentrated in the area of Hills 54, 55, 56 (above).



From Hill 42 on Mount Austen's northwest slopes, the sector could be seen clearly by 25th Division troops resting before the offensive started.

General Collins, Brig. Gen. John R. Hodge, the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Stanley E. Reinhart, the artillery commander, staff officers, all regimental commanders, and most battalion commanders flew over the division's zone of action. Air photographs and observation gave a good view of the open country, but jungle obscured the canyons, valleys, and ravines.

Intelligence officers of the 25th Division had little information on the enemy's strength and dispositions in the division's zone, but they did know that the Japanese were defending a series of strong points and that they held the Gifu and the high ground south of Hill 66 in strength.

Clarence A. Orndorff's 161st Infantry (less the 1st Battalion) was to be in division reserve. Fred Tenore's 89th Field Artillery Battalion, however, would be seeing action.

Divisional artillery battalions were to fire a 30-minute preparation on 10 January, from 0550 to 0620, on the water hole near Hill 66 and the hills to the south. Artillery preparation and aerial bombardment were to be omitted in the 35th Infantry's zone to avoid warning the Japanese of the effort against their south flank.



The 89th (105-mm. howitzers) and the 90th (155-mm. howitzers) Field Artillery Battalions, and the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, were originally assigned to general support. When General Collins later committed the 161st Infantry to mopping up actions, the 89th supported that regiment. On 10 January the 155-mm. howitzers of the Americal (**Ameri**can New **Cal**edonia)[1] Division's 221st Field Artillery Battalion also supported the 25th Division's artillery.

The enemy's deficiency in artillery and air power simplified the problem of selecting forward artillery positions west of the Lunga River. Since defilade, camouflage, and concealment were not necessary, the artillerymen were able to emplace their guns on the forward slopes of hills with impunity. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion decided on Hill 49, a high bluff east of the Matanikau River.

Rough ground and insufficient motor transport complicated the movement of weapons, spare parts, ammunition, rations, and water. Every battalion initially hauled two units of fire from the ammunition dump near the Ilu River to its battle position, a distance of over ten miles for each battalion. Two units of fire for the 105's weigh 135 tons, or fifty-four 2½-ton truckloads. Each 105-mm. battalion possessed but five 2‡-ton trucks. The 90th's heavy transport originally consisted of only ten 4-ton trucks. In addition, each battalion had but five jeeps, two ¾-ton weapons carriers, and four 1-ton trailers. By borrowing Six 2‡-ton trucks from the Americal Division and driving all vehicles day and night, the artillery battalions were able to put their howitzers into their positions and haul enough

[1] The Americal Division was a unique Army unit, for it bore a name instead of a number and had been activated in New Caledonia instead of on United States territory. The name "Americal" is a contraction of the words *America* and *New Caledonia.* The division, activated in May 1942, was composed of elements of the force sent to defend New Caledonia in the early months of the war.

ammunition to support the projected offensive by 8 January. With their howitzers in place, the artillery battalions established check points and registered fire on prospective targets.

CASUALTY MOVEMENT taxed the facilities of medical units during the January offensive. The jeep, only vehicle able to negotiate the poor roads, was used to carry patients to hospitals after men were brought out of the front lines by hand-carry teams.

The 25th Medical Battalion solved the problem of evacuation from Mount Austen and the hills to the west in the same manner as had the 101st in December 1942. Engineers and medical troops strung cableways across canyons, rigged skids on light Navy litters so that they could slide, and later used a boat line on the Matanikau to evacuate wounded. Carrying litters up and down steep slopes exhausted litter-bearers so quickly that litter squads were enlarged from the usual four to six, eight, and even twelve men. Converted jeeps were used as ambulances on the roads and trails.

H Hour for the 25th Division was set at 0635, 10 January 1943. This attack, the most extensive American ground operation on Guadalcanal since the landing, was to open the final drive up the north coast. To make the offensive a success, the 25th Division had to carry out two missions: reduce the Gifu strong point, thus eliminating the last organized bodies of enemy troops east of the Matanikau; and capture the high ground south of the Point Cruz-Hill 66 line, thus beginning the envelopment of the Point Cruz-Kokumbona area and extending the western American lines far enough inland to make the forthcoming western advance a clean sweep.

In the 27th Infantry's zone, the 900-foot-high hill mass formed by Hills 55-54-50-51-52-57-53, called the Galloping Horse from its appearance in an aerial photograph, dominated the Point Cruz area to the north. XIV Corps headquarters believed that the enemy's hold on the Galloping Horse was strong and that he would vigorously oppose the attack in this zone.

The First Day – 161st First Battalion Operations: The distance from Hill 53, the "head" of the Galloping Horse, to Hill 66 is about 1,500 yards. Hill 50, the "tail," lies about 2,000 yards northeast of Hill 53. The Horse is isolated on three sides: the Matanikau River's main stream separates it on the east from the high ground north of Mount Austen; the southwest fork of the Matanikau cuts it off from the hills on the south; and the northwest Matanikau fork flows between the Galloping Horse and the hills on the north. The heavy jungles lying along the river forks also help to isolate the hill mass. The southern slopes of the Horse's back and head--Hills 51, 52, and 53--are almost perpendicular, and Hills 50 and 55 are nearly as steep. The tops of the hills are open, with only a few scattered trees. The main vegetation consists of high, dense, tough grass and brush. The surrounding valleys are dense jungle.

The Battle Plan was complex requiring tremendous coordination between the groups of ground troops, artillery and Army and Marine Air force cover. XIV Corps headquarters believed that the enemy's hold on the Galloping Horse was strong and that he would vigorously oppose the attack in this zone. Throughout December 1942 and January 1943, patrols from the 2d Marines and the Americal Division's Mobile Combat Reconnaissance Squadron had met heavy enemy rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire from the vicinity of Hill 52. The enemy troops, including elements of the Japanese *228th* and *230th Infantry Regiments* of the *38th Division,* also held a series of strong points along the banks of the southwest Matanikau fork south of the Galloping Horse.



Colonel McCulloch, commanding the 27th Infantry, determined to attack south across the 2,000-yard front of the Galloping Horse with two battalions supported by sections of the 27th Infantry's Cannon Company. Believing that the jeep trail from the Matanikau up to the summit of Hill 55 was not adequate for the delivery of supplies to two battalions attacking abreast, he decided to attack from two separate points. He ordered Lt. Col. Claude E. Jurney's 1st Battalion to attack on the right (west) against Hill 57 (the forelegs) from Hill 66 in the 2d Marine Division's zone. The battalion was to advance south of Hill 66 across the northwest Matanikau fork, to seize the water hole where the 182d Infantry's detail had been ambushed on 18 November, and to take the Corps' objective in its zone, the north part of Hill 57. F Company of the 8th Marines and the Americal Division's Reconnaissance Squadron were to provide flank security for the 1st Battalion. Colonel Jurney's battalion was to be supplied over the more convenient Hill 66 route. Twenty-five men from each company of the 1st Battalion were to carry supplies forward from Hill 66.

The 3d Battalion, Lt. Col. George E. Bush commanding, was to advance on the left in a wide enveloping movement. Colonel Bush's troops were to assemble behind the 2d Marines' lines on Hill 55, and then advance south along the Galloping Horse's hind legs and attack generally southwest to take Hill 53, the Corps' objective in the 3d Battalion zone. Supplies for the 3d Battalion were to be brought from the coast road along Marine Trail, across the Matanikau,

and up the jeep trail to Hill 55, from where they would be hand-carried by seventy-five natives escorted by soldiers of the Antitank Company. The assault battalions were to reach their lines of departure from the coast road.

Lt. Col. Herbert V. Mitchell's 2d Battalion was to be initially in regimental reserve in assembly areas at the base of Hill 55. The 1st Battalion of the 161st Infantry, Lt. Col. Louie C. Aston commanding, was attached to the 27th Infantry for this action to block the southwest Matanikau fork between Hill 50 and the high ground to the south, and to assist in holding a defense line along Hills 50 and 51 after their capture. General Collins warned Colonel McCulloch that, if the 35th Infantry encountered difficulty in taking its objective to the south, the 27th might have to come to its assistance from the Hill 51-52 area before moving west to take Hill 53.

Massive Artillery Fire: Artillery preparation for the attack on the Galloping Horse began at 0550, 10 January, when the 25th Division artillery fired a heavy concentration on the water hole near Hill 66 and on the Galloping Horse's forelegs. In thirty minutes, 5,700 rounds were fired by six field artillery battalions-the 8th, 64th, 89th from Hill 66, and 90th from the 25th Division; the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines; and the 221st from the Americal Division. Fire was controlled by the 25th Division's fire direction center. The 105-mm. howitzers fired 3,308 rounds; 155's fired 98; 75's fired 1,874. The total weight of the projectiles was 99½ tons!

To make all initial rounds hit their targets simultaneously, the artillery employed time-on-target fire. This technique, which the 25th Division had rehearsed in previous training, invariably caused carnage among troops caught in the open, for they were not warned to take cover by the shells from the nearest battery landing shortly before the main concentration. The artillery fired at irregular intervals, hoping that the enemy troops who had survived the first blasts would believe the shelling to be over and expose themselves during lulls to the next volleys.

This time-on-target (TOT) "shoot" was the first divisional TOT firing of the Guadalcanal campaign, and may have been the first divisional combat TOT firing by American artillerymen during World War II. The fire devastated the vicinity of the water hole. It was so effective that when the 1st Battalion attacked south against its objective over a route known to have been formerly strongly held by the enemy, it encountered only minor opposition.

As steep cliffs masked some of the enemy positions on the Horse from artillery shells, aircraft from the 2d Marine Air Wing then struck at the positions on the reverse slopes. At 0620, when the artillery fire ceased, twelve P-39's and an equal number of dive bombers (SBD's) flew over to strike at the Japanese. Each P-39 carried one 500-pound bomb, and each dive bomber carried three 325-pound depth charges. The artillery had laid a smoke line from the

southwest tip of Hill 66 to the Horse's left (east) foreleg. No plane was to bomb east of the smoke line. But just before the attacking aircraft reached the target area, a quantity of ammunition blew up on Hill 56. It had been struck either by a short American shell or by an accurate round from the enemy's artillery. The leading bomber, apparently misled by the smoke from the exploding ammunition, dropped a depth charge on the 8th Marines on Hill 66, and the second bombed Hill 55 east of the smoke line. Fortunately, no marines or soldiers were hurt.

The First Day: 3d Battalion Operations

[Details of four long days of fighting are given here so the reader can appreciate how and what these members of the 161st Infantry and Fred Tenore and his artillery support team endured].

In its zone the 3d Battalion was to have a harder and longer fight. This area would certainly not be taken in a single day or a single battle. There, the terrain, though open, was extremely rough. The thick woods in the valleys extend along the north side of the zone for 1,500 yards between the Horse's hind legs and forelegs. The Horse's body, formed by an open area 600 yards across from north to south, is cut by hills and ravines. Waist-high grass and broken ground in this area provided cover for advancing troops. South along the Horse's body the precipitous, almost perpendicular slopes leading to the jungled gorge of the southwest Matanikau fork made troop movements in that direction almost impossible. Hill 52 in the middle dominates the neighboring hills. Between Hills 52 and 53 are two smaller hills, invisible from the ground east of Hill 52, which the 25th Division later called Exton and Sims Ridges after two 2d Battalion lieutenants who were killed on 12 January.

Because it dominated the surrounding area, Hill 52 was an intermediate objective for the 3d Battalion in its attack toward Hill 53. It was a naturally strong position that a few troops could easily hold. Its level crest dominated the approaches from

the east and north, and the steep palisades on the south blocked any flanking movements from that side. Sheer drops on the west and south protected the defenders from American fire. Marine and Reconnaissance Squadron patrols had previously approached Hill 52 and reported it to be a "hornet's nest." Although the area to the east had been scouted, no patrols had been able to push west of Hill 52 prior to 10 January. The 27th Infantry's information about the terrain west of Hill 52 had been derived from aerial reconnaissance and photographs.

Colonel Bush had planned to call for artillery fire to neutralize the crest of Hill 52 prior to the infantry attack, but L Company had moved too rapidly. The artillery could not fire on Hill 52's crest without endangering the platoon. While the 1st Platoon hugged the ground, American artillery put fire on targets beyond Hill 52 but did not dare risk shelling the enemy strong point. American 37-mm. guns and mortars put direct fire on and over the crest, but the 37's could not reach the Japanese troops, who were defiladed by the sheer drop. Mortar fire could have hit the enemy on Hill 52, but the 3d Battalion mortar crews did not know the exact location of the enemy weapons.

Colonel Bush's final plan for the capture of the hill called for another envelopment. The holding force, I Company, was to attack from the northeast while K Company, with one rifle platoon from L and a machine gun platoon from M Company attached, enveloped the position from the north. L Company, holding Hill 51 with one platoon, was in reserve. The attack would be supported by field artillery fire, machine guns, mortars, and antitank guns. The assaulting units moved into position; by about 1400 Colonel Bush had determined the exact location of the assault companies, although the battalion command post on Hill 54 had been harassed by enemy rifle fire. The forward observer then called for artillery fire to be delivered on the crest of Hill 52, but a communication failure delayed the artillery until 1430.

About noon, after the 3d Battalion's attack had bogged down, Colonel McCulloch had sent the air support commander forward to confer with Colonel Bush on Hill 54. The 3d Battalion commander had shown him the most likely targets on the Galloping Horse, and the air officer had agreed to bomb Hill 52 at 1500 unless the hill had been captured by that time. An artillery smoke shell was to mark the target and indicate to the pilots that they were to execute the planned bombing mission. Bush's plan called for K Company to assault Hill 52 before 1500, and had Hill 52 fallen before then, the planes were not to drop their bombs. By 1430, when the artillery was ready to fire the concentration on Hill 52, the planes were overhead. Colonel Bush decided to use the planes despite the fact that K Company would have to withdraw the right (western)

The planes bombed Hill 52 successfully; they spaced the depth charges well. Not one fell on the east slope but all hit the reverse slope. Four charges exploded on the target, and two were duds. After the bombing four howitzer battalions put a 20-minute concentration on Hill 52. When the 105's ceased firing, the 37-mm. guns and mortars fired in support of the infantry.

Under cover of the 37-mm. and mortar fire, the infantrymen launched a coordinated attack. K Company had resumed its position on the north slopes of Hill 52. The platoon from L Company covered the gap between K and I. The soldiers crawled close to the crest under cover of the supporting fire, then, with bayonets fixed, rushed and captured it. By 1635 the 3d Battalion had cleaned out the enemy's positions on the western slopes, captured six machine guns which had survived the bombardment, killed thirty Japanese, and secured the hill. The battalion did not attack again that day but organized a cordon defense on Hill 52 for the night.

The 25th Division, carrying out the most ambitious divisional offensive on Guadalcanal since the capture of the Lunga airfield, had made good progress in its first day of combat. The artillery fire had been especially effective. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, had reached the division objective in its zone. The 3d Battalion, meeting heavier resistance, had advanced 1,600 yards toward its objective and captured Hills 50, 51, and 52. Over half the Galloping Horse was in American hands. Patrols from the 1st Battalion had reached Hill 52 to make contact with the 3d Battalion. Colonel Mitchell's 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in regimental reserve, occupied the Hill 50-51 area, and had established contact between the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 182d Infantry, on the Matanikau. American casualties had been light. It had not been necessary to commit the division reserve, the 161st Infantry.

The Second Day – 3rd Battalion Operations

The 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry prepared to renew its attack toward Hill 53 on 11 January but was faced with a shortage of water. Very little drinking water had been brought forward to the 3d Battalion during its fight on 10 January, which was a hot, sunny day. Springs and streams are usually plentiful in the Solomons, but there was then no running water on the Galloping Horse. Colonel Bush delayed his attack against Hill 53 on 11 January until after 0900 in the vain hope that water would reach his thirsty troops. The water point at the foot of Hill 55 was adequate and the supply officer had sent water up the trail but units in the rear had apparently diverted it before it could reach the soldiers in combat. As most of the soldiers of the 3d Battalion had entered combat with but one canteen of water, they had to attack on 11 January carrying only the water which remained in their canteens from the previous day.

Colonel Bush's plan for 11 January called for two companies to attack abreast after artillery bombardment. Both assault companies moved off the right (north) end of Hill 52 after the artillery preparation. The security platoon of I Company reached a narrow bottleneck west of Hill 52 between two ridges. The rest of the company followed. When fire from Japanese mortars, machine guns; and rifles began to hit them, the soldiers halted. I Company requested that mortars and artillery put fire on the enemy but did not move forward nor maneuver to the enemy flanks. Squeezed in the narrow gap, the company was hit repeatedly by mortar fire. Many spent and thirsty men collapsed. In one platoon only ten men were still conscious at noon.

Also unsuccessful was L Company's attack. The lead platoon and one attached machine gun platoon cut through the ravine north of Hill 52 to secure the right flank. They turned west, and advanced to Hill 57, then turned left to climb the southeast slopes. When heavy machine-gun fire from the flanks and rear halted them, they dug in to await the main body, which did not arrive. When dusk fell the two platoons, out of communication with the battalion, returned to Hill 52. The main body of L Company had not advanced, but had deployed behind I Company to hunt down scattered enemy riflemen.

By midafternoon Colonel Bush felt certain that the 3d Battalion could not take its objective that day. Since the position reached by I Company was untenable, I and L Companies returned to Hill 52 for the night. After dusk the force which had been halted on Hill 57 also returned. Between 1500 and 1600 accurate, heavy Japanese mortar fire forced the 3d Battalion to take cover and delayed defensive preparations for the expected night attack. The enemy did make a slight effort to infiltrate the lines that night but was repulsed by L Company.

Colonel McCulloch ordered the exhausted 3d Battalion to go back to Hills 55 and 54 into regimental reserve on the morning of 12 January, and Colonel Mitchell's 2d Battalion took over the assault against the ridges and Hill 53. Up

to this time the 2d Battalion had held the rear areas taken by the 3d Battalion and had helped to carry supplies forward. The 1st Battalion of the 161st Infantry then took over the Hill 50-51 area.

The Third Day - 3rd Battalion Operations

Colonel Mitchell planned to attack on 12 January to capture Hill 53 and that part of Hill 57 which lay in his zone. The attack was to be delivered from Hill 52. Artillery and aerial bombardments were to support the infantry's attacks.



After a preliminary bombardment both assault companies moved out of the cordon defense on Hill 52 at 0630, 12 January. On the right G Company advanced to the north and west. Some enemy riflemen in the woods north of Hill 52 opened fire but were hunted down by patrols from G Company. As the company moved west Japanese in the jungle north of Sims Ridge opened fire, but G Company continued its march and by noon had made contact with the 1st Battalion on Hill 57.

G Company was the only unit which reached its objective on 12 January. In general, vigorous Japanese resistance halted the 2d Battalion's advance. At the beginning of the day the Japanese were occupying Exton Ridge, and Sims Ridge 200 yards west of Exton; Hill 53 southwest of Hill 52; the jungle north of Sims; and the shallow dip between Exton and Sims Ridges. Enemy machine guns covered all approaches, and the steep precipice above the southwest Matanikau fork prevented F and E Companies from enveloping the enemy from the south.

F Company attacked Exton Ridge but moved too far to the right and exposed the battalion's left flank. By then the Japanese had pulled off Exton Ridge and F Company took it quickly but could advance no farther toward Hill 53. Colonel Mitchell then committed his reserve, E Company, to F's left to cover the battalion's south (left) flank, but E Company also failed to advance beyond Exton Ridge. Fire from Sims Ridge held both companies in place, Colonel Mitchell decided to envelop Sims Ridge. He withdrew F Company from Exton and ordered it to move to the right to attack Sims Ridge from the north. E Company continued its attack but failed to progress. When F Company attacked southward against Sims it was able to capture the north slopes, but about halfway to the crest it was halted by an enemy strong point that was dug in on the reverse (west) slope. At first the soldiers could not locate the position which machine guns were defending from all sides. Meanwhile E Company, trying to advance over Exton, in avoiding enemy fire had moved to the right and partly intermingled with F Company.

To give closer support to the assault companies, H Company then moved its heavy machine guns to Exton Ridge. On Sims Ridge the infantry sought out the enemy strong point. Capt. Charles W. Davis, the battalion executive officer, with Capt. Paul K. Mellichamp and Lt. Weldon Sims crawled down the east side of the ridge behind a waist-high

shelf, a natural approach. When Lieutenant Sims exposed himself above the shelf, a Japanese machine gunner shot him fatally through the chest. His companions then pulled his body down and returned to the 2d Battalion lines.

When the strong point was thus approximately located, American machine guns and mortars opened fire while the infantry made one more effort to overcome the enemy. Captain Davis crawled behind the shelf close to the strong point and radioed firing data to H Company's 81-mm. mortar squads. As both he and the men of E and F Companies were then less than fifty yards from the enemy the exploding shells showered dirt, rock chips, and fragments among them, but failed to destroy the enemy position. The enemy machine guns were still in action and kept the American infantry in place.

Meanwhile Colonel Mitchell had left the battalion command post on Hill 52 to join the assault companies on Sims Ridge. As the Japanese and Americans on Sims Ridge were within grenade-throwing distance of each other, he decided not to use 81-mm. mortars. The 1st Battalion mortar sections on the north end of Hill 57 offered to fire at troops visible to them on Sims, but Colonel Mitchell feared that the troops were his own and declined. By the time the last attacks by E and F Companies had been halted halfway to the objective, the day was nearly gone.

By late afternoon, the two companies had exhausted their drinking water; the men were on the verge of collapsing. They organized an all-round defense on the north slopes of Sims Ridge in anticipation of a Japanese night counterattack. Colonel Mitchell decided to spend the night with the troops on Sims Ridge instead of returning to the battalion command post on Hill 52, for the regimental executive officer was then at the command post and could act in emergencies.

During the day the 8th Field Artillery Battalion had fired the seventeen concentrations requested by Colonel Mitchell. Together with its supporting battalions, the 8th also adjusted fire on Hill 53 in preparation for the next day's assault.

The Japanese did not attack the 2d Battalion that night, but they did succeed in cutting the telephone line between Colonel Mitchell and Hill 52. Some of the American soldiers, facing the Japanese for the first time at night, fired indiscriminately in the enemy's direction.

The Fourth Day - 3rd Battalion Operations

The 2d Battalion's attack plan for 13 January called for E Company to continue the attack against Sims Ridge from the north. At the same time F Company was to withdraw from the ridge and advance along a covered route between the jungle and the Horse's neck to attack the north end of Hill 53 H Company was to maintain the base of fire on Hill 52 and Exton Ridge.

E Company attacked as ordered but was immediately halted by machinegun fire from the strong point. Six volunteers from F Company then worked their way to within twenty-five yards of the strong point, but two were killed by machine-gun fire and the survivors withdrew.

The short distance separating the Japanese from the Americans on Sims Ridge protected the Japanese from 60-mm. mortar fire. E and F Companies fired their 60-mm. mortars from the north end of Sims Ridge, but the range was too short and the enemy position too high up to make such firing effective. The 60-mm. squads moved back and fired repeatedly to hit the strong

point. They shortened the range until the barrels pointed almost vertically, but they still could not hit the target. For safety's sake Mitchell ordered the 60-mm. mortars to cease firing.

Colonel Mitchell and the battalion executive officer then devised a plan to break the stale-mate. The colonel took part of E Company down Sims Ridge behind the shelf on the east slope to a point directly east of the enemy. Meanwhile Captain Davis, the executive, and the four survivors of the party which had previously approached the strong point crawled and wriggled their way southward down the west slope close to the enemy position. They were to neutralize the strong point with grenades to prepare the way for Colonel Mitchell's unit to assault from the east on Davis' whistle signal.

The five men had crawled to within ten yards of the position when the Japanese hurled grenades at them. Although their aim was accurate, the grenades failed to explode. The Americans replied with eight grenades which did explode, then sprang up to rush the enemy, some of whom fled. Captain Davis' rifle jammed after one round. He threw it away, drew his pistol, and the five men leaped among the surviving Japanese and finished them with

rifles and pistols. E Company witnessed this bold rush and, in the words of General Collins who observed the day's fighting and helped to direct mortar fire from Hill 52, "came to life" and drove uphill to sweep the last Japanese from Sims Ridge. For his gallant action, Captain Davis later received the Medal of Honor.

Like the 3d Battalion on 11 January, the 2d Battalion had received almost no water after it attacked on 12 January, and thirst might well have caused the 13 January attack to stall. But shortly after E Company had cleared Sims Ridge a quick heavy cloudburst soaked the earth and cooled the soldiers who were able to obtain a little water from standing pools and by wringing their clothes. The amount they obtained, though scanty, proved sufficient to sustain them.

While F Company was moving along its covered route, three field artillery battalions put fire on Hill 53. When the artillery fire ceased both companies (F and E) attacked Hill 53. E Company advanced south and west along Sims Ridge to seize the high ground on the top of the Horse's head, and F Company emerged from the jungle to attack the head from the north. The infantrymen capitalized on the shock effect of the artillery by attacking immediately after it stopped firing. The 2d Battalion found that organized Japanese resistance had ceased. By 1030 the 2d Battalion had captured all but the southwest tip of Hill 53; by noon it had taken the entire hill and reached the division's objective in its zone.

E Company destroyed a Japanese 70-mm. gun on Hill 53, and captured a number of rifles, grenade dischargers, machine guns, and some ammunition. Colonel Mitchell's battalion, in two days of action, had lost two officers and twenty-nine enlisted men killed, and had killed an estimated 170 Japanese soldiers from the *228th* and *230th Infantry Regiments, 38th Division*. A few of the enemy dead wore good clothes and had been in good physical condition, but the remainder were ragged and half-starved.

By nightfall of 13 January the western American lines on Guadalcanal extended 4,500 yards inland (south) from Point Cruz across Hill 66 to Hills 57 and 53. The 27th Infantry had taken all its objectives, pocketed the enemy in the river gorges, and was firmly seated on the Galloping Horse, waiting for the 35th Infantry to complete its longer advance to the division's objective in its zone to the south. From 15 to 22 January the 161st Infantry, in a series of sharp fights, cleaned out the Japanese positions south of the Galloping Horse in the gorge of the southwest Matanikau fork. During this period the 27th Infantry fought no more major actions, but mopped up the Japanese remaining in the jungled gorge north of the Galloping Horse, built defense positions, constructed roads, and patrolled to the west to prepare for the next assault.

The assault of Galloping Horse was finally over.

The Coastal Offensive

The 2d Marine Division, holding the Hill 66-Point Cruz line on the coast on the right of the 25th Division's zone of action, remained in place during the first three days of the Galloping Horse action. On 12 January the Marine division received orders from General Patch to begin its advance westward from the Hill 66-Point Cruz line.

Japanese soldiers from the *2d Division* were then holding the coast sector. In some areas, especially in the wooded ravine just west of the Point Cruz-Hill 66 line, their defenses were very strong. As in November and December enemy machine guns at the head (south end) of each draw were able to pour flanking fire into advancing American troops.

The 2d Marines opened the attack at 0500, 13 January. By 0730 the regiment had moved 800 yards west from Hill 66, at a cost of 6 killed and 61 wounded. At noon the 6th Marines moved forward to relieve the 2d.



Ten minutes after the 2d Marines had jumped off, the leading units of the 8th Marines on the right of the 2d began the attack. They moved from the east slopes of Hills 80 and 81 toward the ravine to the west. The Japanese in the ravines stopped the move with machine-gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Thus, at the end of the first day the left flank units of the 2d Marine Division had advanced, but the attack in the center had been halted. The 8th Marines tried again on 14 January but failed to gain.

The regiment brought up tanks on 15 January to crack the Japanese emplacements but failed to achieve much success. In the afternoon the marines brought a flamethrower forward to use it in action for the first time. The flamethrower burned out one Japanese emplacement ten minutes after its two-man operating team reached the front and burned out two more emplacements later in the day.

The Flamethrower in the Pacific – Guadalcanal to the Marshall Islands

The U.S. Army in World War II used two types of flame throwers, the portable, carried on the soldier's back, and the mechanized, mounted on an armored vehicle, usually a tank. Because flame could penetrate ports and apertures and could be made to turn corners, these special-purpose weapons proved extremely useful in overcoming a determined enemy in strong, stubbornly held defensive positions, invulnerable in most cases to conventional weapons.

During the period between WWI and WWII, the United States devoted little attention to flame thrower research and development. Military men considered it the least valuable incendiary munition and regarded its World War I performance as a total failure, a fact which led the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service to remark: "In the Chemical Warfare Service it has been the habit for a long while not to mention the flame thrower at all, unless questions were asked about it."

In 1940 the United States Army took steps toward the development of a portable flame thrower. On 12 August 1940, the Secretary of War charged the Chief of the Chemical Warfare with the development, manufacture, storage, and issue of the weapon, and during the next year the CWS developed two experimental models. The first, the E1, was quickly discarded; the second, the E1R1, was tested and issued to troops. This model, with slight modifications, was standardized as the M1 portable flame thrower in August 1941. When certain basic deficiencies appeared in this weapon and in the M1A1, an improved version, CWS scientists produced an entirely new flame thrower, the M2-2. This was the group of portable flame weapons used by the U.S. Army in World War II. They were frequently ineffective and faulty, particularly in hands of troops ill trained in matters of operations and tactics. But with the development of a better flame thrower, and with the gradual improvement in tactics and training, this CWS weapon came to play an important part in coping with the unique conditions of the war against Japan.

The Portable Flame Thrower in the South Pacific – Guadalcanal: The American portable flame thrower made its first successful combat appearance on 15 January 1943 at Guadalcanal, five months after United States forces began the assault of this South Pacific island. Although the weapon was not available at first, its potentiality against enemy bunkers encountered on the islands—defenses which defied ordinary weapons—soon became apparent. In speaking of the fighting on nearby Tulagi, Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the 1st Marine Division, stated that flame throwers would have been "practical and effective" against the strong Japanese defenses.

The fortifications encountered on Guadalcanal were typical of those to be found in subsequent fighting in the Pacific. These well camouflaged defenses were made of indigenous material reinforced by whatever metal was available. The compartment of a bunker could be from 4 to 5 feet high, from 6 to 30 feet long, and from 3 to 10 feet wide. Foot-thick coconut logs served as columns and crossbeams, the latter covered by several layers of logs and, later in the war, by quarter-inch sheets of steel. Walls were strengthened by iron or steel rails and sheeting, log pilings, or oil drums filled with sand. The whole elaborate framework was covered with earth and thoroughly camouflaged. Fire trenches, connected by shallow crawl tunnels, usually adjoined the bunker, and entrances were placed in the rear end in positions capable of being covered by other bunkers. Consequently, Japanese bunkers were mutually supporting and practically impervious to the effects of artillery and mortar fire. And they were manned by an enemy who refused to be driven out, but who chose instead to fight until death. There was an obvious and pressing need for a weapon which could reduce such positions instantly and effectively. The flame thrower offered a possible solution to the problem.

Late in 1942 the Americal and the 25th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Marine Division arrived on Guadalcanal to bolster the slackened pace of the American offensive. Each carried a limited number of flame throwers. Beginning in December 1942 a CWS officer conducted on-the-spot training of flame thrower operators, and by mid-January 1943 the troops were ready to give the weapon its initial combat test.

On 15 January 1943 during Quadalcanal coastal operations, combat engineers of the 8th Marines, 2D Marine Division, attacked enemy defenses surrounding a beach installation. Late in the afternoon they encountered a particularly stubborn Japanese pillbox, and 2 marines equipped with a flame thrower went forward to silence it. Covered by automatic rifles, they crawled to within 25 yards of the position and fired the flame thrower at the bunker. All resistance ceased, and the marines found 5 dead Japanese inside. Although 2 of the enemy had managed to get out, neither had escaped the effects of the flame. One lay 3 feet from the escape hatch, the other had run about 15 feet before collapsing. Encouraged by this result, Marine combat engineers went forward and within 20 minutes wiped out 2 more enemy strongpoints with flame throwers.

The 25th Infantry Division used flame throwers on the same day with far less success. Employed by units of the 35th Infantry, the weapons failed to wipe out enemy pillboxes or to materially aid the assault. Since casualties were high, and malfunctions frequent, the regiment decided not to employ its flame throwers in future engagements. Nevertheless, the weapon was used throughout the mopping-up phase of the campaign by other units and often proved a quick and effective means of reducing difficult enemy positions.

If at the conclusion of the Guadalcanal operation the intrinsic merit of the flame thrower was still in doubt, this combat experience with the weapon did provide answers to several important tactical problems. Units discovered that the flame thrower, because of its limited range and short duration of fire, had to be used in conjunction with other weapons in order to be effective. A trained security detachment armed with rifles, automatic rifles, and smoke grenades was needed to keep the enemy under cover long enough for the flame thrower operator to approach and flame his target. Experience also showed that the engineers were too busy with other jobs to handle the flame thrower; that the weapon would be better utilized in the hands of the infantry.

To take advantage of these lessons, the division on Guadalcanal, under the direction of the recently activated XIV Corps, set up ambitious training programs. On 27 March 1943 the 25th Division published a training memorandum which withdrew the weapon from the combat engineers and gave it to the ammunition and pioneer platoon of the infantry battalion. The division then organized a series of one-day flame thrower schools to train eight men from each of these platoons to use the weapons. Other units, many of whose chemical and regimental gas officers had themselves been trained by the 25th Division Chemical Section, organized similar training programs. By mid-1943 the general state of flame thrower readiness of Army units on Guadalcanal was relatively good.

By the end of 17 January, the 8th Marines had cleared out the ravine to its front and had advanced its line forward beside the 6th Marines on the left. In five days of fighting the 2d Marine Division had gained about 1,500 yards. It reported that it had killed 643 Japanese and captured 2 prisoners, 41 grenade dischargers, 57 light and 14 heavy machine guns, 3 75-mm. field pieces, plus small arms, mines, and a quantity of artillery ammunition.

By 18 January, when the 8th Marines were withdrawn, American troops were holding a continuous line from Hill 53 north to the coast. It reached the beach at a point some 1,500 yards west of Point Cruz. The XIV Corps had gained a position from which it could start its drive into Kokumbona, long a major objective. This drive was begun just before the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division completed its task on Mount Austen.

The Second January Offensive

When the 25th Division completed the capture of the Galloping Horse on 13 January, it doubled the length of the Corps' west front. The front now extended far enough inland to enable the Corps to advance westward on a broad front without much danger of having its left flank enveloped. General Patch then prepared for a second co-ordinated attack designed to carry through Kokumbona to the Poha River, about 9,000 yards west of Point Crux.

This northwestern push was intended to drive the remaining Japanese forces to the most likely point of withdrawal – Cape Esperance on the northern coast. To deny the Japanese a retreat pathway southwestward over the

mountains to Beaufort Bay. A small force was established along the only mountain trail. The Japanese, however, never attempted to make their way over the mountain trail.

XI V Corps' Offensive Plans

Two days after Captain Beach's force reached Vurai, General Patch directed the XIV Corps to resume its co-ordinated attacks. Field Order No. 1, issued on 16 January, ordered the Corps to attack west to gain a line extending southwest from a point on the beach about 2,600 yards west of Point Cruz inland to a point about 3,000 yards west of the Galloping Horse. Since most of the regiments of both the 2d Marine and Americal Divisions were too badly worn out for further offensive action, the Corps commander formed the Composite Army-Marine (CAM) Division from the 6th Marines, the 182d and the 147th Infantry Regiments, and the 2d Marine and Americal Division artillery units. The CAM Division was to continue the coastal drive on the right of the 25th Division on a 3,000-yard front. It was also to keep contact on its left with the 25th Division and guard the shore line between the Matanikau River and the objective. General Patch ordered the 25th Division to attack to the southwest to envelop the Japanese south (right) flank and cover the XIV Corps' left (south) flank. "Isolated points of enemy resistance" were to be contained, bypassed, and reduced later. After reaching its objective the Corps was to be prepared to continue the attack to the northwest.

Artillery support arrangements were the same as those made on 10 January. General Mulcahy's 2d Marine Air Wing was to give close air support. Destroyers of the U. S. Navy, assisted by fire control parties on shore, would bombard enemy coastal positions. During the attack the Americal Division (less the 182d Infantry) and the 2d and 8th Marines were to man the Lunga perimeter defense.[8]

The ground over which the XIV Corps was to fight is similar to that covered in the first January offensive. On the coast the rocky north-south ridges, with deep ravines between, furnished the enemy with strong natural positions from which to oppose the CAM Division. The 25th Division's zone covered higher ground than the CAM Division's. The outstanding feature of the inland zone is the hill mass formed by Hills 87-88-89, the highest ground on the north coast between the Matanikau River and Cape Esperance. These hills dominate Kokumbona just as Mount Austen dominates Lunga Point.

25th Division's Preliminary Movements

To carry out General Patch's orders for the offensive, General Collins, on 20 January 1943, ordered the 25th Division to attack west from the Galloping Horse on 22 January. The 27th Infantry was to deliver a holding attack while the 161st Infantry, making the division's main effort, moved southwest to outflank the enemy. The 35th Infantry was to complete mopping up the Gifu, then pass to division reserve.

In the 161st Infantry's zone, three small open hills lay southwest of the Hill 53. Hill Z, the most distant, was 2,500 yards from Hill 53, and 6,900 yards south of Sealark Channel. The 161st Infantry was to seize these hills, then move northwest through the jungle to attack Hill 87, the division objective, from the rear. After the capture of Hill 87 the regiment was to seize the other two eminences (Hills 88 and 89) comprising the hill mass.

The road up to the Galloping Horse had been extended to Hill 53. Supplies for the 161st Infantry had been trucked to Hill 53, and native bearers were to hand-carry supplies forward from there to support the attack. The 161st Infantry assembled on the southern parts of the Galloping Horse. On 20 January the 2d Battalion advanced to Hill X, and the next day to Hill Y. but found no strong forces there. The battalion killed only one Japanese on 21 January.

In the northern half of the with Division's zone, the 27th Infantry prepared for its holding attack. A long, slender, open ridge runs from a point southwest of Hill 66 near the northwest Matanikau fork to a point east of Hill 87. This ridge, called the "Snake" from its appearance in an aerial photograph, provided a route of approach for the 27th Infantry. To supply the 27th's attack, the 57th and 65th Engineer Battalions extended the road from Hill 66 up to the Snake's back prior to 22 January, and when the infantry advanced the engineers were to push the road to Hill 87.

On 20 January a patrol from A Company--one rifle and one mortar squad--advanced west over the Snake toward Hill 87. As the patrol neared Hill 87C enemy machine-gun and mortar fire forced the soldiers to take cover.

Before a reinforcing platoon reached the scene an artillery forward observer with the beleaguered patrol radioed firing data to his battalion. The resulting artillery bombardment forced the enemy to cease fire and the 1st Battalion patrol returned safely. Another bullseye for Fred Tenore and his team.

The enemy still held Hill 87; the mortars and machine guns emplaced there helped to confirm the American belief that the position would be strongly defended. Because Hill 87 dominated Hill 87C, the 1st Battalion did not try to hold the latter prior to 22 January.

A second 1st Battalion patrol marched without incident to Hill 87G, 1,000 yards northwest of 87C, on 20 January. Because the route led the patrol over such rough terrain that it took three hours to travel the distance, Colonel Jurney determined to attack only over the Snake on 22 January.

The 25th Division's Advance to Kokumbona

First Day: The Change in Plan

Infantrymen of the With Division attacked at 0630, 22 January. The divisional field order had not specifically ordered a preparatory artillery bombardment, but at the requests of the regimental commanders the division artillery fired 12½ tons of 75-mm., 105-mm., and 155-mm. ammunition into the 161st Infantry's zone southwest of the Galloping Horse, and 55½ tons on Hill 87. Four battalions put fire on Hill 87; the 8th Field Artillery Battalion, for example, fired at an extremely rapid rate--fourteen and one-half rounds per gun per minute.



While the 1st Battalion of the 161st Infantry covered the division's left flank, the 2d Battalion, which had been designated as the assault battalion, moved off Hill Y into the deep jungle. The 3d Battalion followed to Hills X and Y. The 2d Battalion began marching along an old trail toward Hill 87.

A JAPANESE COASTAL POSITION near Kokumbona, in the 6th marines' zone, after it had been blasted open by artillery. The position apparently had housed a 75-mm. antiaircraft gun.

The 27th Infantry launched its holding attack simultaneously with the 161st's attempted envelopment. At 0630 the 1st Battalion started over the narrow Snake in a column of companies led by C Company. At 0700, when the artillery battalions ceased firing, the 27th Infantry's mortars and 37-mm. guns on the Snake opened fire at Hill 87. C Company started to climb Hill 87F but Japanese machine-gun fire from the top of Hill 87 forced it to halt. American mortars and antitank guns on the Snake silenced the enemy, and by 0745 the battalion had resumed the advance. The battalion then deployed A Company on the right, B in the center, and C on the left--and assaulted Hill 87. But the enemy had withdrawn; there was no opposition. By 0910, in less than three hours, the battalion had advanced almost 3,000 yards to the summit of Hill 87, the day's objective.

Fortunately, the XIV Corps possessed officers who were flexible enough to change their plans to exploit this unexpectedly rapid advance. General Patch had orally instructed the 25th Division commander that if the attack progressed well, the 161st Infantry was to push past the day's objective to take Hills 88 and 89 without waiting for the 27th to reach Hill 87. But the 27th had reached its objective while the assault battalion of the 161st was still deep in the jungle. Colonel Jurney's battalion therefore advanced past the objective. While A Company held Hill 87, B Company went forward 500 yards to seize Hill 88 and C Company advanced 1,000 yards west and north to take Hill 89 by 1035. By 1100 all companies were in place and digging in.

General Collins witnessed this rapid advance from the division observation post on Hill 49 east of the Matanikau. In view of General Patch's instructions to go beyond the objective if possible, General Collins, who in Admiral Halsey's words was "quick on his feet and even quicker in his brain" left the observation post and started toward Hill 89 by jeep and on foot to make arrangements to continue the attack, for the 27th Infantry had outrun its wire communications. Reaching Hill 66, he met Brig. Gen. Robert L. Spragins, the Corps chief of staff, and obtained authority from him, in the name of the Corps commander, to continue the 25th Division's advance into Kokumbona as rapidly as possible. The boundary between the two divisions was immediately changed to place Hills 91, 98, 99, and Kokumbona in the 25th Division's zone. It then ran north to the beach in front of the CAM Division's zone of action.

U.S. LEADERS INSPECTING THE BATTLE ZONE from a hill near the Matanikau (probably Hill 49). Left to right: Secretary of the Navy Frank Know, General Patch, Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, and General Collins

General Collins reached Hill 89, where he conferred with the 27th Infantry's commander, Colonel McCulloch. As the 27th was obviously best situated to pursue the retreating Japanese, General Collins and Colonel McCulloch agreed that the 27th Infantry should resume the attack to capture Hills go and 97 just south of Kokumbona. The 2d Battalion of the 161st, then deep in the jungle, continued toward Hill 87 against a few Japanese riflemen. It gained its objective in the afternoon. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 161st were immediately withdrawn from the south flank and dispatched to the Galloping Horse and the Snake.

The main body of the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry had followed the 1st Battalion over the Snake to Hills 87 and 88; I Company, in covering the right flank, kept contact with the 182d Infantry in the CAM Division's zone. E Company of the 2d Battalion moved from the Galloping Horse to the Snake's head in the early morning, and later in the

Second Day: The Capture of Kokumbona

The 27th Infantry's successful attack on 22 January carried it to the high ground immediately overlooking Kokumbona. In one day, the 1st Battalion had gained over 4,500 yards and by nightfall the 2d and 3d Battalions were close behind. The supply route was protected, and the regiment was ready to exploit its success by moving into Kokumbona. Plans to take Kokumbona on 23 January were completed on the night of 22-23 January. On the morning of 23 January the 3d Battalion, 27th, advanced north from its positions on Hills 89 and 91 to Hills 98 and 99. While the 1st Battalion's advance blocked the Japanese on the south, the 3d Battalion's move extended the regiment's right flank over the undefended hills to the beach to block the hills and the beach road and pocket the enemy facing the CAM Division in the ravines east of Hills 98 and 99.

Once the 3d Battalion was in position, the 1st Battalion, with E Company and one K Company platoon attached, sent two columns into Kokumbona from the east and south. The right flank column B Company, the platoon from

K, and one machine gun platoon and two mortar sections--attacked westward over the northern and western slopes of Hill 99. On the left A and E Companies plus one machine gun platoon and two mortar sections advanced north over Hill go into Kokumbona. By 1510 the two columns had each traveled over 1,000 yards to join forces in the village.



In the afternoon the 2d Battalion was ordered to hold the hills just south of Kokumbona (Hills 90 and 97), and to advance west through the jungle north of Hill 97 to complete the defense of the left flank by seizing Hill 100, about 500 yards beyond the west slopes of Hill 97. G Company assumed the defense of Hill 90, and Battalion Headquarters and H Companies extended their lines west to Hill 97. F Company moved west and killed about thirty Japanese in the jungled draw between Hills 97 and 100 cut by the Beaufort Bay trail and by the Kokumbona River, and took Hill 100 without suffering casualties.

The nights were generally uneventful. The American troops built strong defenses each night, but the retreating Japanese attempted none of the night attacks which had previously characterized their operations on Guadalcanal. After the capture of Kokumbona, I Company of the 3d Battalion, 27th, blocked the road between Hill 99 and the beach. After nightfall on 23-24 January, a group of Japanese soldiers carelessly marched west along the road, talking, using flashlights, and wheeling a 37-mm. gun. Obviously unaware that the Americans had reached the beach, they walked right into I Company's block. The men in the company lay quiet until the Japanese were close, then opened fire with all weapons that would bear and killed about fifty of the enemy.

By the end of the fighting on 23 January, the XIV Corps had pocketed the main body of Japanese remaining east of the Poha in the ravine east of Hill 99. On 24 January the CAM Division resumed its advance. Soldiers of the 147th, attacking to the northwest, killed eighteen Japanese and reached Hill 98, where they made contact with the 27th Infantry by 0940. The 6th Marines attacked and killed over 200 Japanese. By 1500 all three battalions had gained Hills 98 and 99 and had made contact with the 27th Infantry.

Final Push to Poha

The objective was the Poha River, whose mouth lies about 2,300 yards northwest of the west tip of Hill 100 and about 2,600 yards northwest of Kokumbona. The thrust would be lead by the 27th. Supplies had run short, but the capture of the Kokumbona beaches made it possible for landing craft to bring supplies in by water. By noon enough supplies had reached the 27th 2d Battalion to enable it to move out of Kokumbona.

Supported by H Company's machine guns and mortars on Hill 97, K and E Companies attacked west at 1300 on the right, with K Company's right flank on the beach. E Company, on K's left, attempted to drive over Hill 102, a bare hill just west of Kokumbona, but a vigorous Japanese defense held the company on the west tip. To avoid exposing its left flank, K Company halted, and both companies stayed in place for the rest of the day.

On the left G Company, with the antitank platoon of Battalion Headquarters Company and six machine guns from H Company attached, began its advance north from Hill 97; it turned northwest to attempt to seize Hill 103, about 250 yards beyond Hill 100. When G Company tried to cross one of the dry stream beds north of Hill 100, fire from the same well-hidden enemy positions that had halted E Company hit G Company from three sides. Colonel Mitchell ordered the company back. It withdrew and approached Hill 103 by moving safely around the south slopes of Hill 100, which protected G Company from the enemy fire. By nightfall it had reached Hill 103.

The 27th Infantry attacked in greater strength the next day, 25 January, again with orders to reach the Poha. Colonel Bush's 3d Battalion, which had been relieved on Hills 98 and 99 by the 6th Marines, was to attack along the beach west of Kokumbona while the 2d Battalion on the left advanced to Hills 105 and 106 overlooking the Poha. K Company was detached from the 2d Battalion and ordered to clean out the Japanese between Hills 102 and 103.

The 3d Battalion left its lines on Hills 98 and 99 and passed through the 1st Battalion in Kokumbona about noon to advance northwest in columns of companies. L Company led, followed by I, Battalion Headquarters, and M Companies. Deployed on a 400-yard front to comb the jungle, L Company advanced slowly. At 1600 Colonel Bush decided to narrow his front in order to speed the advance sufficiently to reach the Poha before dark. I Company passed through L Company and moved northwest along the coast road. A few Japanese riflemen opposed the 3d Battalion, which killed about thirty-five of the enemy during the day.

Colonel Bush's battalion reached the Poha area in late afternoon. Colonel Bush, who had only a crayon map to guide him, had difficulty in finding the correct river. The Poha channel, like many other rivers on Guadalcanal, splits and wanders over alluvial bars as it nears the sea to form a small delta cut by several sluggish streams. Colonel Bush's troops, who were out of physical contact with the 2d Battalion, crossed six such streams, each one of which was part of the Poha, although the map represented the Poha to be a single stream. The battalion commander therefore requested the artillery to drop a round 1,000 yards offshore, opposite the Poha's mouth as shown on the map. When the shell fell into the channel behind him, Colonel Bush concluded that he had crossed the Poha and ordered his battalion to bivouac. The troops constructed a perimeter defense in a coconut grove, which is shown on aerial photographs as west of the river's main stream.
Meanwhile the 2d Battalion was advancing to Hills 105 and 106. E Company passed through G on Hill 103 and advanced without fighting over steep hills and jangled ravines to reach Hills 105 and 106 by dusk. The battalion blocked the area extending from its front southeastward to the hill mass south of Kokumbona. About fifty Japanese were killed on the night of 25-26 January at the stream and trail blocks.

The two battalions regained contact at 0700, 26 January, when one platoon from L Company patrolled south along the Poha to meet F Company. The 2d and 3d Battalions held the Poha line until the 6th Marines and 182d Infantry passed through the lines about noon to pursue the Japanese up the north coast all the way to Cape Esperance.



To meet an apparent enemy threat to land once more on Guadalcanal in force, XIV Corps headquarters sent the 25th Division including the 161 RCT and Fred Tenore's 89th Field Artillery Batallion back to the perimeter defense to guard Henderson and Carney Fields.

Carney Field - 1944

The 27th Infantry's successful January attacks had cost that regiment few casualties. Seven officers and 67 enlisted men had been killed in January and 226 were wounded, largely in the capture of the Galloping Horse. Losses in Kokumbona had been light.

Kokumbona, formerly an important enemy landing beach, trail junction, and assembly area, was now in American hands. In addition the 27th Infantry had captured the highest ground dominating the landing beaches between Kokumbona and Cape Esperance, an enemy radar station, trucks, landing craft, ten field artillery pieces, two 37-mm. guns, three 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, flame throwers, and ammunition, besides killing over 400 of the enemy. Had the Japanese attempted to land, they would have encountered greater difficulties in getting inland to envelop the perimeter defense than they did in October of 1942, for the XIV Corps held the important trail junctions in Kokumbona and dominated the landing beaches to the northwest. With the enemy retreating, the task facing the XIV Corps was to pursue and destroy the remnants of the Japanese *17th Army* before they could reach Cape Esperance to escape or dig in for a suicidal stand like that of the determined defenders of the Gifu.

Final Operations on Guadalcanal

By the first week of February 1943, the American forces in the South Pacific expected the Japanese to make another full-scale attempt to retake the Guadalcanal positions. The Japanese were known to be massing naval strength at Rabaul and Buin, and enemy air attacks were being intensified.

Admiral Halsey's naval strength had increased greatly since November 1942. Expecting a major Japanese attack, he deployed six naval task forces south of Guadalcanal by 7 and 8 February, including seven battleships, two aircraft carriers, and three escort carriers plus cruisers and destroyers. The XIV Corps on Guadalcanal including the 161st RCT and Fred Tenore's 89th Field Artillery Battalion anticipated an attack by 2 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, about 8 cruisers, 11 transports, 28 destroyers, 304 land-based aircraft, from 150 to 175 carrier-based aircraft, and one infantry division. General Patch prepared to resist enemy attempts to land by deploying the large part of his corps between the Umasani and Metapona Rivers, and also decided to continue to pursue the retreating *17th Army* to Cape Esperance. But Allied intelligence agencies had erred in their estimate of Japanese intentions.

Japanese Plans

In December the Japanese front-line troops had been ordered to hold their positions until the last man was dead. The American corps offensive which began on 10 January had torn great holes in the Japanese front lines. Japanese General Hyakutake recognized that he could no longer maintain troops in the Kokumbona area and ordered his troops to withdraw west to Cape Esperance, where they were to offer "desperate resistance."

After a long succession of failures, the Japanese high command had at last decided to abandon its efforts to drive the Americans from Guadalcanal. This decision harked back to October and November of 1942, when the defeats had caused concern in *Imperial General Headquarters* in Tokyo. The 1st Marine Division's successful defense of the

Lunga airfields (Henderson Airfield) against the *17th* Army reduced the number of Japanese troops available for campaigning in New Guinea. The Japanese clearly realized that the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns were integral parts of one whole. Attempting to reinforce Guadalcanal at the expense of New Guinea, would cause the Japanese to lose the entire campaign.

The Japanese prepared to deceive the American forces in order to cover the rescue of a sizable body of troops from Guadalcanal. Massing strength at Rabaul, New Guinea, for a time they intensified their air attacks against Henderson Field to lead Allied forces to expect another major Japanese attempt at landing on Guadalcanal.

The Japanese put about 600 replacements ashore near Cape Esperance on 14 January to cover the withdrawal, while an additional covering force landed for a short time in the Russell Islands. The Japanese planned to remove their troops from Cape Esperance at night by destroyers, cramming 600 men aboard each vessel. In the event that American air and naval forces drove the destroyers off, barges were to carry the troops to the Russells, where the destroyers would pick them up for the trip north.



By 8 February General Patch was no longer convinced that the Japanese would attempt a landing to recapture the airfields. They were known to be withdrawing supplies from Doma Cove, and Patch expressed his belief that the Tokyo Express was evacuating the remaining Japanese. Aerial photographs of the Cape Esperance area would have shown conclusively whether the enemy forces there were being evacuated or reinforced, but XIV Corps headquarters could not obtain photographic coverage on 7 and 8 February.

Pursuit of the Enemy

The North Coast

When the XIV Corps reached the Poha River on 25 January, the American offensive was ready to enter its final phase--the pursuit of the retreating enemy. Enemy intentions and dispositions at this time were not clear. In general, the Americans did not expect to meet a formidable Japanese force but they did expect the Japanese to defend the beach road and the Bonegi River line. While few Japanese prisoners had been taken in January, a study of captured documents led to the belief that the beach was well defended.

West of the Poha River the terrain resembles that of the Point Cruz-Kokumbona area. The coastal corridor is generally narrow; the distance from the beach inland to the foothills varies from 300 to 600 yards. The coral ridges run north and south; the coastal flats are cut by a great many streams. There were no bridges. The lack of room for maneuver limited the size of the pursuing force, and allowed, in most areas, only enough space for the deployment of one regiment.

The CAM Division attacked on 26 January and advanced 1,000 yards beyond the Poha. There was little fighting. The tempo of the advance increased the next day and gaining 2,000 yards and reaching the Nueha River.



The 147th Infantry passed through the lines west of the Nueha to attack about 0700, 30 January. On the beach the 1st Battalion advanced against light opposition to the mouth of the Bonegi River, about 2,000 yards west of the Nueha. One patrol crossed the river about 1152. Inland on the left flank, Japanese machine guns stopped the 3d Battalion 1,000 yards east of the Bonegi. When Japanese on the west bank placed heavy fire on the 1st Battalion, the patrol withdrew from the west bank and the battalion pulled back from the river mouth.

On 31 January the 3d Battalion crossed the Bonegi and captured part of the ridges on the west bank, about 2,500 yards inland from Tassafaronga Point. The enemy was defending the river mouth in strength and Japanese patrols infiltrated to the east bank to harass the 1st Battalion. Despite a Destroyer's fire and two artillery barrages, the 1st Battalion could not get across but was held in place about 300 yards east of the Bonegi.

The Infantry's attacks on 2 February were more successful. The 1st Battalion, supported by artillery, crossed the Bonegi at its mouth, and by 1710 the 1st and 3d Battalions had made contact south of Tassafaronga. The river crossing cost the 147th two killed and sixty-seven wounded. The 147th Infantry estimated that 700-800 Japanese troops had occupied the positions east and west of the Bonegi. They had executed an orderly withdrawal.

On 3 February, while the main body of the pursuing force was establishing itself along a line running south from Tassafaronga Point, patrols reached the Umasani River, about 2,300 yards west of Tassafaronga. The next day the main body advanced 1,000 yards farther on to a line about 1,000 yards southeast of the Umasani River. A few Japanese fired on the 3d Battalion on the inland flank, but there was no heavy fighting. On 5 February, operations on the western front were limited to patrolling. Patrols again reconnoitered to the Umasani River but found no organized enemy forces.

The Junction of Forces – Re-engaging the 161st RCT and 89th Field Artillery

Because of a feared reinforcement of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal which never came, the 25th Division had been ordered to guard the Henderson and Carney airfields. However, in early February the 161st Infantry was placed under corps control and ordered to continue the drive north. On 6 February two battalions of the 161st reached the Umasani River and then crossed the Tambalego River. On 8 February they met light Japanese resistance prior to seizing Doma Cove. The next day the 1st Battalion of the 161st linked up with a battalion of the Americal Division at the village of Tenaro effectively ending organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal.

The 25th Division remained on Guadalcanal to defend against any Japanese attempts to recapture the island. The 161st along with the rest of the division spent the spring and summer of 1943 training and recuperating.

General Patch, relieving the understrength 147th Infantry on the north coast on 6 February, ordered the 161st Infantry of the 25th Division to pass through the 147th's lines to continue the pursuit. The 2d Battalion of the 10th Marines, the 97th Field Artillery Battalion, and Americal Division artillery were to support the 161st. A supply dump which had been established at Kokumbona was to service the advancing force.

The 161st Infantry, then commanded by Col. James L. Dalton, II, passed through the 147th about 1000, 6 February. Preceded by patrols, the 3d Battalion moved along the beach; the 2d Battalion covered the foothills; and the 1st Battalion was in reserve. By 2020 the 161st Infantry had reached the Umasani River, and patrols had crossed the river. The day's only skirmish occurred when one patrol from L Company ran into a small Japanese force in a bivouac area on a ridge just west of the Umasani. The patrol killed at least seven of the enemy and withdrew without losses.

On 7 February the 161st crossed the Umasani and advanced to Bunina, while patrols penetrated to the Tambalego River, 1,200 yards farther on. The Japanese did not offer a resolute defense but retired as soon as the American infantrymen attacked them. The 161st Infantry encountered some Japanese at the Tambalego River on 8 February, but after a brief fight drove the enemy off and advanced to Doma Cove.

Since coastwatchers had warned that about twenty enemy destroyers would reach the Cape Esperance area during the night of 7-8 February, Colonel Ferry's 2d Battalion of the 132d Infantry at Marovovo, about six miles southwest of Cape Esperance, expected action that night but saw no enemy. When the American soldiers left Marovovo on the morning of 8 February, they found several abandoned Japanese landing craft and a stock of supplies on the beach. Realizing that the enemy was evacuating, the battalion narrowed its front and advanced to Kamimbo Bay.

On 9 February the 2d Battalion, 161st Infantry, which had been traveling over the uphill north coast flank on scanty rations, went into regimental reserve. The 1st Battalion, 161st, passed through the 3d Battalion at Doma Cove to take over the assault, and was followed closely by the 3d Battalion and the antitank company. By afternoon the 1st Battalion had marched five miles, crossed the Tenamba River, and entered the village of Tenaro.

On the morning of 9 February, a force under Colonel Ferry, the 132nd Infantry, that had secretly landed on the southwestern coast had started around Cape Esperance toward the same objective, the village of Tenaro, which was the point selected for the forces to meet. Advancing in column of companies, the battalion met fire from some

Japanese machine guns and mortars but did not halt. Between 1600 and 1700 the 2d Battalion of the 132d Infantry marched into Tenaro and there met the 1st Battalion of the 161st Infantry, an event that marked the end of organized fighting on Guadalcanal. Only scattered stragglers from the *Japanese Army* remained on the island.

General Patch, after the juncture of forces, sent the following message to Admiral Halsey: "Total and complete defeat of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal effected 1625 today . . . Am happy to report this kind of compliance with your orders . . . because Tokyo Express no longer has terminus on Guadalcanal." The reply from South Pacific Headquarters was characteristic: "When I sent a Patch to act as tailor for Guadalcanal, I did not expect him to remove the enemy's pants and sew it on so quickly . . . Thanks and congratulations."

The Japanese Evacuation

While the American troops could feel justly elated over the end of Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal, they had let slip through their hands about 13,000 of the enemy--by Japanese count. The western pursuit and the shore-to-shore envelopment had been boldly conceived but were executed too slowly to achieve their purpose--the complete destruction of the enemy.

in 12 January, General Imamura had directed some of his staff officers to board a destroyer and proceed to Guadalcanal, there to give the *17th Army* commander the instructions to evacuate. Hyakutake, receiving the order on 15 January, explained the prospective movement to his men as "a change in the disposition of troop[s] for future offense."

The Japanese *17th Army* began its withdrawal to Cape Esperance on the night of 22-23 January. The rescuing destroyers ran down the Slot to Esperance three times and evacuated troops on the nights of 1-2, 4-5, 7-8 February. The Japanese *38th Division,* some naval personnel, hospital patients, and others left first, followed by *17th* Army headquarters and the Japanese 2d *Division* on 4-5 January, and by miscellaneous units on the last trip. The Americans claimed that three of the destroyers were sunk and four were damaged. About 13,000 Japanese--12,000 from the *17th* Army and the rest naval personnel--were evacuated to Buin and Rabaul in New Guinea.

In post-war interviews the Japanese commanders ironically expressed their gratitude over their escape. The Americans, they felt, had moved toward Cape Esperance too slowly and stopped too long to consolidate positions. General Hyakutake stated that resolute attacks at Cape Esperance would have destroyed his army.

The Cost of Victory

The Japanese had displayed skill and cunning in evacuating the troops from Guadalcanal, but the essential significance of the Guadalcanal campaign was unchanged. American forces, in executing Task One as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by taking the first major step toward the eventual reduction of Rabaul, New Guinea, had decisively defeated the Japanese.

The cost of victory, though dear, had not been prohibitive. A total of about 60,000 Army and Marine Corps ground forces had been deployed on Guadalcanal. Of these, about 1,600 were killed by enemy action and 4,245 wounded. The 1st Marine Division bore the heaviest burden of casualties, losing 774 men killed and 1,962 wounded. Three hundred and thirty-four of the Americal Division were killed, and 850 wounded. The 2d Marine Division suffered equally with the Americal, losing 268 killed and 932 wounded. The 25th Division including the 161st RCT and 89th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in action a shorter length of time than the others, suffered correspondingly fewer casualties--216 killed and 439 wounded.

The Japanese suffered much more heavily. More than 36,000 Japanese from the *17th* Army and the *Special Naval Landing Forces* fought on Guadalcanal. Of these, over 14,800 were killed or missing, and 9,000 died of disease. About 1,000 were taken prisoner.

In other respects, the Japanese were to feel the cost of defeat much more heavily than in manpower. Their ship losses had been heavy, and the loss of over 600 aircraft with their pilots was to hinder future operations. The Allies had won a well-situated base from which to continue the offensive against Rabaul, New Guinea. The Allied offensive into the Solomons had halted the Japanese advance toward the U.S.-Australian line of communications, and also had taken the initiative away from the hitherto victorious Japanese.

The 25th Division remained on Guadalcanal to defend against any Japanese attempts to recapture the island. The 161st along with the rest of the division spent the spring and summer of 1943 training and recuperating.

A SOLDIER SAYS GOODBYE TO A FRIEND

AMERICAN CEMETERY - GUADALCANAL

North Solomons



With Guadalcanal secured, attention turned to recapturing the remaining Solomon Islands, particularly the island of New Georgia where the Japanese had built a key airfield at Munda.

On 30 June 1943, the same day that MacArthur's forces began attacking in New Guinea, Admiral Halsey's forces were landing four hundred miles away at several sites in the group of islands collectively known as New Georgia. Code-named TOENAILS, the invasion of the New Georgia islands presented several obstacles to the Army and Navy planners who had spent six months preparing for the operation.

Lieutenant Colonel Lester Brown (standing) briefs officers of the 103rd Regiment, 43rd Infantry Division, dressed in camouflage-pattern uniforms, prior to boarding several LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry) in the Russell Islands for transport to Rendova, June 1943.

Located in the central Solomons, New Georgia comprises about a dozen large islands and numerous smaller ones, all surrounded by coral reefs, barrier islands, and shallow lagoons. With only a few narrow passages through the offshore obstacles, the seas surrounding New Georgia proper are hazardous. Because reefs made Munda Point inaccessible to large ships, Halsey and his commanders chose to seize the offshore island of Rendova as a preliminary to the main invasion. Close enough to Munda for supporting artillery, Rendova would serve as a forward base from which the main invasion could be launched and supported.

Besides the Rendova invasion, the first phase of operations involved three simultaneous landings to capture and hold tactically significant sites on or near New Georgia: Segi Point (the best site for an airfield on the island), Viru Harbor, and Wickham Anchorage (on the nearby island of Vangunu). Possession of the latter two sites would protect supply lines and provide staging areas for New Georgia operations. The second phase consisted of invading New Georgia proper to seize Munda, while a supporting force invaded Enogai Inlet, several miles to the north, to cut Japanese communications running from Kolombangara through Enogai to Munda. The seizure of Munda and Enogai would be followed by operations against Vila airfield on Kolombangara and then by operations farther up the Solomons chain.



The plan for taking Munda was not complicated. General Hester envisioned the 169th and 172d marching from Zanana to the Barike River, a distance of no more than three miles. Using the river as a line of departure, his regiments would drive west (the 169th inland, the 172d along the coast), capture the high ground, and then take the airfield. On paper, the plan seemed simple. For the green troops, however, who would be using inadequate maps to find their way through a labyrinth of coral jottings, draws, and swamps, all so densely overgrown with exotic jungle flora that visibility was measured in yards and enemy positions were invisible, the reality proved quite different.

Munda Point Airfield

Marine Raiders cross a stream during the advance on Enogai Point, August 1943. Extreme heat, humidity, disease, and a tough, well-camouflaged enemy took a heavy toll on American troops.

A 43rd Division soldier uses an M2 flamethrower against a Japanese pillbox during fierce fighting near Munda airfield, September 9, 1943. The Japanese fought skillfully, forcing a stalemate at the airfield.

By 17 July the 43d Division's casualties were 90 dead and 636 wounded. More than a thousand men had contracted diseases. Diarrhea was a common affliction, while dysentery cases and malaria relapses were prevalent. One-quarter of the men were suffering from varying degrees of skin fungus. Additionally, between fifty and one hundred men left the line each day as neuroses cases. Ominously, there now appeared the first large number of shaken, hollow-eyed men suffering from a strange malady, later diagnosed as "combat neuroses." Before the end of July, the 169th would suffer seven hundred such cases of

of battle fatigue. In the opinion of the XIV Corps surgeon, who flew in on 14 July, there was no doubt that the major reason for these "non battle casualties" was combat fatigue--extreme exhaustion exacerbated by atrocious living conditions. Little could be done until rest camps could be built on the offshore islands; the high incidence of casualties due to disease and combat fatigue would continue throughout the campaign. Reinforcements were badly needed.

The division surgeon gave this graphic description of the symptoms:

At least 50% of these individuals requiring medical attention or entering medical installations were the picture of utter exhaustion, face expressionless, knees sagging, body bent forward, arms slightly flexed and hanging loosely, hands with palms slightly cupped, marked coarse tremor of fingers. . ., feet dragging, and an over-all appearance of apathy and physical exhaustion. About 20% of the total group were/highly excited, crying, wringing their hands, mumbling incoherently, an expression of utter fright or fear, trembling all over, startled at the least sound or unusual commotion, having the appearance of trying to escape impending disaster. Another 15% showed manifestations of the various types of true psychoneurotic complexes. The remaining 15% included the anxiety states, and those with various bizarre somatic disturbances. These were the individuals whose symptoms were of insidious onset, starting with insomnia, vague digestive symptoms, bad dreams, frequency of urination, irritability, diminished ability to concentrate, and a generally reduced efficiency in the performance of assigned duties.

Put yourself in the following situation and you will understand why:

Without taking the time to set up a strong defensive perimeter, the 3rd Battalion of the 169th quickly dug foxholes when they stopped for the night short of the Japanese roadblock. Their foxholes were more than six feet apart, making it easy for an enemy to slip past men who were sleeping. Which is exactly what happened. Small Japanese patrols, only a few men in each, began harassing the men of 3–169th as soon as darkness fell. They moved around, shouted English phrases, sometimes calling out the names of the men in the unit or American catchphrases such as "come out and fight," fired randomly, threw hand grenades, and other such tactics. Combined with the

normal sounds of the jungle, which the frightened men turned into imagined terrors, the 3–169th passed a sleepless night.

The next day the unrested soldiers faced visibility of no more than ten yards and so American troops blindly walked into well-concealed ambushes. Company K's commander was killed in one of these ambushes and the Americans were unable to break the Japanese line. After a day of fire fights, ambushes and no progress against a very well dug in platoon of Japanese soldiers, another night began.

Night brought the same terrors to the exhausted men of the 3–169th Infantry. They reported the same harassing patrols, the same constant firing and explosions, and many said that the Japanese were jumping into foxholes and stabbing Americans quietly and withdrawing. Any noise was met by a fusillade of bullets and grenades from the Americans, but in the morning, there were never any dead Japanese left as an indicator that anyone had been there.

CASUALTIES BEING EVACUATED FROM NEW GEORGIA

The night previous to the eventual all-out advance, the 169th had again been targeted by Japanese harassers. The Connecticut National Guardsmen were beyond jumpy having had no sleep since the operation began, and as such, had fertile imaginations. Even the natural rustle of the jungle brought a hail of bullets. Men waking suddenly in the hot darkness in a fit of panic thought their foxhole mate was a Japanese soldier and lashed out with knives or bayonets. When morning dawned, the 169th had casualties; nearly all of them caused by American edged weapons and grenades.

The night of July 9 was worse. Men armed themselves with knives, grenades, and .45 pistols, knowing what the night would bring. Many linked arms, with the idea that if they awoke suddenly, they would know the man next to them was their friend. Still, men slashed and cut their friends, shot them with .45s, or threw grenades that bounced off trees into other foxholes. 360 neuropsychiatric casualties were evacuated from the front lines the next day, along with more Soldiers bearing the now-familiar knife wounds of their friends' night terrors.

Initially the 25th Division, now known as the Tropic Lightning Division for its swift combat actions on Guadalcanal, was not included in the invasion plans for New Georgia as resistance was anticipated to be light. However once US forces landed on New Georgia June 30, 1943, Japanese resistance stiffened and by the mid-July, Corps requested a regiment from the 25th Division. The 161st was selected, landing on Rendova Island, New Georgia on 22 July 1943 and was attached to the 37th Division. Fred Tenore and the 89th Field Artillery Battalion would again be seeing combat.

"Landing Artillery at Rendova Island"

Cruising from Guadalcanal to New Georgia

Cruising? Not really**.**

The day before they received their orders to move out, each man was given an egg and a beer, two unaccustomed treats that usually forshadowed return to combat action. On July 20th the entire 161st Infantry Division of 2600 boarded six transport destroyers (APD's), six infantry landing craft (LCI's) and one tank landing craft (LCT) for the "cruise" to New Georgia. The ships were extremely packed with men and equipment and the overheated holds reeked of sweat, metal, gunpowder and fuel – certainly not a fair trade for an egg and a beer!

APD - High-speed transports were converted destroyers and destroyer escorts used in US Navy amphibious operations in World War II and afterward. They received the US Hull classification symbol APD; "AP" for transport and "D" for destroyer.

APDs were intended to deliver small units such as Marine Raiders, Underwater Demolition Teams, and United States Army Rangers onto hostile shores. An APD could carry up to 200 troops - a company-size unit, and approximately 40 tons of cargo. It could also provide gunfire support if needed.





LCI - The Landing Craft Infantry were several classes of seagoing amphibious assault ships of the Second World War used to land large numbers of infantry directly onto beaches. They were developed in response to a British request for a vessel capable of carrying and landing substantially more troops than their smaller Landing Craft Assault (LCA). The result was a small steel ship that could land 200 men, traveling from rear bases on its own bottom at a speed of up to 15 knots.

Some 923 were built starting in 1943, serving in both the Pacific and European theaters, including a number that were converted into heavily armed beach assault support ships.





LST - Landing Ship, Tank , or tank landing ship, is the naval designation for ships first developed during World War II (1939–1945) to support amphibious operations by carrying tanks, vehicles, cargo, and landing troops directly onto shore with no docks or piers. This enabled amphibious assaults on almost any beach. The capacity of an LST was 13-30 tanks, 27 vehicles and 193 men.

The LST had a highly specialized design that enabled ocean crossings as well as shore groundings. The bow had a large door that could open, deploy a ramp and unload U.S. or allied vehicles. The LST had a special flat keel that allowed the ship to be beached and stay upright. The twin propellers and rudders had protection from grounding. The LSTs served across the globe during World War II including in the Pacific War and in the European theatre.



Which one was Sergeant Fred Tenore's transport? It did not matter. As you can see, the amenities were the same everywhere.

Nightmare Conditions

Earlier operations revealed the nature of the main Japanese defenses: machine gunners and riflemen ensconced in sturdy pillboxes with interlocking fields of fire. The pillboxes were tough obstacles. Constructed with three or four layers of coconut logs and several feet of coral, they were largely subterranean. The few feet exposed above ground contained machine-gun and rifle firing slits, so well camouflaged that American soldiers often could not determine their location.





When the offensive resumed, therefore, so did the demanding, draining, and deadly task of assaulting hidden Japanese positions one by one--a style of warfare that chewed up rifle companies and became all too familiar to American ground troops in the Pacific. Because the enemy was virtually invisible in his pillboxes and rarely fired indiscriminately, reconnaissance squads and platoons frequently could not determine the extent of Japanese defenses; details of Japanese positions often remained unknown until the attack. Once infantrymen located an enemy position, they called in artillery fire which made the position visible amidst the jungle growth, if not destroying it outright. Next 81-mm. mortars, using heavy shells with delay fuses, would fire on visible positions. Finally, a platoon or company assaulted, supported by whatever heavy weapons were available.

When full reconnaissance was not possible, troops had to attack the terrain--seize and occupy pieces of ground while calling in mortar fire on likely pillbox sites. A tactic of necessity, attacking the terrain could be risky against more than light opposition. Although flamethrowers proved useful in attacking pillboxes, the operator had to expose his head and torso and was likely to be shot unless supporting infantry provided suppressive fire. Just as in tank infantry operations, troops learned that mutual cooperation and support between riflemen and flamethrower

Flamethrower in Use at Munda

operators were vital to success. Once integrated with the infantry, both tanks and flamethrowers were important infantry-support weapons on New Georgia, especially because the irregular shape of the front line and the poor quality of available maps often made artillery support impractical.

Bibilo Hill: As part of the assault on Munda Airfield, the mission of the 37th Division including the 161st RCT was to take Bibilo Hill. As the attack commenced the 3rd Battalion of the 161st ran into stiff resistance while approaching the line of departure for the attack, coming under heavy fire from a ridgeline later called Bartley's Ridge. This ridgeline contained numerous pillboxes which were well hidden and mutually supporting.

On 25 July the attack on Bartley's Ridge commenced. While the 3rd Battalion attacked the ridgeline frontally, the 1st Battalion flanked the position. While partially successful the attack stalled. Resuming the attack on 28 July, the 161st was successful in clearing the ridgeline. The regiment then moved on to attack Horseshoe Hill, which had the same type of defenses as Bartley's Ridge. By 1 August, using every weapon available, including flamethrowers, the 161st cleared the hill, pillbox by pillbox and closed on Bibilo Hill.

PT Boat Actions: There were numerous Japanese offensive actions underway around the cluster of New Georgia Islands. On the same night the 161st took Horseshoe Hill, a Japanese air raid hit a torpedo boat mooring basin further north at Rendova - attacked by two dive bombers and Zeros (estimated 50) about 1600. Two PT boats were destroyed, another was sunk and beyond salvage. At 0200 on 2 August while patrolling the Blackett straits between Kolombangara Island and Ghizo Island 25 miles to the north, fifteen US PT boats intercepted Japanese destroyers



MAP 10

returning to Rabual on the island of New Britain after delivering supplies to Japanese forces on the Solomon Islands. US forces gave the name "Tokyo Express." to the Japanese navy's more or less regular supply convoy to soldiers fighting the advance of US forces in the islands farther south.

On a dark moonless night with all ships under way without running lights, a PT boat was rammed and sliced in half by the destroyer Amagiri. Two of the crew were killed immediately – others were badly hurt or burned by the burning fuel on the water. The ships commander gathered the surviving crew and they swam three and a half miles in four hours to deserted Plum Island where they were eventually rescued.

The commander of PT109, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, went on to become the 35th President of the United States.



Destroyers of the Tokyo Express



Japanese Destroyer Amagiri

Tokyo Express Route

Field artillery firing missions against the New Georgia area continued to be conducted by Battery B of the 89th until 3 August. A platoon of tanks led the assault on Kokengolo and Biblio Hills on 4 and 5 August. After two days of heavy fighting, they routed the defending forces. The tanks then cleared the way to the principal objective of the entire New Georgia campaign, the Munda airfield, which was captured and occupied by XIV Corps Army troops on 5 August 1943.



The XIV Corps had ordered the remainder of the 25th Division to New Georgia on 2 August. The capture of Munda airfield on 5 August was only one phase of the New Georgia campaign. There were still Japanese on New Georgia, as well as on the surrounding islands of Arundel, Baanga, Gizo, Kolombangara, and Vella Lavella. These islands had to be taken or neutralized before the Americans could continue up the Solomons chain. General Griswold had tried to prevent Japanese from escaping during the Munda operation by encircling the airfield to prevent withdrawals and trap Japanese troops, but this tactic proved only partially successful. After the airstrip was captured, Griswold ordered the 161st, back under 25th control, along with the 27th Infantry Regiments of Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins' 25th Division to pursue the retreating Japanese north to Bairoko Harbor and northwest along the coast.

Regiments of the 25th Infantry Division pursued the Japanese as they withdrew north from Munda Point. Elsewhere, on the night of 6 August a naval battle was fought in Vella Gulf, where Japanese destroyers and barges of the "Tokyo Express" bringing in supplies and reinforcements were turned back.

Most Japanese moved to Arundel, Kolombangara, and Baanga, leaving behind only a small detachment to contest the American advance northward. U.S. troops spent two weeks eliminating these forces. The 27th Infantry overcame stiff resistance in their drive to the north. The

161st, probing west of the Bairoko River and on to Bairoko Harbor, found the Japanese had fled before them. Finally, the 161st and the 27th linked up to occupy Bairoko on August 25th.

Elsewhere, on Arundel parallel activities and intense fighting had driven the Japanese out. On Baanga, from where a pair of Japanese 120-mm. guns had been shelling Munda Point, the Japanese resisted strongly and two regiments spent ten days driving the Japanese from the southern part of the island, losing 52 killed, 110 wounded, and 486 non-battle casualties. The remaining Japanese troops withdrew to Arundel which now needed to be taken because of its important position. But there, too, because of recent undetected reinforcements and because of the difficulty of its terrain--perhaps the worst in New Georgia--Japanese resistance proved stronger than expected. The 172d Infantry landed on 27 August, but additional troops were needed, and soon joining the 172d were the 169th Infantry, two battalions of the 27th Infantry, a 4.2-inch mortar company, and Marine tankers. While combat on Arundel was viewed primarily as "mopping up small groups of Japanese," one 43d Division battalion commander later described the fighting on Arundel as "the most bitter combat of the New Georgia campaign." The fighting continued through the first three weeks of September, when, once again, remaining Japanese troops withdrew at night, this time to Kolombangara.

There were about 12,000 Japanese troops on Kolombangara, the next stronghold in the Solomons chain and site of another Japanese airfield. The difficulty, effort, and cost involved in ejecting the Japanese from fortified jungle defenses, as on Munda, however, were not lost on Admiral Halsey. Wary of Japanese strength on Kolombangara, he had no desire for "another slugging match." There was an option. In mid-July as the advance toward Munda floundered and the Japanese reinforced Kolombangara, Halsey's staff suggested a deviation from the original TOENAILS plan: seize, instead of Kolombangara, Vella Lavella, only fifteen miles northwest of Kolombangara and weakly held by the Japanese. Halsey endorsed the idea, recognizing that it exploited both American mobility and local air and sea superiority. He would gain his objective, a better airfield nearer to Bougainville, while avoiding a costly battle. Japanese forces on Kolombangara would be left to "die on the vine".

With Munda, Arundel, Baanga and Vella Lavella resolved and Kolombaranga effectively isolate, fighting on New Georgia Islands ended. However, the bypassed "isolated" Japanese troops on Kolombangara did not wither on the vine. During three nights between 28 September and 3 October, more than 9,000 troops escaped to southern Bougainville in a well-organized evacuation effort. The evacuation of Kolombangara largely ended the campaign for New Georgia and the surrounding islands, a joint campaign that had proved much more involved and costly in its ground operations than had been anticipated. American casualties were 1,094 dead and 3,873 wounded, excluding the even greater number of disease, combat fatigue, and neuropsychiatric casualties.

New Zealand – Reorganization, Rehabilitation and Re-Training

On October 13, 1943 the 25th Infantry was directed to prepare to return to Guadalcanal. From October 15 through 25, 1943, all units returned by water transit then reassembled and prepared for overwater movement to New Zealand. Water transport to Auckland, New Zealand, began on or about November 1st with the main body of the Division arriving mid-month and the final echelon by December 5th.

The Camps: The 25th troops occupied nine separate camps in New Zealand's Northern Island scattered around Auckland from 23 miles south to 34 miles north. They had earned eight weeks of rest and recuperation from their time in combat on the Solomon Islands. Here 29,500 could be accommodated and the division was brought back to full strength.


Andersons Road
Rodney's Showgrounds
Dome Camp
Wylies Road
Wilsons Road
Outer-Camp Hale
Opaheke East & West
Hilldene Papakura
Sim Road
Pukepohe Racecourse

American life in New Zealand between 1942 and 1944 was centered on the camps, most of which were within marching distance or a short train journey from Wellington or Auckland city. Riverina Camp on Wilsons Road was the 25th Division's Headquarters location

Riverina Camp on Wilsons Road was the 25th Division's Headquarters location.

Outer-Camp Hale in Auckland was a 750-bed convalescent depot

There is a small hospital on View Road just north of Warkworth that predominantly served the 25th Division. Today it is a local birthing center.



Many of the camp sites were quite small and occupied land that already had memories and associations for New Zealanders. Sim Road Camp, Paerata, was built on farmland behind Wesley College. In Wellington, Anderson's Park where boys had played cricket and Central Park where lovers had strolled were suddenly covered in huts. Hutt Park raceway hosted not horses but American soldiers. Auckland Domain was covered by regular lines of army huts. In both Wellington and Auckland a remarkable number of buildings were used by the Americans. In the capital, Hannahs Building, the Bank of New Zealand, Odlins and Tisdalls served as stores or offices. It was difficult, if you lived in these two centers, not to be aware of the invasion.

Conditions: Camp life seemed spartan for men landing directly from the United States, but comfortable for those arriving from the heat of a Pacific battle. At first most of the Americans lived in pyramid-shaped tents, but increasingly they moved into two-, four- or occasionally eight-man huts. There was often no electric light or heat, and the louvred windows let in the cold and the damp. Men brought up in the central heating of American suburban homes found New Zealand winters unpleasant.

Soldiers lined up with their own mess gear at the cookhouse and ate in mess rooms with bare wooden tables. Food was plentiful, and cooked if possible in American style. But the local staples, especially fatty lamb ('god-damned mountain-goat'), were not easy for the visitors to cook or to eat. All the larger camps had stores from which American products – cigarettes, Coca-Cola – could be bought. The camps did their best to make the men feel at home amid bush and sandhills.

The Look of R&R

Opaheke East & West Camps were home to many units including the 25th Infantry and the 89th Field Artillery Battlion. Opaheke East is the camp where Seargent Fred Tenore and his buddies wound down after eight months of combat. Here they are standing in front of the huts they called home in January of 1944.



The Camp Routine: The first bugle call was at 6 a.m. and the men were at physical drill 10 minutes later. The subsequent routine depended on where they had come from or were headed. Those arriving fresh from the United States were here to be trained for battles on Pacific islands. There were few ceremonial parades in full dress uniform, although all stood to attention at sunset when 'Old Glory' was hauled down.

There were long route marches to toughen up young city slickers and scouting missions in the Tararua Ranges, which stood in for tropical jungle; artillerymen learned how to fire under camouflage; landings on Pacific beaches were practiced on the Petone foreshore, at Eastbourne, and more ambitiously on Māhia Peninsula, south of Gisborne. When reality finally dawned at Guadalcanal and Tarawa for the new soldiers, these practices must have seemed innocent and pleasant by comparison.

R&R

When the horror of the Pacific war got too much, the men might return to New Zealand. Some came simply for what a later generation described as 'R & R' (rest and recreation): a period of good food, good times and peace in which the body could recover and the mind let go of its nightmares. Others, less fortunate, returned on stretchers. Some were wounded; more came back suffering the fevers of malaria. In all, 19 hospitals were set up to take almost 10,000 patients. Cornwall Park in Auckland and Silverstream in Wellington were the sites of major institutions. To provide care and the human warmth of a familiar female accent, a considerable number of American nurses came to New Zealand.

Men too worked at providing the back-up needed by a modern army. The Quartermaster Corps took over large warehouses and areas of the wharves, procured local goods, and packed them off to the war zone. New Zealand conditions added some difficulties. Wet winters, the restricted range of vegetables available and periodic disputes with the 'wharfies' were not the least of the problems. Though locals at times muttered about the Americans' fondness for machinery (they introduced forklifts to New Zealand), all were impressed with their efficiency and thoroughness.

All Dressed Up and No Where to Go: Although the American forces in New Zealand worked hard, there had to be some time for fun; and, increasingly, those arriving had come to recover from war and to enjoy rest and recreation. This presented the American authorities with a problem, for New Zealand and American patterns of leisure were different. Many Americans were used to a lively urban culture; New Zealand cities were closed and deserted in the evenings and on Sundays. So, the American soldier with a 'liberty pass' at first found it difficult to buy the alcohol he desired or the foods he craved. There was nowhere for him to dance to the songs he hummed.

One response was for the Americans to provide their own entertainment and to begin establishing enclaves of American culture in this foreign land. Like most soldiers, the Americans found ways of amusing themselves informally. There was the usual skylarking, teasing and swapping of funny stories; and there was much gambling, usually the games of blackjack and craps.

The Americans also provided their own organized entertainment. Sport was a particular favorite, since it helped to raise morale and improve physical fitness as well as providing enjoyment for spectators. Baseball and softball leagues were organized for weekend afternoons, and a crowd of 20,000 watched a baseball game at Wellington's Athletic Park. Boxing tournaments were held, and an intensely competitive game of American football was played on Eden Park in Auckland between the army and the Marines. In Wellington an old Wakefield St building was converted into a gymnasium and venue for basketball and badminton. A skating rink was opened nearby.

There were occasional efforts to play sport with the locals. Tugs-of-war appear to have crossed cultural boundaries. On one occasion a game of rugby was played with New Zealanders – causing the Americans much amusement but also some disgust. The American photographer witnessing the performance described it as 'mayhem'; the apparent object was to twist the opponent's neck, 'throw him on the ground, and take the football away from him'. Such occasions of sporting competition between the nations were rare. In general, the Americans carried their own games with them.

US Marines vs New Zealand Army rugby match

Music and Dance: The Americans also organized music for themselves. Their units were well supplied with bands, and at the larger camps there was a regular weekly concert. Occasionally travelling entertainers arrived to perform. The most famous was the jazz clarinetist Artie Shaw, who came with his navy band. The comedian Joe E. Brown was another popular visitor. If there was no live music available, from April 1944 the doughboys could tune into Radio 1ZM in Auckland, the 'American Expeditionary Station', to hear 'Music America Loves Best' or 'American College Songs'.



Most of the bases, especially the hospitals, had photographic darkrooms and materials for painting, drawing and carving. They also offered regular showings of Hollywood movies – outside in 'starlight theaters' at the smaller bases, and in the recreation halls at larger camps. The recreation hall at Titahi Bay still stands. On special occasions the American Red Cross hostesses at the camps would arrange dances to which the 'right type' of women were invited as partners.

Red Cross Clubs: Red Cross officials, nearly all of them women, organized Red Cross clubs in Warkworth, Masterton, the Hotel Cecil near the Wellington railway station, and two in the Auckland Hotel, one each for officers and men.

These clubs were oases of American culture. There was cheap American food – hamburgers, doughnuts, ice-cream sodas, Coca-Cola, apple pie, coffee. There were a library and desks at which to write home; there were games to play, such as table tennis and pool; and there were facilities for pressing and mending clothes. The American hostesses were supported by New Zealand volunteers, who worked in the canteens and supervised the 'wholesome' dances that were put on at these clubs.

Time Flies

Back in New Zealand, the soldiers had settled in and, although many of the customs seemed strange, the place was beginning to feel like home. They had been there for three months of a generally anticipated six months of rest when new orders arrived. To the man, they were a sad bunch. At that point they could muster no more than half-hearted attempts at marching., close order drill, weapons handling ("the same old stuff").

The alert arrived in January when the 25th Division was told to initiated preparations and training for participation in projected operations in the vicinity of Kavieng, New Ireland, Papua, New Guinea, on or about June 1, 1944. This was a continuation of the drive across the southwest Pacific towards the Philippines that began at Guadalcanal.





At least June 1st was four months away! But that euphoria was short lived. After 12 weeks, the 25th Division was somewhat rested and back at full strength. To get back in the action, the 25th Division would begin leaving peaceful New Zealand in groups, or echelons, going by water to New Caledonia, a distance of 1077 miles - halfway back to Guadalcanal. There they would immediately engage in intense training for more water landing and jungle combat.

The first echelon embarked on February 23, 1944 on the USAT General John Pope. Marching through Auckland that day was a very sad time for the soldiers as well as their hosts who had adopted and grown very fond of these men.

US Troops Leaving Auckland – February 1944

The USAT General John Pope and the USAT George Clymar were the transport ships that carried the 161st to New Caledonia. The Pope had just completed her part in the giant amphibious offensive on New Guinea's northern coast. On a 3-month round-trip voyage out of San Francisco, beginning 23 January, she took troops to Guadalcanal, Auckland, and Noumea and while in the area, moved the 161st.


New Caledonia
Australia
New Zealand

USAT General John Pope

General characteristics	
Class and type:	*General John Pope*-class transport
Type:	troopship
Displacement:	11,450 tons (lt)
Tons burthen:	20,175 tons fully laden
Length:	622 feet 7 inches (189.76 m)
Beam:	75 feet 6 inches (23.01 m)
Draft:	25 feet 6 inches (7.77 m)
Installed power:	19,000 shp
Propulsion:	2 steam turbines, reduction gearing, twin screw
Speed:	21 knots (39 km/h)
Troops:	5,142
Complement:	465
Armament:	4 x single 5"/38 caliber dual purpose guns, 4 x quad 1.1" guns, 20 x single 20mm cannon

USAT George Clymar

General characteristics	
Class and type:	*Arthur Middleton*-class attack transport
Displacement:	9.000 tons(lt) 16,725 t.(fl)
Length:	491 ft (149.7 m)
Beam:	69.5 ft (21.2 m)
Draft:	26.5 ft (8.1 m)
Propulsion:	Steam turbine, single shaft, designed shaft horsepower 8,500
Speed:	18.4 knots
Capacity:	Troops: 1,304 Cargo: 140,000 cu ft, 2,300 tons
Complement:	578
Armament:	1 x 5"/38 cal dual purpose gun, 4 x 3"/50 caliber dp guns, 8 x single Bofors 40 mm gun mounts, 4 x .50 cal (12.7 mm). machine guns

The John Pope arrived at Noumea, New Caledonia, first on February 24, 1944 with most of the 161st RCT. It was likely Fred Tenore was on this ship. A few days later on February 27, 1944, the remainder of the regiment arrived on the Clymar.

The soldiers boarded trucks and set out on a seventy-mile hot and dusty trip to the wilderness. They stopped somewhere northeast of La Foa near the Oua Tom airstrip. Their first order of duty was to build Camp Richie from the bottom up.

NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA



Who needs fishing poles, reels, line, hooks and bait? Dynamite work just as well!

The men had to build their camps wherever they went and they would have hated it if it had not kept them busy and away from combat. At first it was another tent city but in six months their little paradise would have sleeping quarters, kitchens, medical quarters, a Red Cross Center, outdoor movie theater, athletic fields and, of course, all the humidity and mosquitoes you could ever want.

The 25th Division continued training for operations at Kavieng. It was more of the same – same preparations, same jungle warfare. As June 1st approached their orders for deployment to Kavieng were cancelled. New Guinea had been taken and the next step was the Philippines.

ENTRANCE TO CAMP IN NEW CALEDONIA IN 1944-45



US SOLDIER ON A BASE IN NEW CALEDONIA IN 1944-45



Typical New Caledonia Terrain


Fred Tenore & Spellman
July 1944


Pop outside Mess Hall In Caledonia







Nonetheless, throughout the summer the 25th trained hard from squad level up to division, with the 35th Infantry serving as an opposing force. In the fall the Division became proficient in conducting amphibious landings in preparation for its participation in the liberation of the Philippine Islands and in early September they were alerted to their participation in the Leyte-Samar operation, code named KING II. They were assigned a mission as the Sixth Army Reserve with an alternate mission of seizing and securing Samar Island and San Juanico Straight. They were further directed to be prepared to seize and secure Panaon Island and Panaon Straight.

Preparation began but due to the pace of advancement north in the Philippine Campaign, they were relieved of their participation and assigned instead to the invasion of Luzon, code names MIKE I. They were directed by the sixth Army to be prepared to reinforce either I or XIV Corps in Lingayen Gulf with one RCT on “D” Day plus 2 and the remainder of the Division by “D” plus 4. “D” Day would be in early January and preparation and training continued up until the time of loading on November 24, 1944.







The USAT David C. Shanks was a large attack transport ship - one of many ships in the convoy that would be going to Luzon. The Division engaged in loading from November 21 to December 16, 1944. The convoy arrived at Guadalcanal on December 17, 1944, arriving at Tetere Beach. On December 21, 1944, the Division practiced assault landings then reloaded from December 21 to December 23, 1944.



LOADING !!

Back on Guadalcanal … and practicing again, and again, and again ……


Tetere Beach, Guadalcanal
New Caledonia



Today, Tetere Beach is frequented by World War II veterans and Army buffs to see a beachfront littered with the remains of the landing craft used in very large number of training exercises.

After reloading at Guadalcanal, The USAT Shanks would sail the short distance across the Indispensable Strait to Purvis Bay on Florida Island.

Purvis Bay is a deep water protected bay, ideal for ship-to-ship loading and fueling.



As the Navy crew prepared to join the Philippine-bound convoy, Fred Tenore and his buddies would spend another Christmas away from home as the soldiers stayed on board the USAT Shanks on December 24th and 25th, 1944. On December 26, 1944 they departed Purvis Bay for Manu Island in the Admiralty Islands.

Although it may seem that a route from New Caledonia to Guadalcanal then on to Florida Island and Manus Island is an awfully choppy and roundabout way to get to the Philippines, the USAT Shanks was only one cog in a giant wheel that had to come together with precision.

MIKE I: The code-named MIKE I convoy consisted of 164 ships including five battleships, six cruisers, forty-three destroyers, twelve carriers, mine sweepers, tug boats, seaplane tenders, LCI Gunboats, Hydrographic Vessels and numerous Troop Transports. The Japanese in the Philippines were about to meet 203,608 US ground troops.

The major problem amphibious and ground forces commanders face in mounting the assault forces (once shipping limitations had been established) was that of coordinating staging activities at widely separated points. For example, with MIKE I, XIV Corps headquarters, corps troops, and the 37th Infantry Division staged and loaded at **Bougainville** , in the Solomon Islands, nearly 3,000 miles southeast of Lingayen Gulf. The XIV Corps' 40th Division mounted at **New Britain**, 37.5 miles west, 2,000 miles from Lingayen Gulf; its 43d Division was 125 miles to the east at Aitape in **British New Guinea**; and its 6th Division staged at Sansapor, on the Vogelkop Peninsula of western **Dutch New Guinea** (Manus Island) some 625 miles northwest of Hollandia . The 25th Infantry Division of Sixth Army Reserve with Fred Tenore and his buddies had the longest distance to travel, being located on **New Caledonia**, about 1,300 miles south-southeast of Bougainville. The 158th RCT loaded at **Numfoor Island**, 440 miles northwest of Hollandia. Sixth Army headquarters, the 6th Ranger Battalion, and various other Sixth Army units were on **Leyte**, about 500 miles southeast of Lingayen Gulf .



All distances referenced here are straight-line statute miles. (Of course, not one of these groups traveled in a straight line making the journeys that much longer. Fred Tenores journey from New Caledonia was 4,877 actual miles versus 4,033 straight line miles). Service units were loaded for all these places at various times and various Services of Supply bases from Australia to Morotai. Working without personal or super computers with sophisticated planning algorithms or anything else we take for granted today, the staff work involved in coordinating the movement of such widely dispersed units, and in scheduling the arrival and departure of shipping from each staging point, would stagger the imagination of anyone not well versed in the peculiar problems of waging war over the vast reaches of the Pacific.

Convoy MIKE I Steaming Though the China Sea En-route to Luzon

Escorts Protecting the Fleet

Deception: General Mac Arthur's invasion plan for Luzon was being intentionally disguised. While the primary purpose of the earlier seizure of Mindoro was to establish airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb selected targets on Luzon and at the same time protect the assault and resupply shipping en-route to Lingayen Gulf, supplementing this aim was an extensive deception plan to obfuscate Japan's military leaders as they tried to anticipate General MacArthur's next target after Mindoro. This plan was twofold in intent. From a broad strategic viewpoint, it attempted by means of extensive naval operations in nearby waters to direct the enemy's attention to a possible Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan. Tactically, it aimed to undertake such measures as would lead the enemy to believe that the main thrust of any Allied offensive on Luzon would come from the west.

As the first step in the tactical deception effort, one company of the 21st Infantry of the 24th Division moved on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast on 1 January. Other troops of the same regiment then advanced by shore-to-shore movement to Calapan, the main town on northeastern Mindoro, while enemy-held villages on the northwestern side were also cleared. In all of these actions substantial assistance was rendered by organized guerrilla forces. Occupation of Marinduque Island, situated close to southern Luzon's Bicol Peninsula, was the next operation undertaken. On 3 January, a small force of the 21st Infantry landed unopposed at Buenavista, on the island's southwestern shore, and consolidated positions for the establishment of radar installations.

Concurrently with specific ground operations near the southwestern shore of Luzon, additional steps were taken to conceal the Lingayen invasion plan from the Japanese. While United States bombers struck carefully selected targets on Luzon, other aircraft flew photographic and reconnaissance missions over the southwestern region and transport planes made dummy drops over the same area to simulate an airborne invasion. At the same time, Seventh Fleet motor torpedo boats patrolled the southern and southwestern coasts of Luzon as far north as Manila Bay from new bases on Mindoro, and mine sweepers cleared southwestern bays. Landing ships and merchantmen also approached the beaches in these areas until they were fired upon by the enemy and then slipped away under cover of darkness. On instructions from GHQ, the guerrillas in lower Luzon intensified their activities and conducted ostentatious operations designed to divert Japanese attention to the south. Although it is not clear exactly to what extent these deception measures influenced the operational plans of the Japanese Army, it is certain that, in the period during and immediately after the Mindoro assault, the Japanese centered their attention on southwestern Luzon.

Convoy Convergence: The plan called for the coordinated approach of four massive convoys – MIKE I from the west (Fred Tenore's convoy), MIKE II from the east, LOVE II from the north and LOVE III from the south – an incredible logistic feat! MIKE I and Sergeant Fred Tenore would be the main thrust following a preliminary operation by LOVE III to the south on Mindoro. LOVE II and MIKE II would wait in reserve if MIKE I needed assistance.

Japanese Air Defenses on Luzon: There were 48 active airfields on Luzon at the time of the invasion. US fighter planes from the aircraft carriers in the convoy were given the responsibility of destroying and keeping as many of the enemy planes on the ground as possible to protects the convoys and their cargoes of 200,000 men. Things would have gone much worse if not for the superior efforts of the Allied pilots.

The Approach by Sea – Running the Gauntlet:

The convoy, MIKE I, approached from the east passing through the Leyte Gulf and Bohol Sea on January 6, 1945. There was an encounter with a mini-sub and the sub was sunk. From that time on until January 9th, it was pure Hell.

The Imperial Japanese Military realized the Pacific forces were closing in on the Japanese mainland. The Kamakazi Pilots had their orders. Four ships were sunk and thirteen badly damaged by strafing bombs, torpedoes and suicide pilots.

As an infantry troop passenger on a transport, all you could do is wait and pray. It had to be maddening for Segeant Fred Tenore and his fellow soldiers to hear planes, the guns and explosions from their quarters below decks. We they finally emerged from their cells they saw smoke, ships on fire and some disappearing below the waves.

Each of the incidents from both the approach and return routes are shown on this map.



Kamakaze actions at Lingayen Gulf had devastating results but did not stop the assault. All otaled, Fifty-six ships had minor to serious damage with four sunk. Damages or sunk ship included destroyers and destroyer-escorts, minesweepers and transports, heavy and light cruisers, battleships, escort carriers, transport oilers, tank landers, cargo Liberty Ships, landing attack transports, small troop carriers and tugs. 734 servicemen were killed in action and 1,365 were wounded in the attacks before and during the landings.

Kamakaze Pilots Who Are About to Die Salute the Emperor







KAMIKAZE NEAR-MISS (US NATIONAL ARCHIVES)

Lingayen Gulf Losses Buried at Sea

Psychological Warfare

One of the most powerful aspects of warfare is that of psychological manipulation. People are often aware of the brutality and violence of war itself, but they ignore psychological warfare. World War II offers a vivid example of psychological warfare in the way it was employed to target the morale and sentiment of numerous soldiers. The most fascinating means of dissemination was in the form of leaflets that were dropped from bomber planes.

As the Allied Forces locked up the northern Pacific and were successfully working their way across the Southwest Pacific to eventually turn north towards the Philippines, the Japanese began dropping leaflets on American positions in hopes of raising the anxiety of American troops. Anticipating MacArthur's first thrust to be the southern Island of Mindoro (and a correct guess at that), their leaflets described the unbearable conditions there. Although somewhat childish at face value, the one below on the left did reflect their belief that American soldiers were easily frightened and is only one of many acts of phycological brutality that occurred every day.





BEWARE OF THE TRIPLE THREAT!!!

Hi, Joe, I sure hate to be in *your* shoes! Your commander certainly chose a helluva place to land. Don't you know what dangers confront you in Mindoro?

They are the TAMARAOS, the ANOPHELES MOSQUITOES, and the JAPANESE SOLDIERS.

The tamaraos are the fiercest animal on earth, found only in Mindoro. When you march through the jungles, look out! They come at you unawares and you're a dead man before you know what hit you.

The Anopheles mosquitoes are veritable "malaria bombers." And believe me, they don't give a damn when or where they hit. And once hit, you're a goner.

And the Japanese soldiers! They're even worse than the tamaraos or the Anopheles mosquitoes. You should know without my telling you.

By the way, Joe. Mindoro means "mina de oro" or "mine of gold" in your lingo. Dig for some in your spare time. Even if you fail to locate any, the hole will still serve as your grave. So long, pal.

TICKET TO ARMISTICE

USE THIS TICKET, SAVE YOUR LIFE
YOU WILL BE KINDLY TREATED

Follow These Instructions:

1. Come towards our lines waving a white flag.
2. Strap your gun over your left shoulder muzzle down and pointed behind you.
3. Show this ticket to the sentry.
4. Any number of you may surrender with this one ticket.

JAPANESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS

投 降 票

此ノ票ヲ持ツモノハ投降者ナリ
投降者ヲ殺害スルヲ嚴禁ス

大日本軍司令官

Sing your way to Peace pray for Peace

Sometimes the Japanese used sexual images in order to influence Allied soldiers to pick up surrender leaflets.

Landing: On January 11, 1945, the 25th Division landed in the Mabilio area on White Beach 3 and immediately as per plan concentrated in the vicinity of Manaog. The 25th Division including the was held as Army reserve and was not committed to the fighting until 17 January when the 25th Division the 89th Field Artillery with the 161st Infantry was assigned to I Corps.



Sergeant Fred Tenore's first steps on Philippine soil.

LCIs Heading for the Beach



Infantry Heading to the Beaches of Lingayen Gulf – January 11, 1945

Early Wave Landing Craft at Lingayen Gulf



Landing and Under Fire on the Beaches at Lingayen Gulf

Low-Level Bombing Paves the Way

LST Unloads Trucks & Ammunition Under Fire

Gathering Supplies – D-Day +2

Advancing from the Beach Under Fire

Beach Landing - Lingayen Gulf

January 1945 – Unloading Supplies at Lingayen Gulf

-

Bulldozer Work the Beach While the Lingayen Gulf Landing is Underway

Lined Up to Bring Ammunition Ashore – Lingayen Gulf

The Luzon landing operation was announced in a communique of 10 January:

Our forces have landed in Luzon. In a far-flung amphibious penetration, our troops have seized four beachheads in Lingayen Gulf ... The decisive battle for the liberation of the Philippines and the control of the Southwest Pacific is at hand...

General MacArthur is in personal command at the front and landed with his assault troops. His ground forces of the Sixth Army are under General Krueger, his naval forces of the Seventh Fleet and Australian Squadron are under Admiral Kinkaid, and his air forces of the Far East Air Force are under General Kenney. The Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey is acting in coordinated support.

General Douglas MacArthur at Lingayen Gulf – January 9, 1945

The Topeka Daily Capital

AMERICANS LAND ON LUZON

Large Forces Invade Island at 4 Points

Landings at Lingayen Gulf North Of Manila Made With Light Losses; Sixth Pushes Deep Into Flatlands

800-Ship Convoy Carries Troops

Near Nazi Last Escape Route

Yanks Whittle Another Mile Off Belgium Bulge

Sgt. Robert Sloan Killed in B-29 Crash Over China

Kansas Board Of Agriculture Opens Sessions

Holmes to Address Dinner Honoring State Legislators

Joint Session Of Legislature For Schoeppel

New Credit System Is Worked Out for Topeka High School

Luzon's Flat Land Ideal for Open Warfare

First Combat since Early 1944: The 25th Division was ordered by I Corps on January 16th, to secure a line from the village of Pozorrubio, to Urdaneta through Binalonan. The 27th and 161st Infantry were given the mission of liberating all three villages. Both regiments were entering combat for the first time in over a year. The 27th Infantry encountered only light resistance in taking their objective but the 161st ran into stiff resistance as they attacked the village of Binalonan. The 161st turned back counterattacking Japanese tanks and infantry as they secured the village on January 18th.



The 161st was next given the mission of clearing the town of San Manuel of Japanese forces. The Japanese forces were well dug in and determined to hold San Manual. The Battle of San Manuel began with a five-day U. S. Army artillery bombardment of enemy positions and the town in preparation for the assault. Seizing the high ground northwest of the town on January 22nd, the regiment found itself in a fierce fight with a determined foe. The Japanese force consisted of some 1,000 troops supported by approximately forty tanks.

As the 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry supported by Cannon Company (Fred Tenore and the 89th Field Artillery Battalion), 161st Infantry advanced to the edge of the town, the Japanese counterattacked. In extreme close combat the brunt of the attack fell on Company E supported by Cannon Company equipped with self-propelled direct-fire 105mm howitzers. In the two-hour battle Cannon Company destroyed nine enemy tanks as Company E, while sustaining fifty percent casualties in close combat, turned back the Japanese attack. On January 25th the 2nd Battalion resumed its advance into the town led by Cannon Company which destroyed some twenty dug-in enemy tanks and four artillery pieces and some 150 enemy soldiers while the 2nd Battalion inflicted additional heavy casualties on the retreating Japanese forces. The advance required very difficult house-to-house fighting.



89th Field Artillery at luzon

M7 Priest – Self Propelled 105mm Howitzer

On January 26, 1945 in the morning, a dozen Allied M4 Sherman tanks assaulted the area, firing on the remaining Japanese tanks from a safe distance and

M7 Preparing to Fire at Luzon

destroyed most of them. By January 27, 1945 the remaining Japanese tanks were pushed out of the town into the hills and had no escape route. The remaining Japanese resorted to suicide attacks and a Japanese sapper managed to destroy an M7 Priest using a mine attached to a pole and was killed in the blast.

On January 28, 1945 at 1:00am the remaining thirteen tanks attempted a suicidal banzai attack. Their attack failed to break the U. S. line and resulted in the loss of ten tanks with the other three retreating into the hills. By 1:30pm the Japanese defenders abandoned San Manuel after losing all their armor, heavy weapons and 750 Killed-In-Action (KIA) including a Brigadier General and Colonel.

Bonzai Suicied Charge

161st at Binlalonan

Just Before All Hell Breaks Lose

Troops Pass a Dead Japanese Soldier Impaled on a Tree

Taking Out a Sniper Next to a Fallen Comrade

Ducking Heavy Machine Gun Fire

Checking an Enemy Pill Box



Hauling Needed Ammunition Over a Bridge Destroyed by Retreating Japanese

Sharpshooters Fire at Enemy Positions

Clearing a Small Village

Artillery Blasts a Japanese Position

Exhausting Village-to-Village and House-to House Combat

After four days of intense close-combat the 161st Infantry Regiment liberated the town. For their gallantry in the battle for San Manuel, Company E and Cannon Company earned the Presidential Unit Citation.

E Company – San Manuel, Luzon, Philippines – January 28, 1945

Survivor Interrogation - Binalonan Belongs to the 161st – January 28, 1945

The 161st next occupied the recently abandoned village of San Isidro on 6 February. By this date the operation to secure the central plains of Luzon was complete. The I Corps was directed to turn north into the mountains of northern Luzon to attack the main Japanese stronghold. The 161st advanced through Cuyapo and Mapangpang, beginning their thrust north through San Jose, Lomboy and Puncan.

The 25th Division was given the mission of clearing Highway 5 from San Jose north to the village of Digdig. Route 5, in February 1945 a good, two-lane gravel road, runs northeast about four miles through open, flat country between San Jose and barrio Rosaldo, which elements of the 25th Division had taken on 14 February. Near Rosaldo the highway swings northward through a narrow section of the valley of the Talavera River, which changes its name to Digdig River north of barrio Digdig. Three miles north of Rosaldo, at Lomboy, the highway leaves the river and swings north-northeast about seven miles to Digdig, where it drops down a sharp slope back into the river valley. The terrain west of Route 5 between Rosaldo and Digdig is generally wooded and rises steeply from 500 feet at the highway to 1,000 feet within a quarter of a mile of the road. To the east, the ground rises just as sharply, but on this side of the highway much of the terrain is more open and many of the slopes are grassy.



The 25th Division, on 21 February 1945, had discovered two other possible routes of advance northward in its sector. The first was a narrow trail originating at Lupao, on Route 8 nine miles northwest of San Jose, and running eastward across the tough, forested terrain of the Caraballo mountains to Puncan, on Route 5 three miles south of Digdig. The second was an ill-defined trail that originated near barrio Rosaldo and ran north through the same mountains, west of Route 5, to join the first trail near Puncan. On 21 February a battalion of the 25th Division's 161st Infantry was in contact with Japanese outposts along both trails at points about two miles south and southwest of Puncan.

Staging wide flanking maneuvers with both the 35th and 161st Infantry Regiments, the 161st was to strike for high ground overlooking Puncan and clear the ridges west of the road. The 27th Infantry cleared on the east while the 35th Infantry conducted a flanking movement to the enemy rear to cut off their retreat north.

Taking the western ridges was certainly no picnic.

During the period 21 February-5 March the 25th Division lost approximately 40 men killed and 165 wounded. Virtually wiping out the *Puncan Sector Defense Unit,* the division had killed some 1,250 Japanese in the same thirteen days. This disparity of casualties was, in part, due to the exceptionally heavy aerial, artillery, and mortar support, to which captured Japanese diaries gave credit for unusual effectiveness.

Following this heroic effort at Puncan, the Japanese put up only minimal resistance and Highway 5 to Digdig was secure by March 5, 1945.

Continuing North: The 25th was directed by I Corps to continue the advance north on Highway 5. The division maintained the same formation with the 161st west of the road, the 27th on the east side and the 35th leading the attack with an enveloping maneuver to take the town of Putlan. The 35th reached the town on 8 March but was halted when the Japanese destroyed the bridge over the Bonga River and put up a fierce defense of the town. The advance was stalled until 10 March when the 27th and 161st relieved the 35th and cleared the Japanese from the area.



Putlan Bridge





Route of the 161st Infantry



After seizing the town of Minuli on March 12, on March 13, I Corps ordered the Tropic Lightning to continue its successful advance up Highway 5 to seize the town of Kapintalan, then attack through Balete Pass to the town of Santa Fe. The area was a series of rugged ridges and thick forests, making progress against a determined, well-fortified enemy extremely difficult. The Battle of Belete Pass was to prove to be one of the toughest fights the 25th Division faced in WW II, with all three regimental combat teams seeing heavy combat.

The 3rd Battalion of the 161st attacked Hidley Ridge north of Norton Ridge. A heavily defended Japanese position dug into caves on Crumb's Hill stopped the battalion's advance. The battle for the hill was stalemated until the battalion captured the west side of Crump's Hill on 14 April. Reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, the 3rd Battalion then eliminated the last Japanese resistance.

The 1st Battalion of the 161st assaulted Norton's Knob, west of Highway 5 on 15 March 1945. The battalion met heavy opposition from well dug-in Japanese forces. For ten days the battle raged, with the 1st Battalion finally seizing the ridge on 26 March.

Meanwhile, the 35th and 27th Infantry battled to clear Mount Myoko, Kapintalan and Balete Pass. After clearing Crump's Hill on March 30th the 161st Infantry assaulted the Kenbu Plateau west of Balete Pass in support of the overall drive to seize the pass.

By 6 May, the 161st secured the plateau. Three days later, on 9 May, the 161st linked up with the 27th Infantry at Balete Pass, fighting to open the pass for the advance to the town of Santa Fe.

War Memorial at Balete Pass


Fred Tenore & Mike Rossie
April 1945


Fred Tenore & Mike Rossie
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

Have Gun, Will Travel -- 105mm Howitzer


Lowell Junior Wahler, Fred Tenore
April 1945


Dom Castelluccio, Fred Tenore, & Casper the Polack


Sana Fe
Balete Pass
Myoko Mountain
Crumb Hill
Norton's Knob
Kapintalan
Minuli
Putlan on the Bonga River
DigDig
Puncan
Lomboy
San Jose


Sana Fe
Balete Pass
Kenbu Plateau
Myoko Mountain
Crumb Hill
Kapintalan
Norton's Knob
Minuli
TO BALETE PASS AND SANTA FE
25TH DIVISION
12 March – 31 May 1945
MAP 22
Putlan on the Bonga River


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Minuli
TO BALETE PASS AND SANTA FE
25TH DIVISION
12 March – 31 May 1945
MAP 22
Putlan on the Bonga River

Looking Down on Balete Pass

Looking North Through Balete Pass

89th Field Artillery Fires into Balete Pass


25TH DIV TROOPS
CROSS RUGGED TERRAIN
NEAR BALETE PASS


25TH DIV G.I.s ADVANCE
OVER BALETE PASS, LUZON

The Balete Trees of Balete Pass

Sgt. Peter Kostares Mail Delivery to Beleaguered Troops at Balete Pass

Advancing Slowly Under Tank Cover

Cleaning Out Pill Boxes … and More Pill Boxes

Covering Ground Pounded by the Artillery

89th Artillery Fires Into Balete Pass

89th Field Artillery Battalion Hammering the Field for the Next Advance

Another Pill Box Cleared

Japanese Medium Tank Has Seen Better Days

Japanese 2nd Tank Division Type 95 Ho Go Tank Destroyed – No Survivors

Troops Inspecting a Knocked-Out Japanese Tractor

Steady Hand of a 25th Division Sniper

Blasting a Japanese Position with a Flamethrower
[This Was the Most Feared Weapon on Both Sides – Carrying a Flamethrower Made You an Immediate High-Priority Target for Snipers]

Using a Bombed Out Japanese APC for Cover on What is Left of a Village Bridge

Soldiers Giving Space to an LVT

Soldiers Welcoming Cover from and LVT

Artillery Spotters on the High Ground

Finding the Japanese Sniper

Leave No Man Behind

Extricating the Wounded

Watching the Artillery Clear the Area

Bucket Brigade Hauling Ammunition in Difficult Terrain

The Terrain Can Be as Difficult to Fight as the Japanese – 105MM Howitzer Stuck in the Mud

Over the Kenbu Ridge – Almost There

Japanese Retreat Into the Mountains

On 19 May the 25th resumed its drive along Highway 5. The 35th attacked astride the highway with the 27th on the right flank and the 161st advancing on the west side of the highway. On 22 May the 161st turned west to clear the Japanese off of Mount Haruna and then continued north over the Haruna ridge to reach the Villa Verde Trail, west of Santa Fe.



The Japanese lost 7,750 KIA at Balete Pass. The Japanese 10th Division and 2nd Tank Division were finished as effective combat units.

The 25th Division American Soldiers incurred the death of 685, and the wounding of 2,090, between February 21 and May 31, 1945.

Villa Verde Trail

INFANTRYMEN ADVANCE
ON VILLA VERDE TRAIL
LUZON

US TROOPS REST ON HILL #4
NEAR VILLA VERDE TRAIL

Japanese Officer Surrenders His Sword

For the Emaciated Japanese Troops, Their War Is Over Without Honor



Sergeant Fred Tenore (Right)

Japanese Flags: There are three distinctive Japanese flags that would be seen on the battlefield. The first is the traditional National Flag of Japan, a red circle representing the rising sun on a white field.



The second most often seen flag was the Japanese War flag. It was historically used by the Japan's military, particularly the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The design is similar to the flag of Japan, which has a red circle in the center signifying the Sun. The difference compared to the flag of Japan is that the Rising Sun Flag has extra sun rays (16 for the ensign) exemplifying the name of Japan as "The Land of the Rising Sun". The Imperial Japanese Army first adopted the Rising Sun Flag in 1870. The flags were used until Japan's surrender in World War II during August 1945.



The most frequently seen flag is the Good Luck Flag (*yosegaki hinomaru*), a traditional gift for Japanese servicemen deployed during the military campaigns of the Empire of Japan, most notably during World War II. The flag was typically a national flag signed by friends and family, often with short messages wishing the soldier victory, safety and good luck.

The name *'hinomaru'* is taken from the name for the flag of Japan, also known as *hinomaru*, which translates literally as "circular sun". When *yosegaki hinomaru* were signed by friends and relatives, the text written on the flag was generally written in a vertical format radiating out from the central red circle, resembling the sun's rays. This appearance is referenced in the term *'yosegaki'* (lit., "collection of writing"), meaning that the term *'yosegaki hinomaru'* can be interpreted as a "collection of writing around the red sun", describing the appearance of text radiating outwards from the circle in the center of the flag.

Hinomaru normally featured some kind of exhortation written across the top of the white field, such as *bu-un chō-kyū* (武運長久) ("may your military fortunes be long lasting"); other typical decoration includes medium sized characters along the right or left vertical margin of the flag, typically the name of the man receiving the flag, and the name of the individual or organization presenting it to him.

For the military man stationed far away from home and loved ones, the *yosegaki hinomaru* offered communal hopes and prayers to the owner every time the flag was unfolded. It was believed that the flag, with its many signatures and slogans, would provide a combined force or power to see its owner through tough times, as well as reminding the soldier of his duties in the war, with the implication that the performance of that duty meant that the warrior was not expected to return home from battle. Often, departing servicemen would leave behind clipped fingernails and hair, so that his relatives would have something of him in which to hold a funeral.

The belief of self-sacrifice was central to Japanese culture during World War II, forming much of wartime sentiment. It was culturally believed that great honor was brought upon the family of those whose sons, husbands, brothers and fathers died in service to the country and the Emperor, and that in doing one's duty, any soldier, sailor or aviator would offer up his life freely.[2] As part of the cultural samurai or *bushido* (way of the warrior) code, this worldview was brought forward into twentieth century Japan from the previous centuries of feudal Japan, and was impressed upon twentieth century soldiers, most of whom descended from non-samurai families.

This *yosegaki hinomaru* was captured in battle by Sergeant Fred Tenore.



[2] This notion of achieving honor by dying in battle goes back to the soldiers of Sparta who accepted it, however, not as a method of achieving honor but as their duty and mission. When a Spartan soldier went off to war, he too was presented with something from home to take into battle. It was not a flag for encouragement presented by family and friends. Rather, it was a gift and a wish from one person only – his mother. "My son, I give you this shield. Come home with it, or on it."

OK! What's Next?

Break Time !

Except for mopping up actions in support of the clearing of the Old Spanish Trail by the 27th and 35th Infantry in June 1945, there were no further major combat actions conducted by the 161st Infantry before the campaign for Luzon was officially declared ended on 4 July 1945. The 161st was relieved by XXXXX on June XXX, 1945.



Looking Back: Along Highway No. 5, the story of the 25th Division's advance to seize Balete Pass was one of bitter fighting which continued all through March and April, and lasted well into May. There were few battles in the Pacific war which were waged along more formidable terrain. Gen. Joseph J. Stillwell, on a visit to the Balete front, commented, "This seems to be as tough as anything could be.... In Burma it was thick, almost impenetrable, jungle. Here there are cliffs that are almost impossible to scale as well as the worst sort of mountain terrain."

Heavy rainstorms during the latter part of April, flooding already impassable roads, taxed the ingenuity and endurance of the engineers to the utmost. From the end of April to the middle of May, the division made maximum use of aircraft to assist the infantry advance, an average of eighty planes daily flying tactical support missions.

The enemy continued to contest every inch of ground, however, and it was not until 13 May that troops of the 25th Division finally broke through Balete Pass. After long weary weeks of flushing Japanese from their underground burrows, sealing the deep caves, building new roads, and improving old trails, the American forces had finally forced an entrance into the Cagayan Valley. Contact between the 25th and 32nd Divisions was made at Imugan and I Corps began to move on to Santa Fe and into the valley itself.

This union of Divisions at Imugan marked the end of organized Japanese resistance in the Caraballo Mountains Cagayan Valley. General MacArthur announced the end of this operation on 28 June:

> *Our northern and southern columns have joined forces, securing the entire length of the Cagayan Valley, heart of northern Luzon. This juncture climaxes a campaign which overran the 200-mile valley in twenty-eight days. Battered enemy remnants have been driven into the rugged mountain ranges to the east and west cut off from all sources of supply.*
>
> *Except for isolated operations this closes the major phases of the Northern Luzon Campaign, one of the most savage and bitterly fought in American history. No terrain has ever presented greater logistical difficulties and none has ever provided an adversary with more naturally impregnable strongholds.... Our troops comprised the I Corps and the north Luzon guerrillas, all of the Sixth Army, closely and most effectively supported by the Far Eastern Air Force and the Seventh Fleet. The entire island of Luzon, embracing 40,420 square miles and a population of 8,000,000 is now liberated....*



Only General Yamashita's last stronghold, the Kiangan pocket, held on with any semblance of organization. The 37th Division, together with guerrilla units in the area, turned east to mop up enemy remnants in the Sierra Madre Mountains. The 6th Division, assisted by guerrilla units, undertook the task of crushing the enemy forces at Kiangan.

The liberation of Luzon brought the following message from Secretary of War Stimson to General MacArthur:

> *Your announcement that all Luzon has been liberated marks the achievement of a great military success. It has been brought about with a minimum of casualties. My congratulations go to you and to all officers and men in your command for this most skillful and heroic accomplishment.*
>
> *From my own service in the islands and my close association with their government, I have retained a high respect and warm friendship for the Philippine people. They have suffered cruelly under the Japanese occupation. I share their great rejoicing at the liberation of the main island of their commonwealth. Your great victory hastens the day when the last of the oppressors will have cleared Philippine soil.*

For his extraordinary service in the Philippine Luzon Campaign in maintaining an uninterrupted supply of ammunition to the artillery team in the heat of battle, and directing an air-tight perimeter defense that stopped eight enemy intrusions, Sergeant Fred Tenore was awarded the Bronze Star.

The Cost of the San Jose to Santa Fe Campaign

There can be no doubt that the 25th Division, as events turned out, had played the decisive role in the converging drive to Santa Fe, but it must also be made clear that the 32d Division, pinning the *2d Tank Division* to the defense of the Villa Verde Trail, had in large measure made the 25th Division's success possible. The Japanese had, indeed, been forced to send fresh troops to Salacsac Pass No. 1 to hold back the 32d Division even as troops of the 25th Division were climbing the last slope to Balete Pass.

The *Japanese 2d Tank Division* and the *10th Division* (including attachments) lost at least 13,500 men killed, of whom the American 32d Division dispatched about 5,750 in the Villa Verde Trail sector and the 25th Division 7,750 in the Route 5 zone. The Japanese losses in killed alone amounted to nearly two-thirds of the 20,750 or more troops the *Japanese Bambang Branch, 14th Area Army,* had committed to the Route 5 and Villa Verde Trail battles.

U.S. INFANTRY CASUALTIES IN ATTACK TOWARD SANTA FE
21 FEBRUARY-31 MAY 1945

Regiment	Killed	Wounded	Total
32d Division			
126th	195	460	655
127th	350	750	1,100
128th	280	950	1,230
Subtotal	825	2,160	2,985
25th Division			
27th	275	685	960
35th	175	605	780
161st	200	630	830
148th	25	140	165
126th	10	30	40
Subtotal	685	2,090	2,775
Grand total	1,510	4,250	5,760

In late June 1945, the 25th Infantry Division went into. Until 30 June, when the Division was relieved, it carried out mopping-up activities. It had served in continuous combat longer than any division in the Sixth Army and once again went into another period of rest and recuperation. On July 1, 1945, the Division moved to Tarlac, Philippines for R&R and more training before leaving for the occupation of Japan on September 20, 1945.

Luzon Epilogue: Plans called for the Division to take part in the invasion of Japan and exercises for the assault landings were eventually undertaken. But with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war ended, and soldiers of the 25th could land on Japanese soil without taking casualties.

The 161st Infantry entered Japan peacefully, as the regiment had done as the 1st Washington Volunteers after the Philippine Insurrection. The stay of the 161st in Japan, however, would only be slightly longer than its stay in 1899. On 1 November 1945, the 161st Infantry Regiment was inactivated and replaced on that date by the 4th Infantry Regiment.

B-29 Superfortress "Enola Gay" 82, 05.08.1945.

R-DAY (Not V-E or V-J Day but R-DAY!)

In early as mid-1943 as troops were being shipped all over the world, it was becoming obvious that bringing all the Soldiers, Sailors and Marines back home after the war was going to be a huge logistic challenge. The U.S. military was about 12 million strong in 1945, with approximately 3 million Service men and women in Europe.

R-Day was the result of nearly two years of planning by the War Department to develop the most equitable means of discharging troops from service. During this process, scientific polling methods were applied to obtain the opinions of representatives from each of the Army's constituent groups. The response showed that the GIs agreed with Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall that discharge by units, such as divisions, as had been the case in the First World War, would be grossly unfair, since each unit had both short-and long-termers and the former would be released while the latter would wait in frustration.

On May 10, 1945, two days after Germany's surrender, the War Department announced a point system to decide who gets to go home first. Instead of the discharge by unit system, the Army's V-E Day demobilization formula would assign the soldier or airman points in various multiples for service rendered as of May 12, 1945. This total was known as the Adjusted Service Rating (ASR). Each month of service earned a point; each month of overseas service was another point. Combat service was recognized by battle stars affixed to a theater ribbon (European or Pacific), each star adding five points. Each medal for merit or valor and the Purple Heart for wounds earned five points as well. Fathers received twelve points each for up to three dependent children. The Combat Infantryman Badge was not worth anything, leading to much grumbling among the troops.

Campaign participation credits were also worth 5 points each. American participation in the war was divided into 16 separate campaigns, but even the most battle-hardened units only participated in up to nine of these. Finally, each dependent child under 18 years of age was worth an additional 12 points. Moreover, men with three or more minor children could go home regardless of their score. It should be noted that age, marital status and dependents above 18 were not factored into calculating the score.

Initially, a point score of eighty-five or above would qualify one for discharge. Low score men would stay behind for occupation duty in Germany or be sent through the United States for a thirty-day furlough and then on to the Pacific. Construction and engineer units would sail directly for the Pacific with no furlough. Altogether, the Army expected to redeploy three million men to the United States and the Pacific Theater while it discharged another two million by June 1946. Under the best of circumstances, moving large military units was, said a colonel in the Transportation Corps, as "complex as all get out": "You've got a hundred different variables and you've got to be able to rationalize all your variables," and re-rationalize them. General Marshall, who was not given to exaggeration, called redeployment "the greatest administrative and logistical problem in the history of the world."

In addition to stimulating a constant churning of manpower within divisions, the point system threatened to strip units of their most experienced personnel and leaders on the eve of the climatic battles with Japan. This was particularly noticeable in the Philippines where the already battle-weary divisions of the Sixth Army including the 161st Infantry were seeking to replenish troops lost in securing the islands with raw recruits from the U.S. In addition, these same units scheduled for the first phase of the invasion of Japan were about to lose as many as 23,000 veterans who had accumulated 85 points or more.

Although Marshall had aimed for fairness in the discharge process, he soon found the Army under fire from critics at home. Senators complained that the discharge process was too cumbersome and should be replaced by a simple first-in-first-out system. Why not lower the discharge age from forty, asked others?

Parents were beginning to wonder why their sons weren't returning at once; why troops continued to be redeployed from Europe to the Pacific; and why soldiers with no overseas duty were being sent to the Pacific to replace combat veterans.

Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-Colo.) launched a violent attack against what he called Army hoarding. On 5 August, the New York Times ran an article on a letter from Johnson to Secretary of War,Stimson, requesting immediate reduction of the Army. The article, which revealed the extremely critical attitude of the Senator, repeated his statement that there was "a widespread feeling in Congress and in the country now that the War Department is tenaciously holding millions of men it does not need and whom it cannot use."

The War Department, with Undersecretary of War, Robert Patterson, taking the lead, refused to break faith with the soldiers by altering the discharge system. Patterson had found the public's commitment to sacrifice on the home front wanting throughout the war. Now he sensed that public opinion was settling on the prospect of economic reconversion and the loosening of wartime restraints. He dug in his heels and repeatedly rejected calls by the heads of civilian agencies to furlough soldiers needed for railroad work, mining, and other industries in need of skilled labor.

Robert Porter Paterson

Points!

As hostilities were winding down in the Pacific and the 161st Infantry was being relieved in late June of 1945, Sergeant Fred Tenore had more than enough points to go home even though the war with Japan had not yet ended. As a matter of fact, with four campaign stars his point total was 115.



CHART II

ADJUSTED SERVICE RATING CARD

Name TENOLE, FRED — Army Serial No. 12028925

Unit 89 FAB3 — Arm or Service A

Primary Mil. Occupational Specialty: Title ARTILLERY — SSN 5753

Type of credit:

Type of credit	No.	Multiply by	Credits
1. SERVICE CREDIT No. of months in Army since Sept. 16, 1940	47	1	47
2. OVERSEA CREDIT No. of months served overseas	46	1	46
3. COMBAT CREDIT No. of decorations and Bronze Service Stars	2	5	10
4. PARENTHOOD CREDIT No. of children under 18 years old	0		0

TOTAL CREDITS 103

READ INSTRUCTIONS on reverse side before filling card out.

CERTIFIED BY Rodney T. McCathur

Form Engrs. No. 246—8717



Instructions for filling out ADJUSTED SERVICE RATING CARD

DETERMINE ALL CREDITS AS OF THE DATE OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN EUROPE. Write the proper number for each type of credit in NUMBER column. Multiply this number by the figure on the same line in the MULTIPLY BY column, and write the resulting figure in the CREDITS column. Add all figures in the CREDITS column to obtain the TOTAL CREDITS.

SERVICE CREDIT AND OVERSEA CREDIT. After determining the number of whole months, give credit for an additional month if you have 15 or more days left to your credit. Oversea service means any service outside of continental limits of the United States, including Alaska. It begins on the date of leaving a POE and ends on the date of arrival at a port in the United States.

COMBAT CREDIT. Include the first and each additional award of the following only: MEDAL OF HONOR, DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS, LEGION OF MERIT, SILVER STAR, DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS, SOLDIER'S MEDAL, BRONZE STAR MEDAL, AIR MEDAL, PURPLE HEART, and BRONZE SERVICE STARS (Battle Participation Stars). No other awards or ribbons will be included.

PARENTHOOD CREDIT. Credit will be given for children under 18 years of age as of date of cessation of hostilities, but will not be allowed for more than three children.

Going Home

Although his contract with the United States Army stipulated, "… unless extended for the duration of fighting during times of war," with his four years of service, most of which was overseas, he had more than enough time in to go home.

By early July, Sergeant Fred Tenore was back in Guadalcanal waiting on the docks at Honiara for his ride home. **USS *Elizabeth C. Stanton* (AP-69)** was the lead ship of her class of Second World War United States Navy transport ships, named for the suffragist and abolitionist Elizabeth Cady Stanton. After overhaul at New York, *Elizabeth C. Stanton* sailed for the Pacific on 4 January 1945, and arrived at Espiritu Santo on 23 February. Assigned to redeploy troops in the central and southern Pacific, she sailed from Pearl Harbor to the New Herbides, Marianas, Marshalls, Solomons, Carolines and Okinowa Gunto.



General characteristics	
Class and type:	*Elizabeth C. Stanton*-class transport
Displacement:	7,980 long tons (8,108 t) light 14,909 long tons (15,148 t) full
Length:	492 ft (150 m)
Beam:	69 ft 6 in (21.18 m)
Draft:	28 ft 6 in (8.69 m)
Propulsion:	Steam turbine, single shaft, 8,500 hp (6,338 kW)
Speed:	18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)
Complement:	429 officers and enlisted
Armament:	1 × single 5"/38 caliber gun 4 × single 3"/50 caliber guns

The Stanton left Guadalcanal with 79 casualties, one Red Cross Member, nine Army Officers, 6 Navy Officers, 313 Army Enlisted men and 484 Navy Enlisted men.

On June 26 at Dock 3 on Grand Quay in Noumea, New Caledonia, more passengers would board with no one debarking. Now in peaceful waters, the Stanton sailed to San Francisco averaging 15 knots, arriving on July 11, 1945.

After four long years and four Christmases away from home, Sergeant Fred Tenore stepped back on American soil.

Operation Magic Carpet: Fred was lucky that he traveled home before the Japanese surrender on August 16, 1945. The crush of military personnel returning from Europe after the surrender of Nazi Germany in May exacerbated by the shift of resources from the European to the Pacific Theaters, had already overwhelmed available transportation capacity. 7,730,000 military personnel needed to be demobilized. When Japan surrendered and Operation Magic Carpet began, every available space on every available ship was packed with humanity. Breakdowns caused major upsets. There were riots and mutinies by 20,000 US troops packed and waiting to get home for Christmas when told their voyage had been cancelled. While most were told they could be home by Christmas of 1945, the last soldiers repatriated by Operation Magic Carpet were not home until August of 1946.

Even after stepping on US soil, it was “hurry up and wait” at debarkation points, repatriation centers, military travel stopping points and separation centers. You might be back on US soil but you were still weeks or months from being back at home in civilian clothes.

Separation Centers

Separation centers were not the cold impersonal disassembly lines one would imagine. Several personal guidelines were considered at all times. Before individuals were returned to civilian life, center operators attempted to bring the separate-e face-to-face with the realization that their home communities were probably changed by war, and that their own interests also may have changed. Men wishing to use Army-acquired skills in civilian life were informed how these skills could be used. Each separate-e was provided a record of his military experiences to help him get a job. Those with handicaps or physical limitations, who needed rehabilitation or development of a proper mental outlook, were given counsel. Thus, those operating the centers guided soldiers from the world they knew before the war into the post-war contemporary world. This was the humanitarian approach followed during the maximum 48 hours allotted each individual prior to his release from active service.

The system was set up none too soon. Separation activities steadily increased until it seemed they would be overwhelmed by the hordes of troops returning from the war. Separation Center 26, which had begun operations at Dix in April 1944, processed only 323 men that month. The volume slowly increased, and at the year's end, 38,554 officers, enlisted men and WACs had been separated. This number was but a trickle preceding the later flood.

There were twenty-two designated Separation Centers by April 11, 1945:

SEPARATION CENTERS ARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY INDICATING AREAS SERVED

(Source: RR 1–2, 11 Apr 45)

Separation center	*States served*
Camp Atterbury, Ind.	Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio
Camp Beale, Calif.	California (north of 35th parallel of latitude)
Camp Blanding, Fla.	Florida
Ft. Bliss, Tex.	Arizona, New Mexico, Texas (west of 100th parallel of longitude)
Ft. Bragg, N. C.	North Carolina, South Carolina
Camp Chaffee, Ark.	Oklahoma
Ft. Devens, Mass.	Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont
Ft. Dix, N. J.	Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
Ft. Douglas, Utah	Utah, Idaho, Nevada
Camp Gordon, Ga.	Georgia
Camp Grant, Ill.	Iowa, Illinois
Jefferson Barracks, Mo.	Missouri, Arkansas
Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.	Kansas, Nebraska
Ft. Lewis, Wash.	Oregon, Washington
Ft. Logan, Colo.	Colorado, Wyoming
Ft. MacArthur, Calif.	California (south of the 35th parallel of latitude)
Camp McCoy, Wis.	Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota
Ft. McPherson, Ga.	Alabama
Ft. Meade, Md.	District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia
Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.	Texas (west [*sic*] of 100th Parallel of longitude)
Camp Shelby, Miss.	Louisiana, Mississippi
Ft. Sheridan, Ill.	Michigan (Upper Peninsula), Wisconsin

Sergeant Fred Tenore's repatriation journey began the day he stepped off the USAT Elizabeth C. Stanton at Pier 7 in San Francisco sometime after the day it docked on July 11, 1945. Just getting off the ship was an unpredictable affair. Next came repatriation with more paperwork to review and to prepare including travel orders through several military facilities and eventually to the Separation Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey - Fort Dix! In and out the same door for Fred Tenore.

Back in New Jersey in what would be remarkably fast time when viewed a few months later, he could see the light at the end of the tunnel.

This was the tunnel:

A man entered the demobilization stream when he reported at the Arrival Station, officially known as Incoming Records Section of the Enlisted Men's Record Branch. The Arrival Stations operated on a 24-hour basis throughout the entire period, employing hundreds of civilians and enlisted men and women under the supervision of five officers. Among its other facilities the Arrival Station had a snack bar where men got coffee, milk, doughnuts, and sandwiches before they assembled to be briefed on the separation

procedure. At this assembly the soldiers completed the first in a series of WD (Discharge) forms and then proceeded to the Initial Clothing Shakedown Section at which place they were relieved of all unauthorized government clothing and equipment. The Clothing Shakedown Section, like the Arrival Station, operated on a 3-shift basis, facilitating the rapid processing of the discharge-es. This is where the men were separated from their "War Trophies".

War Trophies *- The problem of war trophies gave the separation center personnel cause for much extra work. Certain items were authorized to be kept by discharge-es, provided they had the items certificated by their commanding officers before leaving their units. It was discovered, however, that many troops kept unauthorized articles -and even had no certificates for those which could have been authorized. Various reasons were offered by the men for this situation. Some of them claimed that they had known nothing about the arrangement to have trophies checked; others complained that officers were either too busy or not available to do the job. Whatever the reasons, the result was that unauthorized items showed up everywhere, and it was discovered that soldiers were throwing these trophies out the train windows as they approached camp, hoping to pick them up later without censure. Roadbeds had to be searched daily in order to pick up these discarded articles. Those who legally retained weapons were warned to register them with local police after discharge.*

From the Clothing Shakedown Section, separate-es were transported to their assigned processing company. Separation Companies, usually divided into five units - Orderly Room, Billeting, Supply, Mess, and Operations Sections - was in charge of all casual personnel processing for discharge. Separate-es were fed, billeted, issued passes and furloughs, and kept informed by the company. Roster leaders from Operations Section, trained in separation procedure, conducted each group to formations, the first of which was an orientation lecture giving the details about separations, information regarding the facilities of the camp, and a pep talk about re-enlisting.



The fourth step in the separation process was the final physical examination. Separation Centers devoted multiple barracks-size buildings to this purpose - most for actual examinations and some
in which to keep records. With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, Fort Dix took on a new prominence. During that year, the Separation Center expanded and became the largest in the nation with a personnel center capacity of 24,560 as compared to most others with well under 10,000 capacity. “R” (Redeployment) Day, 12 May 1945, was a notable date at Fort Dix when more than 2,000 troops in process for overseas shipment were screened for eligibility and placed in the separation stream. In order to separate as many eligible men as possible that day, all military and civilian personnel who could be spared were put to work in the Separation Center. Separations on R-Day were given worldwide coverage by news and motion picture services with two national radio hookups. In total Fort Dix would discharge 508,069 personnel is 1945 alone.



While in the Medical Processing Branch men were not only examined thoroughly but their complete medical history was made a matter of record. Should a man require further examination, he was sent to the Tilton General Hospital, a huge sprawling complex adjacent to Fort Dix.

The last step in the medical examination was a final check at which time a board of four medical officers, one of whom was a psychiatrist, made the decision as to whether or not a man was fit for discharge. At this point men filed their disability claims.

Having passed his physical examination a man was ready to go through the fifth stage of the separation - counseling. The Army had instituted counseling to assist the soldier in making a smooth transition to civilian life, to make known to him his rights and benefits as a veteran, and to offer vocational and educational guidance. At Fort Dix, the counseling system was divided into enlisted men's and officers' sections with each section housed in buildings consisting of a general orientation room, an individual booth capacity of fifty, a library, a civilian agency office, and an administrative office. The original group counselors for enlisted men rose into the hundreds (plus officer counselors) at the height of separation activity. Counselors at first were graduates of The Adjutant General's Counseling School and had had experience in the work at other separation centers. When the demand for additional counselors became great, schools and on-the-job training courses were

established and men with high AGCT scores, personnel experience, and college educations were enrolled.

Although formal counseling was the fifth step in being discharged, counseling of sorts had been going on all the time. Men had already been apprised of the benefits they could expect under the GI Bill of Rights, the actions discharge-es must go through in civilian life, and what to do about their National Service Life Insurance. With this information in mind, the soldier could approach his counselor with intelligent questions and could assimilate the new facts he learned.

When the soldiers were brought to the Counseling Branch, they were first given a quick summary of what they could expect there and were impressed with the importance of cooperating as much as possible - for their own good. After the brief orientation, soldiers passed to the counseling booths for individual attention. There particular emphasis was placed on filling out the Separation Qualification Record, with an account of all military and civilian education, training, and experience; and the rest of the interview dealt with awards, various GI rights, and job opportunities for returning veterans.

In addition to the Army counselors, there were representatives on hand from civilian agencies, such as Red Cross, U. S. Employment Service, and the Veteran's Administration, to answer questions and give advice. At all times an effort was made to have current information so that it would be as useful as possible to the veteran.

The Awards and Decorations Section of the Counseling Branch issued Good Conduct Medals to qualified troops, gave detailed information regarding all medals, awards, and decorations, and prepared medals for presentation at the Departure Ceremony.

The clothing issue warehouse and tailor shop operated under the Post Quartermaster's supervision. The clothing issue warehouses were set up so that a man could enter at the side of the building; and then, proceeding down a guide rail, he collected the various items of clothing that were coming to him. A checker stood at the end of the line, making sure that the separate-e had received the proper things. From this point the man continued to the near-by tailor shop for any necessary alterations, pressing, or sewing, which usually took no more than ten or fifteen minutes. Sometimes a soldier was of such extreme size that he could not be provided with proper clothing immediately, in which case it was forwarded to his home as soon as possible.

At the Initial Clothing Shakedown separate-es were relieved of all unauthorized items, and this process was repeated at the Final Clothing Shakedown, with men's uniforms being checked for

neatness and fit also. Should any alteration, pressing, or sewing be required, the separate-e received a priority slip entitling him to these services as soon as his discharge was complete. Luggage was tagged for storage at this point until after the final ceremony.

The final step in the separation procedure was the departure ceremony. At this assembly the War Department had an opportunity to express in a dignified way its gratitude to the civilian soldiers for their service and to help them leave with a feeling of pride in themselves for doing a good job. Military and religious significance was given to the occasion by having both a field grade officer and a chaplain in charge. Begun with an invocation by the chaplain, the ceremony continued with a talk by the officer, who gave the soldiers a few pointers about returning to civilian life. At the same time the discharge-es were praised for their loyal service in the Army and were given a pep talk on being good Americans when they became civilians again. When the speeches were concluded and decorations issued, the separate-es filed past the officer in charge to receive their discharge certificates, the last step in the separation process.

And so it ended. The 33,626 mile journey to Hell and back was finally over.

July 27, 1945, just sixteen days after coming down the gangway, Sergeant Fred Tenore with a ruptured duck neatly sewn to his chest was finally ……

HOME !

Army of the United States

Honorable Discharge

This is to certify that

FRED TENORE 12 028 925 SERGEANT

BTRY A 89TH FA BN

Army of the United States

is hereby Honorably Discharged from the military service of the United States of America.

This certificate is awarded as a testimonial of Honest and Faithful Service to this country.

Given at SEPARATION CENTER
FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY

Date 27 JULY 1945

E. B. NELLIS
MAJOR, INFANTRY

Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
with 4 stars and
issued at Newark Recruiting Main Station
PO Bldg., Newark 2, NJ on 21 July 47

ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
HONORABLE DISCHARGE

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL	2. ARMY SERIAL NO.	3. GRADE	4. ARM OR SERVICE	5. COMPONENT
TENORE FRED	12 028 925	SGT	FA	RA

6. ORGANIZATION	7. DATE OF SEPARATION	8. PLACE OF SEPARATION
BTRY A 89TH FA BN	27 JUL 45	SEP CTR FT DIX NJ

9. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES	10. DATE OF BIRTH	11. PLACE OF BIRTH
482 S 10TH ST NEWARK NJ	7 JUL 21	NEWARK NJ

12. ADDRESS FROM WHICH EMPLOYMENT WILL BE SOUGHT	13. COLOR EYES	14. COLOR HAIR	15. HEIGHT	16. WEIGHT	17. NO. DEPEND.
SEE 9	BROWN	BROWN	5-8	185 LBS	0

18. RACE	19. MARITAL STATUS	20. U. S. CITIZEN	21. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND NO.
X WHITE / NEGRO / OTHER (specify)	X SINGLE / MARRIED / OTHER (specify)	X YES / NO	BAKERS HELPER 7-99 210

MILITARY HISTORY

22. DATE OF INDUCTION	23. DATE OF ENLISTMENT	24. DATE OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE	25. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE
	26 MAY 41	26 MAY 41	NEWARK NJ

SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA	26. REGISTERED	27. LOCAL B.D. BOARD NO.	28. COUNTY AND STATE	29. HOME ADDRESS AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE
	YES X NO			SEE 9

30. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY AND NO.	31. MILITARY QUALIFICATION AND DATE (i.e., infantry, aviation and marksmanship badges, etc.)
CHIEF OF AMMO SECTION 844	NONE

32. BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS
CENTRAL PACIFIC, GUADALCANAL, NORTHERN SOLOMONS. GO 33 WD 45 AS AMENDED LUZON

33. DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS AMERICAN DEFENSE SERVICE MEDALWITH BRONZE STAR, ASIATIC PACIFIC SERVICE MEDAL, GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL GO 3 HQ 89TH FA BN APO 25 9 APR 45, PHILIPPINES LIBERATION RIBBON GO 23 HQ USAFFE 3 FEB 45 WITH BRONZE STAR

34. WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION
NONE

35. LATEST IMMUNIZATION DATES YF 18 JUN 41

SMALLPOX	TYPHOID	TETANUS	OTHER (Specify)	36. SERVICE OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S. AND RETURN: DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	DATE OF ARRIVAL
15NOV42	21DEC43	28SEP42	CH 9 NOV 44	21 JUN 41	ASIATIC P TH	27 JUN 41
			TY 15 NOV 44	19 JUN 45	USA	22 JUL 45

37. TOTAL LENGTH OF SERVICE						38. HIGHEST GRADE HELD
CONTINENTAL SERVICE			FOREIGN SERVICE			
YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS	
0	1	0	4	1	2	SGT

39. PRIOR SERVICE
NONE

World War II Victory Medal issued at 1202d ASU Rctg Det #3, Rm B-31, 50 Bldg, Newark 2, NJ, on 28 Oct 47 CMB

40. REASON AND AUTHORITY FOR SEPARATION CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT RR1-1 (DEMOBILIZATION)
AR 615-365 15 DEC 1944

41. SERVICE SCHOOLS ATTENDED
NONE

42. EDUCATION (Years)

Grade	High School	College
8	0	0

PAY DATA

43. LONGEVITY FOR PAY PURPOSES			44. MUSTERING OUT PAY		45. SOLDIER DEPOSITS	46. TRAVEL PAY	47. TOTAL AMOUNT, NAME OF DISBURSING OFFICER
YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS	TOTAL	THIS PAYMENT			
4	2	2	$ 300	$ 100	NONE	$ 3 15 1/2 2	H M FIX MAJ FD

INSURANCE NOTICE

IMPORTANT: IF PREMIUM IS NOT PAID WHEN DUE OR WITHIN THIRTY-ONE DAYS THEREAFTER, INSURANCE WILL LAPSE. MAKE CHECKS OR MONEY ORDERS PAYABLE TO THE TREASURER OF THE U. S. AND FORWARD TO COLLECTIONS SUBDIVISION, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

48. KIND OF INSURANCE			49. HOW PAID		50. Effective Date of Allotment Discontinuance	51. Date of Next Premium Due (One month after 50)	52. PREMIUM DUE EACH MONTH	53. INTENTION OF VETERAN TO	
Govt. Serv.	U.S. Govt.	None	Allotment	Direct to V.A.				Continue	Discontinue
X			X		31 JUL 45	31 AUG 45	. 6.55	X	

54. RIGHT FOREFINGER IMPRESSION

55. REMARKS (This space for completion of above items or entry of other items specified in W. D. Directives)
LAPEL BUTTON ISSUED.
American Defense Service Medal with
1 star and Clasp
issued at 1202d ASU Rctg Det #3, Rm B-31,
PO Bldg., Newark 2, NJ, on 27 Oct 47

56. SIGNATURE OF PERSON SEPARATED: Fred Tenore

57. OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO SIGN (Type name, grade and organization - signature): 1ST LT QMC E. J. Mathews

WD AGO Form 53-55
1 November 1944

This form supersedes all previous editions of WD AGO Forms 53 and 55 for enlisted persons entitled to an Honorable Discharge, which will not be used after receipt of this revision.

RECEIVED
REGISTER'S OFFICE
AUG 21 1 30 PM '45
COMPARED BY 33 & 30
ESSEX COUNTY
NEWARK, N.J.
RECORDED IN BOOK G OF HONORABLE DISCHARGES OF VETERANS ON PAGE 90

George Strickland
REGISTER